

**Documents And Notes  
On  
The Arab-Israeli  
Question**

**BY  
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# Dedicated

To

The valiant freedom-fighters of Palestine for their heroic resistance to foreign domination and struggle for liberation of their land and restoration of their democratic human rights.

And

To

The leaders of the Arab World and others backing the Palestinians' struggle for liberty, right and justice among whom President Gamal Abd-al Nasser of UAR, President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, President Ahmad Hussan al Bakr of the Republic of Iraq, King Hussein of Jordan, President Charles Helou of Lebanon, King Hussan II of Morocco, President Dr. Nureddin El Attassi of Syria, Emir Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah of Kuwait, President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, President Ismiel El-Azhari of Sudan, President Abdul Rahman El Iriyani of Yemen, King Idris El Sanussi of Libya, President. Quhtan El Shaabi of Southern Yemen and Prime Minister Marshal Kim Il Sung of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea occupy a pre-eminent position.

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# INTRODUCTION

Truth and justice form the basis of all that is good and enduring in human society. Disregard for them results in discontent, strife and war. The Arab-Israeli question constitutes a live proof of that.

The Arab-Israeli Question—in essence the Palestine Question—raises five fundamental issues of principle of concern to the whole mankind. These are :

(1) The status of Palestine on the termination of Mandate in May 1948 and the right of its people, more than two-thirds of whom were Arabs in possession of 90 per cent of the land, to shape their destiny as a free Arab nation in accord with the principle of right of self-determination of people stated in the Charter of the United Nations.

(2) The competence of the U.N. General Assembly to recommend and enforce, the partition of a country against the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants and the consequent invalidity or otherwise of its resolution on the partition of Palestine with economic union and internationalized city of Jerusalem adopted on November 29, 1947.

(3) The right of the people of Palestine to strive for the restoration of their rights and the independence of their land, refusing to accept Israel as a permanent entity in the Middle East.

(4) The propriety of a nation invading another in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations to impose conditions for vacation of its aggression and its attempt to gain national advantage by military adventure.

(5) The duty of the United Nations to suppress acts of aggression, prevent racial and religious discrimination and bring about compliance with resolutions which was made a condition precedent for the admission of a nation—as Israel—to the United Nations.

Article 1 of the Charter of the U.N. states the purposes of the U.N, *inter alia* to be "suppression of the acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with principles of justice and international law adjustment or settlement of international disputes". Under Article 2 Member Nations undertake to "settle their international disputes in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered."

Israel's persistent defiance of the U.N. resolutions, its insistence on direct negotiations and new international borders in a peace treaty before implementing Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 calling for its withdrawal from Arab lands, and its refusal to implement General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 11, 1948 on the refugees' right to repatriation and compensation while admitting Jews one and a half time their number since 1948, as also racial and religious discrimination practised by it against the Arabs, constitute a serious challenge to the whole world and especially to the authority and prestige of the U.N. Twice since its admission to U.N. Israel has committed—in 1956 and 1967—unprovoked, wanton aggression against Arab States and tried to put military gains to its national advantage. There could be no better case for application of sanctions under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter to compel Israel to comply with U.N. resolutions and its obligations under the Charter.

The Security Council is empowered under Art. 39 to take measures to restore international peace and Security. It is high time that it uses this power and invokes provisions of Art 41 to recommend severance by Members of diplomatic, economic and communication relations with Israel. Art. 42 of the Charter authorizes use of armed force also if measures under Art. 41 fail to compel compliance with U.N. decisions by an aggressor nation. Israel's conduct renders it liable to immediate expulsion from U.N. membership.


Peace and justice are inseparable. Truth becomes the first casualty in war and might has justice as its first victim. There can be no knowledge without truth. Fifty years of Zionist and 20 years of Israeli propaganda have tended to confuse the basic issues involved in the question. This book is an attempt to put the whole issue in its proper perspective. I hope it would, in some measure, contribute to a proper understanding of the problem and its resolution in accordance with principles of justice, equity and international law.

Readers are cordially invited to send in their suggestions for improvement in the present work which will be gratefully acknowledged in the coming editions.

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
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


**Partition Plan**

**Area occupied 1956**



**Area occupied 1967**



*Note : Shaded area denotes Israeli occupation.*

## GROWTH OF JEWISH POPULATION IN PALESTINE

Year	Total no of Jews	Israel's Population
1882	30,000	1948— 770,000
1919	65,000	n. Jews—125,000
1929	157,000	1951—1,577,000
1934	283,000	1954—1,717,854
1939	446,000	1957—1,975,954
1944	525,000	1961— 2,232,300
1946	630,000	1965—2,525,600
1948	646,000	1966—2,700,000
		n. Jews—410,000

### Population of Israel And Occupied Territories After 1967 Aggression According to Israelis

Total population of Israel and Arab Territories occupied	3,750,000 (Jews 2,365,000, Arabs and others 1,385,000)
During 1967 Aggression (from Syrian heights To Suez)	

A census conducted by Israel put the population in East Jerusalem (Jordan territory) at 65,857, and in West Bank at 597,000. Some 53% of Arabs were under 15.

The annexationist intent and expansionist aims of Israel are reflected by it referring to Israel as "including the re-unified city of Jerusalem" and Arab territories occupied in its aggressive war as 'territories which came under its administration.'



## CHAPTER I

### Palestine - The Land, Its History And People

Looking like a scabbard and a sheath on the world map and serving as such at different stages in world history, Palestine, with an area of 10,435 square miles, has occupied a place of great strategic importance throughout the ages being a communication link between the three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe.

The name Palestine (called "*Falastin*" in Arabic and "*Erets Israel*" in Hebrew) is derived from the word Pleshet meaning the land of the Pleshetim or Philistines who came from Crete on the southern shore of Asia Minor and occupied the southern coastal parts of the country in the 12th century before Christ. Called Philistia at first, it was given the name of Palestina-Syria in the second century A.D. as the southern portion of the Roman province of Syria. Ottoman authorities who wrested the land from the Mamelukes of Egypt in 1516-17 stopped using the very name Palestine at the time of Egyptian occupation (1832-40). With the stabilisation of the Sultan's Asian provinces through the edicts of 1864 and 1871, the territory was divided into three Sanjaqs or districts : Acre, Al Balqa (Nablus) and Jerusalem, the first two attached to the Province of Bayrut and the last to that of Syria. After 1887 Jerusalem was given an independent status, like that of Lebanon, and became the direct charge of the Ministry of Interior of the Ottoman Empire. The name Palestine, however, persisted in the Jewish and Christian tradition as comprising the land of the Bible and in the Muslim Arab tradition forming part of a loosely defined, non-political geographic area called Al-Sham, the older name for Syria. In both the Judaeo-Christian and Arab traditions it thus remained a flexible geographic concept shifting with specific periods in history under reference. The name Palestine was revived and got a distinct politico-geographic entity when the British got the mandate to administer the land under Article 22 of the Charter of the League of Nations after the second world war. Today the entire land is in the forcible occupation of the State of Israel. Before the 1967 Israeli aggression against the Arabs, Palestine as

a result of U.N. General Assembly's resolution of Nov. 29, 1947, comprised parts of Israel, Jordan and Egypt. A major portion went to Israel. The portion between Jordan River and Israel became part of Trans-Jordan in May 1950 and another 150 square miles of territory came under Egyptian rule. The land is known as holy land by the Christians as Jesus Christ was born and taught there. Jews and Muslims also have some of their holiest places located in the land, some of them on the common spot. The proverbial extent of the Holy Land, as mentioned in the Bible, was from Dan to Beersheeba.

One hundred and fifty miles long and 80 miles wide, Palestine has six distinct geographic regions, namely the Plain of Acre, the plain of Esdraelon or Megiddo, the hill-country of Galilee, Samaria, the high plateau of Judaea and the Jordan Valley. Syria and Lebanon touch its boundary in the north, Transjordan and Egypt in the south-east and south-west respectively, River Jordan runs along its border in the east, and the Mediterranean Sea forms its western coastal border line.

The plain of Acre comprises the most northerly of coastal lowlands and is five to nine miles wide for 20 miles from Ras en Naqura (the ladder of Tyre) in the north to Carmel promontory in south where it is only 200 yards in width. Southward it opens out rapidly into the eight-mile plain of Sharon extending south to the latitude of Jaffa. The maritime plain widens still more, upto 30 miles at the widest, into the fertile region of Philistia, a district of rich orange groves, irrigated orchards and fields of grain. The chief citrus fruit district lies in its sandy central portion. The plain of Esdraelon marks off the hills of S. Galilee from the mountains of Samaria. The maritime plain links up with the plain of Esdraelon through the pass of Megiddo and several lesser routes between the mountain spurs of Carmel and Gibboa. Its 16-mile width narrows down to north-west where River Qishon breaks through to the plain of Acre and to the south-west where the modern river Jalud, rising in the well of Harold, carves the valley of Jezreel into the Jordan Trough.

The hill country of Galilee is better watered and more thickly populated than Samaria or Judaea. The upper Galilee, lying north of the plain of Asochis, is a scrub-covered lime-stone

plateau with Mt. Jarmac, 3965 feet, as Palestine's highest mountain. It is thinly populated and has served as a place of refuge for men of all kinds throughout the ages. Lower Galilee in the south is a land of east-west ridges enclosing sheltered vales like that of Nazereth. Its highest mountain rises upto only 1929 feet.

Samaria comprises the region of the ancient Kingdom of Israel. It is a hilly district extending from the plain of Esdraelon to the latitude of Ram Allah. Easily approached over the hills of Ephraim from the coast and by the Faria valley from Jordan, Samaria has more gently contoured basins than those in Judaea, notably those of Dothan (Shahb Arraba), and Nablus (Shechem), but its mountains, Carmel, Gibboa, Ebah and Gerizim, are lower in height than those of upper Galilee.

The high plateau of Judaea extends from Ram Allah in the north to Beersheba in the South. It is a rocky wilderness of lime-stone with rare patches of cultivation at Bira and Mount Hebron. Separated from the coast by longitudinal fosse and a belt of low, soft, chalky lime-stone hills, the Judaeian plateau descends sharply to the Jordan trough approached with difficulty along the wadis of Kelt and Mukallik.

The Jordan trench covers a deep rift valley varying in width from 1.5 to 14 miles. In its northern section lakes Hule (Huleh, Hula) and Tiberias (sea of Galilee blocked by natural dams of Basalt) fall to about 1290 feet below sea-level. It is an extremely dry and over-heated region with cultivation restricted to areas around rare oases such as at Jericho or at Engedi by the shore of the Dead Sea.

Beyond the Jordan trough, the high edge of the Arabian Plateau captures considerable rainfall. Below Mt. Hermon the high volcanic table-land of Bashan and hills of Gilead are lands of oak forests and cattle pastures. Further south rolling uplands of Ammon and Moah are drier but have cultivation practised. Israeli occupation of all these lands east of Jordan in Biblical times was precarious because of pressure of nomadic tribes from the desert.

The uplands of Palestine were originally forested but even in antiquity got seriously depleted. Overgrazing by flocks of goats and general aridity of the area prevented the forests from regenerating.

naturally. A severe soil erosion was the natural consequence. The upland soils washed down on to the coastal plain, blocked its natural drainage, created swamps and spread Malaria forcing a majority of the people in the 17th and 18th century to settle down in the mountains leaving naturally fertile plains uninhabited and uncultivated. The remaining soil on cultivation terraces in the mountains and in the plain is fertile. Orchards of olives, figs, apricots and plums, grapes and cereal crops in small, sometime minute, fields and often in double planting and wheat fields under olive trees, constitute the usual type of cultivation in Palestine. Extensive olive groves provide a substitute for forests in Palestine, especially the fine old groves of Galilee and the smaller groves in various parts of Samaria, Judaea, Er Ramle and Gaza on the coastal plain.

The eastern flank of the uplands is everywhere steep and high and in eastern Judaea comprises a very rugged country called the ancient wilderness of Judaea. South of the Beersheba basin the northern Ngev rises to 3,965 feet. The southern Ngev is a limestone plateau in the north but has harder crystalline rocks in the southernmost part. Although forming 47.5 per cent of the total land-area of Palestine, Ngev supports only 3 per cent of the population. The area, however, has an enormous potential for development if arrangements for irrigation could be made.

The Rift valley covers the entire length of Palestine east of the mountains. The lowest point on the earth's surface is located in its central part which is entirely below sea-level. The only lakes or seas of the country are also situated there. These are waters of Merom, 230 ft above sealevel, Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) 680 feet below sealevel and the Dead Sea 1280 feet below sealevel, all of them linked by the country's only sizable river, Jordan, which rises at the feet of Mount Hermon and courses 200 miles to join the Dead Sea. The two northern lakes are fresh-water lakes but the Dead Sea water is extremely saline. The soil of the inner part of the Jordan valley also becomes saline halfway between Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea. A successful reclamation project was carried out at Beit-ha-Arrava by washing away the salts in the soil with the waters of Jordan river and preparing it for high quality vegetable production. The southern part of the Rift Valley, between the Dead Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba is known as El Jeib, or Wadi el Arabba, a narrow

valley 106 miles long with the highest point 690 feet above sea-level

Palestine belongs to the zone of Mediterranean climates with four seasons : winter from December to February and Summer from mid-June to mid September with two transitional seasons in between. The Summer is warm and moist along the coast, maximum temperature averaging 85 fh, but a daily sea breeze mitigating its rigours. In the uplands it is also warm but they have a refreshing breeze and less of humidity. The Rift Valley has the highest maximum temperature average of 103 fh which makes it really hot and trying. The winter is moderately cool and temperature some times falls below freezing points at places. Rainy spells interchange with breaks of fine weather. The transitional seasons are characterized by alternating periods of dry and hot weather with cool, cloudy and rainy spells. The highest temperatures are recorded, especially inland, during the transitional periods.

Many kinds of domestic cats originated in Palestine and Syria. Leopards are still found in Galilee. Jackals and foxes abound the neighbourhood of the rural settlements. Rapid development of fish ponds has caused a marked increase in the number of Otters. The country abounds in several species of hare. On the dunes and in the Rift valley several kinds of jerboa are common. Voles and gerbils among the steadily increasing small rodents, cause considerable damage to the crops.

Many species of birds stop for rest in Palestine, specially in the Jordan valley, during their annual exodus from upper Egypt to Europe. Many remain there during the mild winter and others breed in summer. The birds of prey resident in the land are the imperial and several other eagles, buzzards and harriers, falcons, griffons and Egyptian vultures. Ducks, gerbes and plovers stop over in winter and storks are abundant on their passage in spring and autumn.

Palestine also has different species of snakes. The Mediterranean Levant viper, Ehfa in desert environment and the horned cerasters in the sandy soils of the South are venomous. Among the many non-venomous snakes the most common are the Syrian Black snake (upto seven feet long), the coin-marked snake and the whip snake.

Dorothy Garrod was the first to examine the Palcolithic era of Palestine. Her excavations of caves on the slopes of Mount. Carmel

revealed that the Palestinian human remains were of the same group as those of Neanderthal inhabitants of Europe. A succession of industries and fauna for the Middle and upper Paleolithic were found. The finds showed that the country was culturally linked with Europe.

Overlying the Paleolithic deposits was found a succession of Mesolithic levels with the finds having a basic similarity of culture with those of the same period in Europe but with marked regional differences, which gave the culture the name of Natufian. The people lived in caves like their predecessors but experimented in agriculture. They built sanctuaries and the archaeologists put the date of 7800 B.C. on the one found at the base of Jericho tell. Occupation on open sites was revealed in the excavations of 1950.

The succeeding stage at Jericho is that of permanent occupation but with a population that lived in flimsily-sheltered houses more suitable to nomadic existence. Neolithic solidly-built houses come as the next development at Jericho. Single-roomed like those of the primitives, but with solid walls of mud and brick, they constitute a marked advance in construction. Houses were built on 10 acre sites and some 2,000 to 3,000 people lived in single settlements with defensive stone-built towers around. A tower dating back to 7,000 B.C. and 30 feet in height has also been discovered. The civilization of the period practised irrigation and engaged in agriculture. The period was followed by a spell of retrogression. Huts appeared on ruins although the people were a little advanced over the earlier ones since they used pottery.

Transition from the Neolithic to Chalcolithic period took place in Palestine between 5,000 and 4,000 B.C. Excavations at Teleilat Ghasul reveal that the people inhabiting the land called Ghaussulians had pottery, used flint and developed a copper and ivory industry around Beersheba.

Bronze Age saw the growth of fortified Towns and development of fine harbours. The Egyptian Kings sent expeditions northward to conquer the Asiatic coast, control its commerce and obtain timber, metals and other raw materials. It was in this area that the Egyptians exchanged goods with the Babylonians. By the middle of the second millennium B.C. the admixture of two civilizations with some

### *Palestine-Bronze Age*

Minoan additions gave birth to a rich complex society along the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. Fortified towns and fine harbours sprang up all over the place. Walled cities, such as Jerusalem, appeared inland along the caravan routes. The place was inhabited by nomadic and semi-nomadic Semites such as Amorites, Canaanites, Arameans and Hebrews whose lives are vividly portrayed in the accounts of Biblical Patriarchs, particularly Abraham and Jacob. The period also saw the appearance of tombs for individuals in place of those for hundreds as had been the practice before this age.

The Middle Bronze Age provides the background for the old Testament. An urban civilization based on Agriculture flourished. A new people, few in number at first, had also arrived between 2,000 to 1550 B.C.

The Late Bronze age saw Palestine as part of the area under control of Hyksos Kings of Egypt. The Egyptian conquest of Palestine began around 1550 shortly before the death of the New Empire's first native Pharaoh, Ahmose I, and was completed during his successor's regime. The Palestinians raised the standard of revolt during the reign of Queen Hatshepsut (1503-1482 B.C.) but the rebellion was ruthlessly crushed by her successor, Thutmose III, who established a firm administration which continued throughout the reign of his immediate successors. The period between 1450-1350 B.C. is known as Amarna Age and is illustrated by hundreds of cuneiform letters found at Tell el Amarna, Capital of the Heretic King, Ikhintion. The Mittani menace to Phoenicia and southern Syria upto 1375 and the Hittite's threat to the region thereafter explains the Pharaoh's special concern for Palestine which was as poor then as in the early twentieth century.

The Israeli hill tribes occupied most of Transjordan and the western Palestine in the closing decades of the 13th century B.C. Egyptian rule was completely eliminated during the period of anarchy that followed the last of the weak Kings of the 19th dynasty. The Israelis became firmly established in the land only in the early decades of the 12th century B.C. The conquest of Canaan by the semi-nomadic Hebrew tribes already in Palestine greatly augmented their number. Canaanites were still entrenched in the plain of Esdraelon and could have probably reconquered the area under the unorganized Israeli clans. But the great invasion of the sea people in the early

decades of the 12th century B.C. prevented that. Philistines were among these invaders from the Aegean basin who were to conquer the entire country within 150 years of their first settlement in the southern coastal plain. Three other people also had, before the Israeli invasion, begun settling down in the Transjordan, Edomites in the south, Moabites east of the Dead Sea, and Ammonites on the edge of the Syrian desert. Considered as fellow-Hebrews by the Israelis, they remained polytheists until the end of the Old Testament.

Their monolithic faith, and constant attacks launched by neighbours, bred Israeli unity and ultimately Saul became King of All-Israel in 1020 B.C. after several attempts at one-man rule had failed earlier. He defeated the Ammonites and the Philistines but died in battle against the latter (1000 B.C.). His successor was David who crushed the Philistines and brought under his control the three Hebrew States of Transjordan who were the subjects of the Philistines. Following the intervention of Arameans from Syria he attacked and defeated them and annexed the states of Aram upto the borders of Hamath on the Orontes. He also established some sort of control over the Syrian nomadic tribes upto Euphrates. He patterned his administration after the Egyptian model and conducted probably the first census in the country.

The reign of Solomon, 973 to 933 B.C., marks the culmination of Israeli political history. He lost control over the outlying territories conquered by his predecessor, but brought great economic prosperity to his country by organizing the economic life of the nation and by bringing in rich products of Africa through expeditions to Ophir. He extended his trade relations with the Arabs as far as up to Yemen, developed copper mines of Edom and set up refineries at Ezion Geber (modern Tel el Khaleifa) on the Gulf of Aqaba. He also built magnificent buildings such as the Royal Palace in Jerusalem and the Temple, as well as numerous fortified towns and chariot cities, the best known of the latter being Megiddo where excavations revealed stables for 400 horses. Heavy levies were imposed even on Israelis who were also conscripted into labour gangs since the vast royal building operations cost much more than the money brought in by the foreign trade and by tribute from the vassals. After the king's death the people of northern Israel rose up in revolt and set up an independent kingdom which lasted for 200 years sharing



worships of the Yahweh and the Mosaic tradition with its smaller southern neighbour Judah. Intermittent warfare between the two forced king Asa of Judah to enter into an alliance with the growing kingdom of Damascus under which Damascus attacked Israel to relieve pressure on Judah and captured its Transjordan territory north of the Yarmuk river. Long series of wars between Damascus and Israel followed. They ended only with the capture of Damascus by Assyrians in 732. The ninth century B.C. under the Omrides is the best known period of Israeli history. Omri, the founder of the dynasty, selected Samaria as his capital and built magnificent royal buildings and erected elaborate defences. His son Ahab engaged in complex international manoeuvres and became, alternately, the hero and villain of principal stories told by the great prophets, Elijah and Elisha, who lived in this period. Capture by the Assyrian King Tiglath Pileser III of Arpad in northern Syria in 740, spelt the doom of western independence. Israel and Judah paid tribute to Assyria for the first time in decades in 738. Five years later the Assyrians devastated Gilead and Galilee and turned the whole land into their provinces except for western Manasseh and Ephraim. Aram ceased to exist as a separate State on the capture of Damascus in 732. Finally the Assyrians under Sargon II took Samaria in the first months of 721 B.C. and Israel became extinct as a political entity. Its population was deported to various parts of the Middle-East as far north as Caucasus. The Kingdom of Judah lasted till 586 B.C. After the capture of Israel, Hezekiah (715-686), assured of Ethiopian aid, tried to resist but was defeated and compelled to pay a crushing tribute. Only a timely epidemic killing most of the Assyrian Army saved Judah from total devastation. Isaiah restored the morale of people through his eloquent guidance. Another strong King Josiah arose in 640 to bring back, during his 31 years of rule, much of the ancient territory of Israel under the control of Judah. When the Assyrian capital Nineveh was destroyed by the Medes (the neo-Babylonian Empire, Chaldea) the subject people celebrated their deliverance with a joy reflected by Ezekiel in his writings. Josiah's successful rebellion ended when he fell in battle against Necho of Egypt, a powerful contender for succession to the Assyrians.

Meanwhile the Chaldean kings of Babylonia had rapidly gained in strength. Nabopolassar of Babylon and Cyaxares of Media divided the old Assyrian empire between themselves and Nebuchadrezzar

son of the former, conquered Syria and Palestine in quick succession. Egyptian intrigues with the local people were foiled. The last king of Judah, Zedekiah, was deported with most of his people to Chaldea in Babylonian captivity. Jerusalem was twice besieged in 597 and 589 and was finally stormed and destroyed around 587. However when Cyrus II of Persia defeated the Chaldeans, the things began to look well again for the Jews. He ordered the restoration of Judah and building of the Temple by a decree in 538. Some 40,000 to 50,000 Jews were allowed to return. The second Temple was finally built by 516. The Persians allowed considerable autonomy to the Hebrews who maintained their theocratic rule through High Priests and developed a distinct Jewish literature. Alexander's conquest in 333 B.C. left the arrangements concerning them unaltered.

After Alexander's death the Ptolemies of Egypt and Selucids of Syria rivalled with each other to gain control of Palestine for its wealth and for its importance as a commercial outlet for the Asiatic hinterland. Ptolemy gained control of Syria and Palestine. His successor ruled it till 200, leaving much of the power and authority in the hands of the local chieftains. In 200 B.C. Palestine came under Seleucid rulers. The Book of Daniel was written during this period, prophesying incorrectly the end of Antiochus and the Seleucid rule. The reckless haste with which Antiochus IV Epiphanes attempted to Hellenize the Jews provoked a popular revolt under the leadership of the Maccabeans or Hasmoneans in 167 B.C. The Syrian armies were driven out of Palestine and an independent kingdom re-established. The Hasmonean Rulers allied themselves with the Roman Empire but later became its vassals. Pompei took Palestine for Rome in 64 B.C. and Roman rule lasted till 70 A.D. It was treated as a dependency of Rome. King Herod was called King of Jews but real power lay with the Roman Procurators such as Pontius Pilate who, backed by Romans legions, maintained a firm control over Palestine. As a land bridge between Euphrates River and the Mediterranean and also between Egypt and Asia Minor, Palestine was densely inhabited by an industrious artisan and agricultural population. During the height of Roman Empire it was truly 'a land flowing with milk and honey'.

Following the Jewish revolt of A.D. 66 to 70 and the destruction of Jerusalem, the province recovered its economic position within the

Roman Empire. In 132 the Jews, under Akiba ben Joseph and Simon Bar Cochba, staged a second revolt which Dio Cassus calls 'as no small one, nor shortlived'. However by 134 Jericho was destroyed, Bethlehem devastated, Jerusalem barred to the Jews and many Jews sold as slaves. In the 3rd century much of Palestine became populated with non-Jews Greeks, Arabs, Gauls and North Africans, among whom Christianity gradually spread. The country recovered and the area south of Beer-sheba and the Dead sea became intensely cultivated with 30,000 in Gaza engaging in winding silk thread coming from the orient by way of Aqaba. Conversion of Constantine I to Christianity ushered in a new era of prosperity for Palestine. The Emperor built his residence and the seat of Government on the Bosphorus. He built a magnificent church on the site of the Holy Sepulchre. His mother Helena built two others at the place of the Nativity at Bethlehem and, of the Ascension in Jerusalem, while his mother-in-law built one at Mamre. St. Helena's miraculous discovery of the place of the Holy Sepulchre, the three crosses and the scroll with Pilate's inscription, made Jerusalem once again the Palestinian metropolis. The Holy Land attracted large numbers of pilgrims from all over the world and hundreds came to live as hermits in the wilderness of Judaea.

Until 614 when the Persian King Khosrau II sacked Jerusalem, the city along with most of Palestine was a place of sanctuary for Christians and centre of wealth and luxury. There were many monasteries in and about Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth.

Most of Syria and northern Palestine fell to the Arabs under their first Caliph Abu Bakr (632-634) but Jerusalem resisted capture till 637 when his successor, Caliph Omar, entered the city clad in a garment of camel's hair. The Arabs did not molest the Christians or their holy places. They, in fact, recognized the site of the Temple and Mosque of Omar was built over the Unhewn Stone considered by Prophet Mohammad as a holy spot second only to Mecca. Few Jews were to be found in the land and most of these either drifted away or were converted to Islam. Palestine experienced a century of relative calm and prosperity between 661-750. Caliph Abd-al-Malik (685-705) built on the sacred site in Jerusalem the incomparable Dome of the Rock and its accompanying Aqsa mosque. The Ommiad capital was also in the nearby Damascus. But this spell of prosperity and

good fortune came to an end with the supplanting of the Omriad dynasty by the Abbasid Caliphs (750-1258) who shifted their capital to far off Baghdad

For the next three hundred years Palestine remained a minor province of a big Muslim empire. Byzantines under John IZIMISCES occupied Palestine in 974, causing rejoicing over their deliverance among the Christians, but the Muslims returned upon his death two years later. Muslims, however, treated the Christians with consideration and exhibited no religious fanaticism and took few reprisals. Islam at that time was openly divided by the Shia and Sunni struggle and Palestine became the scene of their bitter rivalry. The Selejuk Turks as the champions of the Sunni sect subdued Palestine in 1072 and held it for the next quarter century. The Turkish hostility towards Christians and the hazards confronted by the pilgrims to the holy lands, became the immediate cause of the crusades preached by Pope Urban II at Clermont, France in 1095.

The first crusade reached Syria in 1097 and Jerusalem fell after a valiant defence by Muslims on July 15, 1099. The crusaders indulged in reckless pillage, arson and slaughter in the city for full one week. Most of the Jews were herded into the principal Synagogue which was then set ablaze. Some 10,000 Muslims were butchered in the holy area of the Dome of the Rock. After the carnage the Muslims were ordered to leave the city. Godfrey of Bouillon was invested as Advocate of the Holy Sepulchre and was succeeded upon his death in 1100, by his brother, Baldwin, who became the first King of Jerusalem. The Latin kingdom set up a feudal system and lasted till 1187 when the Muslims, reorganized under Saladin, regained Palestine at the battle of Hattin and formally entered Jerusalem on October 1. This brought on the third crusade, 1189-1192, which failed to capture Jerusalem and gave up Palestine as lost to the West. Several decades later Emperor Frederick II, leading the sixth crusade, took Jerusalem and succeeded in obtaining for the Christians the right to visit and reside in the Holy city as also in much of the rest of Palestine. Peaceful relations between Muslims and Christians were shattered in 1244 by the Khorezmiar Turks from Central Asia overrunning the country and sacking Jerusalem. Palestine was again over-run by the Mongols under Halaku in 1260. But the

Mameluke Sultans of Egypt recovered the area, bit by bit, during the next three decades and the epoch of the crusades ended when the last of them was driven out of Acre under the reign of Al Ashraf on May 18, 1291.

From 1291 to 1516 Palestine remained a province of the Kingdom of the Mameluke Sultans of Egypt. It was a dark age in Palestine's history. Tartars led by Tamurlane (Timur) carried death and destruction throughout the land in the fourteenth century. Frequent earthquakes levelled the walls of many cities and also damaged the churches. Trade and commerce were practically non-existent. The fourteenth century also saw the return of Jews expelled by France. They came to settle in Jerusalem, Er Ramle and other cities. German and Spanish Jews came during the 15th century. By 1522 Jewish population totalled 4,000.

Sultan Selim I of the Ottoman Turks defeated the Mamelukes in 1516 at Marj Dabiq and annexed Palestine and Syria as part of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman rule continued over Palestine, except for a brief spell of nine years, till it was conquered by the British forces during world war I.

The nine-year period between 1831 and 1840 marked the beginning of modern Palestine. A quarrel over compensation between Mohammed Ali of Egypt and Sultan Mohd. for Egyptian efforts in the Greek revolution made Mohd. Ali in 1831 send his son Ibrahim to invade Syria and Palestine which, by a treaty in 1833, were ceded to Egypt. Ibrahim introduced an efficient administration, welcomed Western ideas and ways and treated Christians and Jews as equal with Muslims. He allowed the Christian missionaries to establish many schools which paved the way for modernization of the land. In 1838 Edward Robinson, American Biblical scholar, laid the foundations of modern Biblical archaeology and Sir Moses Haim Montefiore visited the land on behalf of Jewish interests. Sir Moses, the Rothschilds, Albert Cohn and other wealthy Jews contributed large sums to settle Jews in Palestine and ameliorate the life of those already there. The era came to an end in 1840 when by a concerted action, Britain, Austria and Russia forced Ibrahim to return Palestine to the Ottoman's chaotic misrule. They also

secured from the Sultan the right to establish consulates and foreign settlements in Palestine. Great advances in archaeological studies were made in all parts of Palestine under the British Palestine Exploration Fund, the French Institut and the German Deutscher Palestine Verein.

In 1867 the first of the Temple or the second Adventist Colonies was founded near Nazareth. This colony by 1913 had 2,000 members. It introduced new agricultural methods. About the same time another group called Spaffordites settled in Jerusalem forming the nucleus of the American Colony north of the city which was reorganized in 1881 under the rule of theocratic communism. But real increase in the country's population came through Jewish immigration from Russia and Romania. The earliest of Jewish settlements was established by the Russian Jews in 1882. Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa received most of the new-comers and new suburbs sprang up outside the city walls. Almost all of them, whether Christians or Jews, depended on foreign charity. Towards the end of the 19th century Baron Rothschild and Hoveveizion began to subsidize agricultural settlements which numbered 22 in 1900. The Ottoman rulers became fearful of the immigrants as they continued to retain foreign citizenship and enjoy foreign protection and tried in 1888 to ban further Jewish immigration into Palestine. The European powers, however, exerted strong pressure on the Sultan to refrain from taking any such measure. The Jewish population had risen from 10,000 in 1839 to 24,000 in 1882. By 1895 they totalled 47,000 and their figure further rose to 85,000 in 1914. The total population of Palestine in that year was estimated by official Ottoman sources to be 600,000 of whom some 89 per cent were Muslims, 10 per cent Christians, and one per cent Druzes. Neary half of the Christians belonged to the Greek orthodox church. A little over 40 per cent were Roman Catholics, equally divided among the Latin and Eastern (uniate churches) The two most important groups numerically were the Greek Catholic (Melkite) and Maronite, the remainder were attached either to the Syrian orthodox (Jacobite) church or to different other Protestant churches.

Cultural revolution in Lebanon led to Arab nationalist awakening in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. By 1914 the

movement gained in intensity and embraced Syria and Iraq. The Christian Arabs joined their Muslim compatriots in demanding full political autonomy for the predominantly Arab provinces and Arab participation, on terms of equality with the Ottomans, in the Imperial Government. The Ottomans, it may be stated, had already given a good measure of religious, cultural, and quasi-political autonomy to the minority communities such as Christians, Jews and the Druzes, each administered locally by its clerical leaders and having an officially accredited spokesman at Constantinople. Although on the eve of World War the nationalist societies in the Arab world had a few Palestinians among their members, no organized nationalist movement emerged in Palestine until after the war.

The persecution of Jews in East Europe, specially in Russia, swelled the trickle of Jewish immigration into a flood after 1882. Almost all the earlier immigrants settled in the four Holy Cities Jerusalem, Hebron, Jaffa and Tiberias. The first Zionist conference in Basel in 1897, pledged to create a home for the Jewish people in Palestine by public law, injected politics into immigration and made the Jews spread to other cities and rural areas to facilitate attainment of that objective. The Zionist organization set up a number of national agencies to promote, supervise, and service Jewish settlement in Palestine. They entered into quasi-diplomatic negotiations with European powers and the Ottoman Empire to secure support for their objective. The World War provided a golden opportunity to the Zionists to secure, on Nov. 2, 1917, the Balfour Declaration supporting the establishment of a national home in Palestine in return for their promise to secure Jewish support for the Allies and the American intervention in the war on their side. War considerations had earlier made the British promise independence for the Arab States of the Ottoman empire to Sherif Hussein of Mecca in 1915-16. They had also, at the same time, entered into an agreement with France and Russia on the partition of the Ottoman empire between themselves. The three different pledges given by the British were mutually contradictory but succeeded in rallying the support of the parties concerned on their side which helped the Allies greatly in defeating the enemy. The Soviet Government released the Sykes-Picot agreement at the end of 1917 and summaries of the Hussein McMahon correspondence appeared in the Press soon after the war but the full text was not officially released until March 1939.



At the end of the first World War, the Palestine population, in 1919, stood at 700,000 of which 568,000 were Muslim Arabs, 74,000 Christian Arabs and others and 56,000 Jews. The British had captured Jerusalem in December 1917 and the rest of the country by October 1918. The country was hard hit by the ravages of war, epidemics, and famine.

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, signed in June 1919, recognized the provisional independence of the Arab provinces of the Turkish Ottoman Empire subject to the assistance of a mandatory to be selected in consultation, with the communities concerned.

Britain's duplicity in its dealings with the Arabs fired their intense nationalistic feeling. Muslim-Christian Associations came into being in Palestine demanding complete independence for the country. In July 1919 a General Syrian Congress held at Damascus and attended among others by delegates from Palestine, adopted a resolution demanding complete independence for the Arab provinces, rejecting the Balfour Declaration and electing Emir Faisal, son of King Hassein Ibn Ali of Hejaz, as King of United Syria including Palestine. King Faisal was, however, deposed by the French in July 1920. The King-Crane Commission sent by U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson, to Palestine to ascertain the wishes of the local people regarding final settlement, reported that the Zionists contemplated dispossession of the Arabs from their land and that 72 per cent of 1350 petitions received by the Commission were anti-Zionist. The Commission recommended serious modification of the extreme Zionist programme.

The age-old cordial relations between the Arabs and the Jews received a serious blow from the Zionists' anti-Arab intentions. On Easter Day in April 1920, anti-Zionist riots broke out in Jerusalem in which five Jews were killed and 200 injured. An official inquiry commission attributed the riots to Arab resentment over non-fulfilment by the British of their pledge of Arab independence. The Administration came to an end in July and Sir Herbert (later Viscount) Samuel took over as the first High Commissioner at the head of the Civil Administration.

Announcement in August 1920 by Britain of a quota of 165,000 for Jewish immigration in the first year, evoked bitter opposition from the Arabs and gave a spurt to Christian-Muslim Associations through-



out the land to put up stiff resistance to the plan. Fresh anti-Zionist riots broke out in May 1921 resulting in the death of 46 Jews and injuries to 146. The outbreak of the riots was, by an official commission of inquiry, attributed to Arab fear of being swamped by Zionist immigration. The violent Arab resistance resulted in securing the issuance of British Statement of 1922 clarifying that the whole of Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish National Home and that the Jewish immigration would be limited by the economic absorptive capacity of the country. The statement also promised a Legislative Council. But the Arabs rejected the proposals since the Jewish immigration had a definite political objective which was not altered by applying an economic criterion thereto.

In July 1922 The Mandate for Palestine was approved by the League of Nations appointing Britain as the Mandatory power. The Balfour Declaration was included in the preamble and the mandatory was enjoined upon, under Article 2, to place Palestine under such political, administrative and economic conditions as would ensure there the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the development of self-governing institutions. In September 1922 Trans-Jordan, although a part of the Mandate, was excluded from the application of the Balfour declaration. The Mandate officially came into force on Sept. 29, 1923.

Attempts by the British to win Arab support by offers, first of a Legislative Council, and then of an Arab Agency, made in 1923, failed. For the next six years, however, relative quiet prevailed in the land because of fall in Jewish immigration. In 1927 more Jews left Palestine than came in and in 1928 the two-way traffic accounted for a net Jewish immigration of only 10 persons. Agreement, in August 1929, on the enlargement of the Jewish Agency to incorporate non-Zionist Jewish sympathisers throughout the world, caused alarm among the Arabs while giving new sense of confidence to the Jews. The tension was responsible for catapulting a dispute over religious practices at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem into serious riots in which 133 Jews lost their lives and 339 were hurt. The Arab casualties, mostly as a result of the Army firing at them, stood at 116 dead, and 232 wounded. An official inquiry attributed the riots to the fact that the Arabs had come to see in the Jewish immigration 'not only a menace to their livelihood but a possible overlord of the future'. Sir John

Hope Simpson reported in October that no margin of land was available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants.

The British Colonial Secretary in a statement in October 1930, accorded priority to Britain's obligations to the Arabs but barely three months later his Prime Minister, Ramsay Macdonald, sent an explanatory note to Chaim Weizmann who had resigned Presidency of the Jewish Agency in protest against the statement, which meant reversion to 1922 policy.

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Delegates from 22 countries attended a Muslim Congress in Jerusalem in December 1931 and forcefully outlined the dangers of world Zionism. A boycott of the British and Zionist goods was called in 1933. The Nazi accession to power in Germany the same year, and persecution of the Jews, brought in a virtual flood of new immigrants to Palestine. Thirty thousand came in 1933, 42,000 in 1934 and 61,000 in 1935, although a majority of them still came from outside Germany. The Arab political parties in November 1935 unanimously demanded a ban on further Jewish immigration and land transfers as also the immediate introduction of democratic institutions. A month later Britain offered a 28 member Legislative Council comprising 14 Arab (both Muslims and Christians), and 8 Jewish members. The Zionists bitterly opposed the proposal as an attempt at freezing their National Home by giving constitutional stranglehold to the Arabs. The support for the Zionist cause during the debate on the Bill in the House of Commons from all sides, embittered the Arabs and ignited the long-smouldering Arab revolt into an open rebellion.

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An Arab Higher Committee was set up by the Arab Political parties in April 1936. Al Haj Amin Al Hussain, the Mufti of Jerusalem, was elected as its President. The Committee gave a call for general strike which evoked massive response from all quarters and lasted six months, to be called off only at the request of Heads of neighbouring Arab States. The Arab rebels, joined by the volunteers from the neighbouring States, took to the hills and by the end of the year the rebellion assumed nation-wide dimensions and continued well into 1939.

A Royal Commission of Inquiry, headed by Lord Peel, attributed the revolt to the Arab desire for independence and fear of the Jewish National Home. The Commission in its report, published in

July 1937, held that the British obligations to the Jews and the Arabs were mutually irreconcilable. It recommended partition of the country and setting up of a Jewish State from which the Arabs should be transferred to non-Jewish regions. If the mandate were to be continued, political social and psychological factors, besides the economic factors, should weigh in regulating the Zionist immigration which should not exceed 12,000 annually for the next five years. While the Zionists exhibited an ambivalent attitude to the proposals the Arabs were justifiably alarmed and horrified at the prospect of dismemberment of the country and forcible dispossession from their homelands and, in consequence, the revolt increased in intensity during 1937 and 1938, despite extensive British military operations and outlawing, in 1937, of the Arab Higher Committee, and deporting most of its members, except Hazi Amin and a few others who escaped arrest, to the Seychelles Island.

The League of Nations in 1937 authorised Britain to work out a plan for the partition of Palestine. A technical commission, however, reported against that as the number of Arabs would almost equal that of the Jews in the proposed Jewish State. Britain called for a round-table conference in London in 1939. The Arab revolt gradually diminished thereafter. The Arabs took years to recover from the effects of their defiance of the British authority. Casualties suffered by the various parties since 1936, but excluding 1937, are conservatively estimated at 3,112 Arabs killed and 1,775 wounded. Besides, one hundred and ten Arabs were hanged and another 5,679 were held in detention in 1939. One hundred and thirtyfive Britishers were killed and 386 wounded. The Jewish casualties stood at 329 dead and 857 wounded.

No agreement was reached at the 1939 London conference. But a new statement of policy was announced permitting 75,000 Jewish immigrants during the next five years after which new immigrations would require Arab acquiescence. Land transfers were to be permitted only in certain areas and complete independence for Palestine was promised to be considered after 10 years. Arab mistrust of the British prevented them from accepting the proposals while the Zionists gave expression to feelings of shock and alarm at this betrayal of the Balfour Declaration.

The Jewish National Home had, however, made remarkable progress since 1918. The Zionist colonies increased in number from 47 to about 200. The Jewish land-holdings between 1922 and 1930 rose from 148,500 acres to 383,500 acres and the Jewish population now stood at 445,457 (30 p.c. of the total) against 83,790 in 1918. Tel Aviv had developed into an all Jewish city of 150,000 and 80 million sterling of Jewish capital had been brought into the country. The outbreak of the war prevented the discussion of the white paper by the League of Nations.

During the second world war the Zionists made concerted preparations for the establishment of a Jewish State. The 1942 Biltmore congress openly declared it as its objective. Underground organizations like Haganah, sponsored by the Jewish Agency, and Irgun Zvai Leumi, formed by a dissident group, had been set up well before the war and had conducted attacks on the Arabs and the British. A third splinter group called Sternists, came into being during the war which, along with Irgun, was responsible for the 1944 murder of Lord Moyne, the British Minister of State, in Cairo. Haganah also joined in attacks on the British in 1945. Britain, meanwhile, extended the five-year term fixed for Jewish immigration, as 32,000 of the 75,000 immigration certificates had remained unused. The Jewish industry also benefited a great deal from the war and some 27,000 Jews who had enlisted in the British forces, provided the nucleus for the success of Zionist design on Palestine. The Zionists engaged in theft of arms from Middle East installations. In 1944, an election year, they succeeded in winning the support of the United States for their objectives. President Truman urged the British Prime Minister in August 1945 to permit immediate entry of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. In December of the same year the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives recommended unrestricted Jewish immigration to the extent of the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine.

The Arabs had remained quiescent throughout the war. The formation of the Arab League in March 1945, however, revived Arab demand for conversion of Palestine into an Arab State. The League called for boycott of the Zionist goods in December 1945.

The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, in November 1945, announced the formation of an Anglo-American Commission of

inquiry. The Jewish immigration, pending the report, would be allowed at the rate of 1,500 per month beyond the 75,000 limit set by 1939 white-paper. The Commission, in 1946, recommended immediate admission of 100,000 Jews, repeal of 1940 land laws, and the continuation of the mandate. It criticised the Jewish underground forces estimated at 65000. Britain stipulated the disbandment of the Jewish underground for implementation of the proposal on immigration which was backed by President Truman. A plan for provincial autonomy for Arabs and Jews, worked out between Britain and the U.S.A. in June 1946, formed the basis of discussion between Britain and the Arab and Zionist representatives later.

The Zionists, meanwhile, engaged in smuggling in large-scale illegal immigrants into Palestine closely coordinated with attacks by the underground. On July 22, 1946 a part of the King David Hotel was blown up resulting in the death of 91 British Military and civil personnel who had their offices there. The Arab Heads of State, in 1946, reaffirmed the Arab character of Palestine and held out threats to jeopardize the British and U.S. interests in the Middle East if the Arab rights in Palestine were disregarded.

Unwilling to take stern action against Zionists, Britain referred the question to the U.N. in February 1947. A U.N. Commission of inquiry recommended on August 31, 1947, partition of country into Arab and Jewish States with economic union and an international zone for Jerusalem. The U.N. General Assembly, by its resolution of Nov. 29 1947, endorsed the plan. The resolution was opposed by all the Islamic, Asian and African countries. It could be adopted only because of U.S. agreement with the U.S.S.R. on the partition of the country and strong pressure, coupled with threats of withholding aid, exercised by the U.S. on its allies in Asia and Latin America. A Syrian proposal to refer the question whether the General Assembly was competent to partition a country against the wishes of the majority of its people, there were 1,269,000 Arabs and 678,000 Jews then, was narrowly defeated. The resolution allotted roughly 55 per cent of Palestine to the Jewish State although the Jews held only 8 per cent of of the total land in the country. Arabs violently opposed the proposal. Britain refused to share the administration with the Palestine Commission which was to function during the transitional period and set May 15, 1948 as the final date for the termination of the Mandate.

The U.N. resolution led to the flare-up of communal fighting in Palestine. Civil war spread with the progressive withdrawal of the British Administration. The Zionists smuggled in large numbers of Jews and arms. The Arab League raised a volunteer force of 3,000 and assured the Palestinian Arabs of its full support, short of direct armed intervention. Some 2,000 people lost their lives within two months of the adoption of the resolution.

The U.N. Palestine Commission reported on March 16, 1948 its inability to implement the partition plan because of strong Arab resistance and British non-cooperation. The U.S. also expressed its opposition to forcible implementation of the plan and, on March 30, called for a truce between the two communities in Palestine and fresh consideration of the issue by the General Assembly.

To foil the reopening of the question and make partition a reality, the Zionists launched military operations called Nachson and Jephtha on April 1, and 18, 1948. The Irgunists organized a brutal massacre of 250 civilian inhabitants of the village of Deir Yassin. The Zionists took Haifa in a surprise attack on April 22, and Jaffa surrendered after severe mortar shelling on May 13. The success of these operations coincided with the Arab attack on the Zionist settlement of Mishmar Halmak in which an Arab national hero, Abdul Kader Husseini, incharge of the Jerusalem Front, got killed. Poor leadership, and lack of equipment in civil defence was the cause of Arab collapse. The Zionists spread terror among the Arabs by their highhandedness causing the Muslims to stream out in thousands to the neighbouring Arab lands. The British High Commissioner, General Sir Allan Cunningham, left Palestine on May 14, 1948. On the same day the State of Israel was proclaimed and won instant de facto recognition from President Truman and de jure recognition from Russia, two days later. Early on May 15, units of the armies of Syria, Trans-Jordan Iraq and Egypt crossed into Palestine to come to the defence of the harassed Arabs of Palestine.

The ensuing events are best gleaned from the documents and notes in the succeeding chapters and hence are left untouched here.

## CHAPTER II

### The Birth of Zionism And its Background

Zionism was given a concrete militant political form by Theodor Herzl, a noted Austrian journalist and playwright, at the first World Zionist Congress held at Basel, Switzerland, in 1897, as a movement for the establishment of a Jewish National Home and State, called Erets Israel, in Palestine. According to believers in orthodox Judaism, it constituted a profanation on the religion of Jews as Judaism, a historical monotheistic religion, conceived of universal peace and fraternity. In the next 50 years Zionism flourished on methods strictly forbidden by Judaism—murder, theft and deceit—to bring into being an Israeli State in Palestine.

Bible provides the only source for the history of the Jews which it begins in the Tigris Euphrate Valley. The term Jew is probably an admixture of the Latin Judaeus and the Hebrew Yehudi. They are considered descendants of a Biblical tribe called Yehudah or Judah, who themselves were off-springs of the Hebrew or Israelite people, but the Zionist claims of their being a separate race are wholly wrong.

The Bible presents the Israelites as the descendants of a legendary hero, Abraham, who migrated from Mesopotamia to Palestine around 2000 B.C. and lived there upto the ripe old age of 175. To his seed, according to the Holy Bible, was promised the land from the river of Egypt upto the great river the Euphrates, encompassing the traditional Palestine. This promise and the later promise of the Jews' return to the Holy Land, were exploited by the Zionists to bring into their fold members of the world Jewry. Abraham had two sons, the first Ishmael, born of bond-woman Keturah, and the second Isaac of his wife Sarah. Abraham's covenant with God was established through circumcision of Ishmael as Isaac was yet to be born.

The promise to the seed of Abraham is further explained in Genesis: 21-10-12. When Sarah asked Abraham to cast out the bondwoman and Ishmael, causing grief to him, God said unto Abraham. "Let it not be grievous in thy sight because of the lad and because of the bond-woman. In all that Sarah saith unto thee,

hearken unto her voice for in Isaac shall seed be called unto thee. And also of the son of bond-woman will I make a nation because he is thy seed. This, according to Dr. Alfred Guillaume, Prof. of Old Testament Studies at the London University, divests the Zionist claim of any validity of Palestine being promised to the Jews alone. Ishmael became the progenitor of Muslims. This point is further stressed by Rabbi Dr. Elmer Berger saying that all the land of the Canaan was promised to Abraham as an everlasting possession at the time when he made a covenant with God through circumcision of his son (Chapter 17.8). The son was not Isaac but Ishmael. The Zionists in their propaganda, however, conveniently skipped over these facts. Abraham's grand son, Jacob or Israel took, his tribe to Egypt from where Moses led them back into Palestine around 1225 B. C. Some historians date it 200 years earlier.

Zionism drew its strength from political persecution, economic misery, and cultural repression of the Jews in European countries, particularly in Russia. After the 721 BC destruction of the Israeli Kingdom, some 4,000 Jews were transported in captivity to Babylon where, through intermarriages, they got assimilated in the Babylonian nation and disappeared as a distinct group. The exiles from Judaea in 586 A.D., however, proved more resistant to assimilation and retained their distinct identity. The Persian King, Cyrus, allowed the return of Jews to Palestine. Under the Greeks, however, started a new era of persecution forcing Jews to flee to other lands to retain their individuality. By the beginning of the Christian era they spread to various parts of Europe, Asia Minor and Africa. A vigorous propaganda in favour of Judaism won them many new converts. They established themselves in trade and engaged in usury. In fact the term Jew became synonymous with trader and usurer. They lived in compact areas with a Synagogue to rally them around. The Jewish quarters got the name Ghetto.

Persecution of the Jews reached its height during the Middle Ages. The crusades meant pillage, death and destruction for Jewish homes and people. Various false accusations, including ritual sacrifices of Christian boys during the Passover, were hurled against them on occasions of religious, political and



social excitement. They were also accused of causing the plague in the 14th century. By a lateral decree of 1215 the Jews were directed to wear a distinguishing red or yellow hat. They were banished from England, and France in 1290 and 1306. But the worst calamity befell them with their banishment in 1492 from Spain, where they had constituted a rich and flourishing community for nearly 700 years. However Turkey and Poland offered them assylum, mitigating the rigours of a mournful 150,000 Jews who had to flee Spain leaving most of their belongings behind. By the 16th century most of the expelled Jews from Central Europe had concentrated in Poland and Turkey where they formed flourishing communities with a considerable measure of political and civic rights and complete autonomy in their internal affairs. The Cossack invasion of Poland in mid-seventeenth century once again shattered the Jewish community forcing them to seek refuge in the west.

The late 17th century and the whole of the 18th century marked an era of emancipation in the Jewish history, except in Spain and Russia, the former still exclusive and the latter with the largest Jewish population of 5,000,000, still positively hostile. In the rest of Europe, however, a new Jewish community, occidentalized and interested in assimilation in the Western national cultures and civilisation began to take form. The economic structure of the Jewish life also broadened, they becoming financiers and leaders of the Industrial revolution occupying positions of eminence and great influence in the European national societies. Moses Mendelssohn, eminent German Jewish philosopher and man of letters (1729—1786), through his works launched the Haskalah (enlightenment) movement to capture the imagination of many Jewish youth. He stressed the spiritual and universal aspects of Judaism in an endeavour to win them over to modern European civilisations. The movement was helped by the liberal and egalitarian societies emerging in the 19th century which absorbed many Jews in the local and national folds of the countries of their residence.

But the prospect of a return to Zion continued to make strong appeal to a large number of the community still. Almost in every century during the 2,000 years of their exile, there appeared

Messiahs in the midst of the Jews, to be enthusiastically received, promising to lead them back to Zion. David Reubeni and his disciple, Solomon Molcho, were the most important among the 16th century and Salahbatai Sebi among the 17th century Messiahs. The word Zion cast a great spell on the Jewish imagination. Occurring 152 times in the Old Testament and 7 times in the New, Zion appears to be the topographical name the Cannanites gave to the hill upon which Jerusalem was built. It also signified a stronghold in Jerusalem taken by David. In course of time the word came to symbolise the nearby Temple and the sanctuary. Later it embraced whole of the city and then Palestine. Return to Zion has been echoed by self-proclaimed Messiahs and Jewish leaders throughout the ages exercising strong fascination on the Jewish mind.

Emergence of an anti-semitic movement in Germany in 1879 with its reaction in Austria-Hungary and later in France where the 1894 Dreyfus case—captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain, being wrongfully condemned for espionage and attempts at his clearance blocked-convulsed the nation for many years, gave a serious setback to the Haskalah movement. It had not embraced the masses, specially in Eastern Europe. Perpetual influx of Jews questioned the validity of assimilation in the Central Europe itself.

During the time of Catherine the great (1762-1796), the Jews in Russia were allowed religious autonomy and given guarantee of life but severe restrictions on their mobility and modes of livelihood were imposed. She decreed the Jews in 1791, to live in a narrow area on the western border termed as the Pale of Settlement, turning them out of the countryside. For the first 20 years of Alexander's rule the Jews were treated with consideration, but then the Czar turned so cruel and vicious that thousands of Jewish families were mercilessly uprooted from Moghilev and Vitebsk and expelled to die in the snows. The Pale of Settlement was further narrowed down. His son Nicholas, confessedly dedicated to principles of autocracy, nationalism and orthodoxy, detested the Jews and launched an all-out war against them. He enacted over 600 new laws besides a similar number of the existing ones to impose restrictions on the Jews. His scandalous persecution of the community aroused protests from all of civilised Europe in 1843. But these he treated with disdain with

the backing of literary figures like Pushkin and Gogol. Alexander I who succeeded Nicholas in 1825, relaxed most of the repressive restrictions against the Jews, ended juvenile conscription and threw open schools and universities to the Jews. The favoured classes among them were also allowed access to some of the great Russian cities. But by 1871 he abandoned his liberalism to revert to his father's stern autocratic rule. The Jewish schools were closed. The cry of 'fight the Jewish exploitation' rent the air as the anti-Jewish riots began in Odessa in 1871, resulting in massacre of local Jews. After Alexander's assassination in 1881 the anti-Jewish riots-pogroms became centrally organized and spread to many towns. In 1882 were enacted the May Laws interning Jews in their places, narrowing the Pale of settlement and allowing investigation and expulsion of Jews from the interior. This was an era of martyrs, convicts, and political prisoners in Russian history among whom the Jews figured most prominently. Jewish persecution under the May Laws aroused indignation of the civilized world, but all protests went unheeded. The laws continued in force up to 1914. They caused the Russians to seek emigration to other lands. The State tried to check the flight and harried the emigrants wherever they turned up but, despite all difficulties, some 100,000 managed to leave by 1890, most of them going to the United States which maintained an open shore policy and gave equal rights to the Jews.

In 1891 Baron Maurice de Hirsch, a German Railroad magnate, persuaded the Russians to change their policy to permit 25,000 Jews a year to migrate to Argentine to settle as farmers there. But only 10,000 had migrated to Argentine after 10 years.

The reign of Nicholas II which began in 1894, constitutes the saddest period in the history of Jews. The Russian Pogroms, anti Jewish riots, became centrally organized and an annual feature. The riots beginning in Kishinev in 1903 horrified the world. In the Odessa riots of 1905 alone hundreds of Jews were cut to pieces, thousands wounded and 40,000 Jewish homes and shops destroyed. The Jews were involved in conspiracy cases against the State. They formed a sizable portion of the 1800 liberals who were hanged in 1907. Jewish social and economic life was completely ruined. Many became paupers. This persecuted lot provided principal source of strength to the Zionists.

A small number of them migrated to Palestine in 1882 to form an agricultural settlement which soon became bankrupt but was saved by Baron Rothschild who, along with Sir Moses Montefiore, organized financial assistance for Jews in distress in various lands. A few Christian millionaires, especially in Great Britain, kept alive the interest in the Jewish immigration to Palestine. There were also some who pleaded for their settlement elsewhere. Among these the most prominent was an American, Mordecai Manuel Noah (1785-1851), U.S. consul in Tunis in 1813 and later High Sheriff and Surveyor of New-York Port, who in 1825 acquired Grand Island in the Niagara river and extended an open invitation to the world Jewry to establish a Jewish State, Arrarat, there. Later, in 1844, he also made an appeal for resettlement of the Jews in Palestine. But far more important and successful in their efforts were Lord Shaftsbury, Sir Lawrence Diphant and other Britons who wanted to create a Jewish State in Palestine. The British pleas were motivated by political and defence considerations of securing an overland route to India, and preventing the growth of anti-British influence there, through the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.

Some among them were also inspired by religious and mystic ideas. The eccentric Sir Laurence, for instance, was moved by "anxiety to fulfil the prophecies and bring about the end of the world".

The first theoretical basis for Zionism was provided by Moses Hess, a German Socialist, through publication, in 1862, of his book, *Rome Und Jerusalem*. This short book provides an admixture of ethical Socialism, fervent nationalism and religious conservatism, calling for spiritual and moral regeneration among the Jews prior to their resettlement in Palestine where alone the historical ideal of the Jewish people could be realized. He appealed to France, the home of revolution, to support and protect the Jewish settlement to ensure a bridgehead across the Middle East held by friendly people. The book attracted no attention at first but decades later it proved of great use to the Zionists in their propaganda.

George Elliot's 'Daniel Doranda' marks perhaps the first literary portrayal of sympathies for return to Zion. Naftali Herz Imber (1856-1909), a Hebrew poet of Polish origin, provided the Zionist National

## *An American's Offer*

Anthem 'Hatikwe' (the hope), as also another popular Jewish nationalist song 'Mishmar Hajarden' i.e. watch over Jordan. He accompanied Sir Laurence Oliphant on one of his visits to Palestine during the early days of the Zionist movement.

An appeal to the West European Jews to help their persecuted brethren in Russia by assisting their concentration in Palestine, or elsewhere, was made by an Odessa Physician, Leo Pinsker, with the publication of his book, 'Auto-emancipation', in 1882. While no response came from the West European Jews, 'Auto-emancipation' helped Pinsker gather a band of young Russian Jews around him in a body called 'Hovevi Zion', Lovers of Zion, to organize emigration of Jewish artisans and farmers to Palestine. These early settlers, who survived only with the assistance of Baron Edmond de Rothschild of Paris, laid the foundations for later Jewish colonization of Palestine.

Asher Ginzberg (1856—1927) was another important figure among the early Zionists. The modern Hebrew owes its creation and enrichment to him. In his essays under the nom de plume of 'Ahad Ha'am' (one of the people), which form classics in the language. Ginzberg advocated the creation of a Jewish Cultural Centre in Palestine for regeneration of Judaism, scintillating spiritual influences among the world Jewry and kindling in their hearts a true love of the Zion. He, however, held that a majority of the Jews could not be settled in Palestine because of its small size and native population. Nor could it be converted into a Jewish State.

Theodor Herzl may be described as the father of modern Zionism. Born on May 2, 1860 in Budapest, Hungary, unto parents of Central European stock, with Spanish-Portuguese strains on father's side, Herzl moved with his parents to Vienna at the age of 18. Here he passed his doctorate in Laws but preferred Journalism as his career. He joined the widely-circulated 'Neue Freie Presse' and served as its foreign correspondent in Paris from 1891 to 1896 when the Dreyfus affair convulsed the whole of French society. Here he witnessed the disgusting phenomenon of anti-semitism with the crowds furiously shouting 'death unto the Jews'. With German education, mother-tongue and cultural outlook, Herzl had been no stranger to outbursts of anti-Semitism, (the feeling being nowhere stronger than among the Austro-Germans of Vienna. But the French

experience shook him deeply and he made a firm determination to secure for the Jews, through diplomatic negotiations, a land where they could establish a State of their own to live in peace and honour. The first step he took was to outline his views in a booklet called 'Der Judenstaat' (the Jewish State) published in 1895. Herzl regarded assimilation as desirable but impossible of realization because of recurring waves of anti-semitism. He argued that the outside pressures forced the Jews to form a nation against their wishes. They could lead a normal existence only by concentrating in a single territory. In the beginning he was not particular about Palestine being this territory but under the influence of East European friends he later chose Palestine as the land where the Jewish National Home should be founded. But Herzl was no chauvinistic nationalist. He had no direct personal ties with the Jewish traditions and values. He never desired the rebirth of Hebrew as the Jewish National language. His novel, "Altneuland", (Old New Land) forcefully rejected narrow nationalism and made a strong appeal for fraternity with the Palestinians in a common homeland in the liberal European fashion of assimilation. He envisaged the Jewish State as a progressive and modern State.

Herzl convened the first World Zionist Congress at Basel, Switzerland, in August 1897. He was assisted in his task by another gifted scholar friend, Max Nordau. The Congress set up a World Zionist Organization with an elected executive. It drew up its constitution giving it a mass democratic base, with no weightage to the big industrialists or donors to the organization. The Basel Programme drawn up by the Congress guided the world Zionist movement during the next 50 years. Zionism, it declared, 'strives to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by Public law'. To that end the movement was to promote, on suitable lines, the colonization of Palestine by Jewish rural and industrial workers to organize the whole world Jewry through local and national institutions according to local laws, to foster and strengthen Jewish national sentiment and to obtain Government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the Zionist aims. Herzl was elected the first President of the organization. Annual Congresses were held upto 1902 after which the organization met every two years. Vienna became the center and *Die Welt* (the world), its official organ which was edited by Herzl himself.

Almost immediately after election as President, Herzl embarked upon a series of negotiations with top European and Asian dignitaries to secure support for the Zionist ideals. He was received by Sultan Abdul Hamid of Turkey from whom he sought a charter converting Palestine into an autonomous area for the Jewish National Home, but the Sultan rejected the request. He also met Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Foreign Minister of Germany, the King of Italy and Pope Pius of Rome. Among the British statesmen he held negotiations with Joesph Chamberlaine and Lord Lansdown. In Russia he met V.K. Plehev and Count Sergei Y. Witte. He also met Jewish philanthropists, Baron de Hirsche and Rothschild. Except in Britain, and with the Jewish leaders, the negotiations yielded little fruit. Herzl described his experience as one in a stone-age of politics where he had to forge his tools. He had, besides, to contend with attacks from the orthodox Rabbis. He, however, continued his work with unbounded enthusiasm and zeal. He virtually symbolised in his life the motto of his novel, 'Altneuland', 'if you will it, it is no legend.' Handling both orthodox and modern Jews tactfully, Herzl drew increasing strength for his movement. Because of the sympathy he found in Britain for his cause, he established the financial instruments of the movement in London. The Zionists drew upon Karl Renner's theory of nationalism based upon communities with one language and common cultural and political interests.

His persistent efforts resulted in the offer by Britain in 1903 of an area of 6,000 square miles in the uninhabited uplands of Uganda to the Zionist organization for the establishment of a Jewish National Home. Herzl and some other Central European Zionist leaders, including Israel Zangwill were willing to accept the offer but the majority representing the East European Jews would have none of it and insisted on Palestine as the only centre of world Zionist activity. The controversy deeply split the World Zionist Organization. Herzl died of heart trouble at Edlach, near Vienna on July 3, 1904 and was buried at Vienna. His remains were transferred to and interred in Palestine on August 17, 1949, facing Mount Herzl. The bitter controversy and split in the world Zionist organization were probably responsible for the untimely death of Herzl at the age of 44.

The seventh World Zionist Congress held in 1905, by a resolution, firmly rejected any colonization outside Palestine and its

neighbouring countries. But a minority of delegates set up in the same year a Jewish territorial organization to find an autonomous territory for the Jews who could not, or did not, wish to live in their present lands. Leadership now moved from Vienna to Germany, at first to Cologne and then to Berlin. Austrians and Germans led the movement but its mass strength still came from Russia.

Numerically only a very small minority of world Jewry was organized in the Zionist movement. Much opposition to the movement was voiced by Eastern European Jewry. A Russian Jewish Socialist Party, Bund, founded in 1897, firmly declared that the Jewish people could exist as a distinct national group only in Diaspora countries of mass Jewish settlements and Yiddish folk culture. Their first world congress was held in Hague in 1907. Another Jewish Russian group, Mizrachi, founded in 1902, insisted on strict observance of religious laws in the Palestinian Jewish life. The world Zionist Organization, however, declared itself neutral in matters of religion. But the Russian thinking exercised a great deal of influence on the settlers in Palestine who after 1905 stopped working on farms with the assistance of Arab labour. The number of Jewish settlements by 1914 had grown upto 43. Orthodox exhortation helped revival of the Hebrew language which was adopted by the youth. Hebrew schools also sprang up among the settlers.

The outbreak of world war I, in 1914 caused the centre of world Zionism to shift to London. Its leadership also moved from the Austro-Germans to the British Jews of Russian origin. Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Sokolov were the most important among the Jewish leaders who played a significant part in securing official support of the Allied Nations for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine.



## CHAPTER III

### The Three Faces of British Diplomacy

Primarily defence and political considerations made Britain, during the course of the first world war, give contradictory pledges to the Arabs for independence in their lands and to the Jews for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Almost at the same time Britain held out promises of creating a French sphere of influence in the region involved.

Hussein-Mcmahon correspondence (1915-1916), the Balfour Declaration (1917), and the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) vividly bring out the three faces of British diplomacy in the Middle East. The underlying objective of all the three, mutually contradictory, pledges was to bring in the largest measure of support for their winning the war in which they eminently succeeded.

Mcmahon's letter of October 24, 1915, stated in unambiguous terms that Britain was prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca 'where Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her Ally, France, except for two districts of Mersina and Alexdretta (Cilicia) and portions of Syria lying to the West of the Districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo which cannot be said to be purely Arab and should be excluded from the limits demanded.'

Britain later tried to wriggle out of this commitment stating that it did not cover Palestine. But an impartial reading of the letters and a look at the map of the region, clearly show that Palestine was definitely included in the pledge. This view is further strengthened by Hogarth's message of January 1918, made two months after the Balfour declaration, which said that the 'Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population'. Surely political freedom cannot but be regarded as synonymous with independence.

None of the districts mentioned by Mcmahon in his letter to Sherif Hussein of Mecca lies east of Palestine. Damascus, Homs,

Hama and Aleppo go northward in that order. As rightly asked by Sir Michael McDonnell of the 1939 committee in London to study the correspondence, if Palestine were to be excluded why no mention whatsoever, of Sanjaks of Hauran and Mann, River Jordan, or Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea to the west of which whole of Palestine lies was made therein. "To suggest that it was excluded by a side wind by reference to the interests of France, which at that very time the British Government was refusing to admit, is an argument that will not hold water." The Committee, also, came to the conclusion that the correspondence made it 'clear that His Majesty's Government were not free to dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine'. The Bassett Letter of Feb. 8, 1918, the British Declaration to the Seven of June 16, 1918, and the Anglo-French Declaration of November 9, 1918, were all further positive reassurances to the Arabs of independence for their lands after the war.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration were kept secret from the Arabs by Britain. Their terms were revealed by the Soviet Government at the end of 1917. Russia pledged full support for Arab freedom in their homelands. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, conducted at the instance of Russia, split up the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire between Britain, France and Russia. The Agreement recognized Russian claims to Eastern Anatolia and the French and British claims to the Arab provinces north of the Arabian Peninsula and to Cilicia in South-Central Anatolia. The latter region was carved into five zones—Blue (Cilicia and the Lebanese and Syrian coast), Red (vilayet of Basrah and Bagdad), Brown (Palestine), A (the interior of Syria—parts of modern Saudi Arabia and Yemen and the Vilayet of Mosul) and B (Transjordan with a narrow corridor to the Persian frontier. Zones A and B were designated, respectively, as French and British spheres of influence where they were prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of States under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief. In the Blue and Red Zones each was free to establish such direct or indirect administration, or control, as they may desire or think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. The Brown Zone (Palestine) was to be placed under an international

administration, the form of which was to be decided upon in consultation with Russia, and subsequently with other Allies and the representatives of the Sherif of Mecca. Originally France had sought inclusion of Palestine in its zone of direct annexation.

\* The Balfour Declaration of Nov. 2, 1917 followed efforts by Britain to secure intervention of the United States in war on the side of the Allies, and rally the support of world Jewry behind them. Lord Rothschild, Chaim Weizmann, a research chemist, Nahum Sokolov, a Russian born Jew writer, and James Malcolm, an Oxford-educated American Jew, conducted negotiations with British and several European dignitaries to secure their support for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. James Malcolm, a personal friend of Sir Marks Sykes who was asked by the British Government to conduct negotiations with the Zionists assured him of the support of the world Jewry and the Americans in case Britain expressed sympathy with the Zionist objective. The Zionists, through U.S. Supreme Court Judge Louis Brandeis, a friend of President Woodrow Wilson, proved their influence by securing America's entry in war in April 1917. They also impressed upon the British Government the desirability of having a friendly people and State in an area of such great strategic importance, as Palestine. The result was the Balfour Declaration of Nov. 2, 1917 in which the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour, in a letter to Lord Rothschild said that the British Government viewed 'with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country'. Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild in his letter of July 18, it may be stated, had urged the British Government to "accept the principle of recognizing Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish People and the right of the Jewish people to build up its National Life in Palestine under a protection upon the conclusion of peace". He had also demanded internal

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\* Both Winston Churchill and Lloyd George admitted later that it was a tactical move with this object in view.

autonomy for Jews in Palestine, free immigration and the right to form a Jewish National Colonising Corporation for the resettlement and economic development of the country. The Balfour Declaration fell short of their demands, but paved the way for their ultimate achievement. Nahum Sokolov secured support of France, Italy, Russia and the Pope of Rome for the Zionist aspirations.

After the war Zionist leaders tried to soothe agitated Arab opinion and lessen their opposition to Jewish immigration. Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization, met Emir Feisal, leader of Arab movement for independence, and assured him that the Zionists supported the Arab demand for independence and that they would use their influence with the British and other Governments to have the demand conceded. In return he sought the Emir's support for Jewish settlement in Palestine. This resulted in, what is called, Feisal-Weizmann Agreement of January 1919, which was to be twisted and misquoted over the years by the Zionists to claim that the Arabs had acquiesced in the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. Emir Feisal, however, expressed not the slightest support for the Zionist ideal. All that he did was to accept the need for goodwill and understanding between the Arabs and the Jews and to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large-scale and, as quickly as possible, to settle Jewish immigrants upon land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation on the soil. The Agreement, however, clearly stipulated that in taking such measures the Arab peasants and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights and shall be assisted in their economic development.

But the most important proviso to the Agreement was added by Emir Feisal in his own hand which said: 'Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in my memorandum dated the 4th of January 1919 to the Foreign office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made, I shall not then be bound by a single word of the present Agreement which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity and I shall not be answerable in any way whatsoever'. The subsequent events naturally rendered the Agreement null and void.

Arabs rendered valuable service to the Allies in return for the British pledge of independence to them. They engaged large numbers of Ottoman troops around Damascus and facilitated the conquest of Palestine by Allenby. The Gulf of Aqaba was captured by Arab patriots on their own. The British Military historian, Liddle Hart, duly acknowledges their great contribution to the war on the Allies side. British double-dealing with the Arabs consequently became all the more hurtful and reprehensible in their view.

### Basel Programme

(World Zionist Organization came into being in 1897 under the leadership of Viennese journalist, Theodor Herzl, and transformed Zionism into a political movement. The Constituent Congress of the organization in Basel, Switzerland, held on August 27-29, adopted as its basic aims the following platform).

"The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end ;—

1. The promotion on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish Agricultural and Industrial Workers.
2. The organization and binding together of the whole Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.
3. The strengthening of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining Government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism."

### Hussein - McMahon Correspondence (July 14, 1915 to March 10, 1916)

*Text of Letter dated July 14, 1915 From Sherif Hussein of Mecca to Sir Henry McMahon*

"Whereas the whole of the Arab nation without any exception have decided in these last years to live, and to accomplish their freedom, and grasp the reins of their administration both in theory and practice; and whereas they have found and felt that it is to the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support them and

aid them to the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions which are based upon the maintenance of the honour and dignity of their life, without any ulterior motives whatsoever unconnected with this object.

And whereas it is to their (the Arabs') interest also to prefer the assistance of the Government of Great Britain in consideration of their geographical position and economic interests, and also of the attitude of the above-mentioned Government, which is known to both nations and therefore need not be emphasised;

For these reasons the Arab nation see fit to limit themselves, as time is short, to asking the Government of Great Britain, if it should think fit, for the approval, through her Deputy or representative, of the following fundamental propositions, leaving out all things considered secondary in comparison with these, so that it may prepare all means necessary for attaining this noble purpose, until such time as it finds occasion for making the actual negotiations :—

Firstly—England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37° of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn Umar) Amadia, up to the border of Persia, on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Medierranean Sea up to Mersina. England to approve of the Proclamation of an Arab Khilafat of Islam.

Secondly—The Arab Government of the Sherif to acknowledge that England shall have the preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries whenever conditions of enterprises are otherwise equal.

Thirdly—For the Security of this Arab independence and the certainty of such preference of economic enterprises, both High Contracting Parties to offer mutual assistance, to the best ability of their military and naval forces, to face any foreign Power which may attack either party. Peace not to be decided without agreement of both parties.

Fourthly—If one of the parties enters upon an aggressive conflict, the other party to assume a neutral attitude, and in case of such party wishing the other to join forces, both to meet and discuss the conditions.

Fifthly—England to acknowledge the abolition of foreign privileges in Arab countries and to assist the Government of the Sherif in an International convention for confirming such abolition.

Sixthly—Articles 3 and 4 of this treaty to remain in vigour for fifteen years, and, if either wishes it to be renewed, one year's notice before lapse of treaty to be given.

Consequently, and as the whole of the Arab nation have praise be to God) agreed and united for attainment, at all costs and finally, of this noble object they beg the Government of Great Britain to answer them positively or negatively in a period of thirty days after receiving this intimation; and if this period should lapse before they receive an answer, they reserve to themselves complete freedom of action. Moreover, we (the Sherif's family) will consider ourselves free in word and deed from the bonds of our previous declaration which we made through Ali Effendi'.

## **2. Text of Letter dated October 24, 1915 from Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif of Mecca**

'I have received your letter of the 29th Shawal 1333, with much pleasure and your expressions of friendliness and sincerity have given me the greatest satisfaction. I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the time had not yet come when that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner. I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction :—

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the West of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be

excluded from the limits demanded. With the above modification, and without prejudice of our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs, we accept those limits.

As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:—

1. Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions, within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.

2. Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.

3. When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of Government in those various territories.

4. On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

5. With regard to the *Vilayets* of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognize that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt, of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her friends, the Arabs, and will result in a firm and lasting alliance the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of Arab people from the Turkish Yoke, which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.

I have confined myself in this letter to the more vital and important questions, and if there are any other matters dealt with



in your letter which I have omitted to mention we may discuss them at some convenient date in the future.

It was with great relief and satisfaction that I heard of the safe arrival of the Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings, which, thanks to the clearness of your directions and the excellence of your arrangements, were landed without trouble or mishap in spite of the dangers and difficulties occasioned by the present sad war. May God soon bring a lasting peace and freedom to all peoples!

I am sending this letter by the hand of your trusted and excellent messenger, Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Arif Ibn Uraifan, and he will inform you of the various matters of interest, but of less vital importance, which I have not mentioned in this letter."

**Sherif Hussein's Letter of 1 Jan. 1916 to Sir Henry**

"We received from the bearer your letter dated the 9th Safar (the 14th December 1916), with great respect and honour, and I have understood its contents, which caused me the greatest pleasure and satisfaction, as it removed that which had made me uneasy.

Your honour will have realised, after the arrival of Mohammed (Faroki) Sherif and his interview with you, that all your procedure upto the present was of no personal inclination or the like, which would have been wholly un-intelligible but that everything was the result of the decisions and desires of our peoples, and that we are but transmitters and executants of such decisions and desires in the position they (our people) have pressed upon us.

These truths are, in my opinion, very important and deserve your honour's special attention and consideration.

With regard to what had been stated in your honoured communication concerning Iraq as to the matter of compensation for the period of occupation, we, in order to strengthen the confidence of Great Britain in our attitude and in our words and actions, really and veritably, and in order to give her evidence of our certainty and assurance in trusting her glorious Government, leave the determination of the amount to the perception of her wisdom and justice.

As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible

modifications, and all this was only done so to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of the Blessed and Supreme God. It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present war and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from today) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts.

I do not find it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that our plan is of greater security to the interests and protection of the rights of Great Britain than it is to us, and will necessarily be so whatever may happen, so that Great Britain may finally see her friends in that contentment and advancement which she is endeavouring to establish for them now, especially as her Allies being neighbours, to us will be the germ of difficulties and discussion with which there will be no peaceful conditions. In addition to which the citizens of Beirut will decidedly never accept such dismemberment, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which may exercise Great Britain, certainly not less than her present troubles, because of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity and indeed the identity of our interests, which is the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with any power but you. Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.

I declare this, and I have a strong belief, which the living will inherit from the dead, in the declarations which you gave in the conclusion of your honoured letter. Therefore, the honourable and eminent Minister should believe and be sure, together with Great Britain, that we still remain firm to our resolutions which Storrs learnt from us two years ago, for which we await the opportunity suitable to our situation, especially in view of that action the time of which has now come near and which destiny drives towards us with great haste and clearness, so that we and those who are of our opinion may have reasons for such action against any criticism or responsibilities imposed upon us in future.

Your expression "we do not want to push you to any hasty action which might jeopardise the success of your aim" does not need

any more explanation except what we may ask for, when necessary, such as arms, ammunitions., etc.

I deem this sufficient as I have occupied much of your honour's time. I beg to offer you my great veneration and respect".

**Letter dated January 25, 1916 from Sir Henry McMahon  
to Sherif of Mecca**

"We have received with great pleasure and satisfaction your letter of the 25th Safar (the 1st January) at the hands of your trusty messenger, who has also transmitted to us your verbal messages.

We fully realise and entirely appreciate the motives which guide you in this important question, and we know well that you are acting entirely in the interests of the Arab peoples and with no thought beyond their welfare.

We take note of your remarks concerning the *vilayet* of Bagdad, and will take the question into careful consideration when the enemy has been defeated and the time for peaceful settlement arrives.

As regards the northern parts, we note with satisfaction your desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France. It is, as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this war to a victorious conclusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen who have died side by side fighting for the cause of right and liberty.

In this great cause Arabia is now associated, and God grant that the result of our mutual efforts and co-operation will bind us in a lasting friendship to the mutual welfare and happiness of us all.

We are greatly pleased to hear of the action you are taking to win all the Arabs over to our joint cause, and to dissuade them from giving any assistance to our enemies, and we leave it to your discretion to seize most favourable moment for further and more decided measures.

You will doubtless inform us by the bearer of this letter of manner in which we can assist you and your requests will always receive our immediate consideration.

You will have heard how El Sayed Ahmed El Sherif El Senussi has been beguiled by evil advice into hostile action, and it will be a great grief to you to know that he has been so far forgetful of the interests of the Arabs as to throw in his lot with our enemies. Misfortune has now overtaken him, and we trust that this will show him his error and lead him to peace for the sake of his poor misguided followers.

We are sending this letter by the hand of your good messenger, who will also bring to you all our news.

### Skyes-Picot Agreement

#### Sir Edward Grey's Letter to Paul Cambon of 15 May 1916

"I shall have the honour to reply fully in a further note to your Excellency's note of the 9th instant, relative to the creation of an Arab State, but I should meanwhile be grateful if your Excellency could assure me that in those regions which, under the conditions recorded in that communication, become entirely French, or in which French interests are recognised as predominant, any existing British concessions, rights of navigation or development, and the rights and privileges of any British religious, scholastic, or medical institutions will be maintained.

His Majesty's Government are, of course, ready to give a reciprocal assurance in regard to the British Area."

#### Grey's Letter to Cambon of 16 May 1916

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 9th instant, stating that the French Government accept the limits of a future Arab State, or Confederation of States, and of those parts of Syria where French interests predominate, together with certain conditions attached thereto, such as they result from recent discussions in London and Petrograd on the subject.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the whole project, as it now stands, will involve the abdication of considerable British interests, but, since His Majesty's Government recognise the advantage to the general cause of the Allies entailed in producing a more favourable internal political

situation in Turkey, they are ready to accept the arrangement now arrived at, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo.

It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments—

1. That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

2. That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

3. That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.

4. That Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (A) for area (B). His Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third Power without the previous consent of the French Government.

5. That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire, and that there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the red area, or area (B) or area (A); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect,

against British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and protectorates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (A), or area (B), and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against French goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

6. That in area (A) the Bagdad Railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (B) northwards beyond Sammaria, until a railway connecting Bagdad with Aleppo via the Euphrates Valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two Governments.

7. That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (B), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times.

It is to be understood by both Governments that this railway is to facilitate the connexion of Bagdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, the French Government shall be prepared to consider that the line in question may also traverse the polygon Banias-Keis Marib-Salkhad Tell Otsda-Mesmie before reaching area (B).

8. For a period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the whole of the blue and red areas, as well as in areas (A) and (B), and no increase in the rates of duty or conversion from *ad valorem* to specific rates shall be made except by agreement between the two powers.

There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above-mentioned areas. The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry and handed over to the administration of the area of destination.

9. It shall be agreed that the French Government will at no time enter into any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third Power, except the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States, without the previous agreement of His Majesty's Government, who, on their part, will give a similar undertaking to the French Government regarding the red area.

10. The British and French Governments, as the protectors of the Arab State, shall agree that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third Power installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the Red Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression.

11. The negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States shall be continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two Powers.

12. It is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories will be considered by the two Governments.

I have further the honour to state that, in order to make the agreement complete, His Majesty's Government are proposing to the Russian Government to exchange notes analogous to those exchanged by the latter and your Excellency's Government on the 26th April last. Copies of these notes will be communicated to your Excellency as soon as exchanged.

I would also venture to remind your Excellency that the conclusion of the present agreement raises, for practical consideration, the question of the claims of Italy to a share in any partition or rearrangement of Turkey in Asia, as formulated in article 9 of the agreement of the 26th April, 1915, between Italy and the Allies.

His Majesty's Government further consider that the Japanese Government should be informed of the arrangements now concluded.

### 3. Text of Letter of 10/23 May 1916 from Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London

"I have received from the French Ambassador in London copies of the notes exchanged between the Russian and French Governments on the 26th ultimo, by which your Excellency's Government recognise, subject to certain conditions, the arrangement made between Great Britain and France, relative to the constitution of an Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States, and to the partition of the territories of Syria, Cilicia, and Mesopotamia, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured.

His Majesty's Government take the fact with satisfaction that your Excellency's Government concur in the limits set forth in that arrangement, and I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, on their part in order to make the arrangement complete, are also prepared to recognise the conditions formulated by the Russian Government and accepted by the French Government in the notes exchanged at Petrograd on the 26th ultimo.

In so far, then, as these arrangements directly affect the relations of Russia and Great Britain, I have the honour to invite the acquiescence of your Excellency's Government in an agreement on the following terms :—

1. That Russia shall annex the regions of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, up to a point subsequently to be determined on the littoral of the Black Sea to the west of Trebizond.

2. That the region of Kurdistan to the south of Van and of Bitlis between Mush, Sert, the course of the Tigris, Jezireh-ben-Omar, the crest-line of the mountains which dominate Amadia, and the region of Merga Var, shall be ceded to Russia; and that starting from the region of Merga Var, the frontier of the Arab State shall follow the crest-line of the mountains which at present divide the Ottoman Persian Dominions. These boundaries are indicated in a general manner and are subject to modifications of detail to be proposed later by the Delimitation Commission which shall meet on the spot.

3. That the Russian Government undertake, in all parts of the Ottoman territories thus ceded to Russia, any concessions accorded to British subjects by the Ottoman Government shall be maintained.



If the Russian Government express the desire that such concessions should later be modified in order to bring them into harmony with the laws of the Russian Empire, this modification shall only take place in agreement with the British Government.

4. That in all parts of the Ottoman territories thus ceded to Russia, existing British rights of navigation and development, and the rights and privileges of any British religious, scholastic, or medical institutions shall be maintained. His Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that similar Russian rights and privileges shall be maintained in those regions which, under the conditions of this agreement, become entirely British, or in which British interests are recognised as predominant.

5. The two Governments admit in principle that every State which annexes any part of the Ottoman Empire is called upon to participate in the service of the Ottoman Debt.

#### 4. Grey's Letter to Benckendorff, of 10/23 October 1916

In reply to Your Excellency's note of the 1st ultimo regarding the arrangement between Great Britain, Russia, and France, relative to the creation of an Arab State, or of a Confederation of Arab States, and to the partition of the territories of Syria, Cilicia, and Mesopotamia, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government take note of the reservation formulated by the Imperial Russian Government at the end of article 4 of the arrangement respecting the rights of the Imperial Government to *grand cabotage* in the Black Sea, and of the desire manifested by that Government that this question should be submitted later to a friendly examination by the Governments of the parties interested.

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#### French Support For Zionists

(Text of letter dated June 4, 1917 from French Foreign Minister, Jules Cambon, to Nahum Sokolov, a member of Zionist Executive)

'You were good enough to present the project to which you are devoting your efforts, which has for its object the development of Jewish colonisation in Palestine. You consider that, circumstances

permitting and the independence of Holy Places being safeguarded on the other hand, it would be a deed of justice and of reparation to assist, by the protection of the Allied Powers, in the renaissance of the Jewish nationality in that land from which the people of Israel were exiled so many centuries ago.

The French Government which entered this present war to defend a people wrongfully attacked, and which continues the struggle to assure the victory of right over might, can but feel sympathy for your cause, the triumph of which is bound up with that of the Allies'.

### Official Zionist Formula Of 18.7.1917

*(Submitted by Baron Lionel Walter Rothschild to Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour)*

'H.M. Government after considering the aims of Zionist organisation, accepts the principle of recognising Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people to build up its National Life in Palestine as under a protection to be established at the conclusion of peace, following upon the successful issue of the war.

H.M. Government regards as essential for the realisation of this principle the grant of internal autonomy to the Jewish nationality in Palestine, freedom of immigration for Jews, and the establishment of a Jewish National Colonising Corporation for the re-settlement and economic development of the country.

'The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy and a charter for the Jewish National Colonising Corporation should in the view of H.M. Government be elaborated in detail and determined with the representatives of Zionist organisation'.

### Balfour Declaration

*(Text of letter dated November 2, 1917 from the British Foreign Secretary, A. J. Balfour to Lord Rothschild)*

"I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with the Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet.

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

'I shall be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.'

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### **Soviet Appeal To Muslims Of 3 December 1917**

**"Comrades ! Brothers !**

Great events are occurring in Russia ! An end is drawing near to the murderous war, which arose out of the bargainings of foreign powers. The rule of the plunderers, exploiting the peoples of the world is trembling. The ancient citadel of slavery and serfdom is cracking under the blows of the Russian Revolution. The world of violence and oppression is approaching its last days. A new world is arising, a world of the toilers and the liberated. At the head of this revolution is the workers' and Peasants' Government in Russia, the Council of People's Commissars.

Revolutionary councils of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies are scattered over the whole of Russia. The power in the country is in the hands of the people. The toiling masses of Russia burn with the single desire to achieve an honest peace and help the oppressed people of the world to win their freedom.

Russia is not alone in this sacred cause. The mighty summons to freedom emitted by the Russian Revolution, has aroused all the toilers in the East and West. The people of Europe exhausted by war, are already stretching out their hands to us, in our work for peace. The workers and soldiers of the West are already rallying around the banner of socialism, storming the strongholds of imperialism. Even far-off India, that land which has been oppressed by the European 'torchbearers of civilisation' for so many centuries, has raised the standard of revolt, organising its councils of deputies, throwing the hated yoke of slavery from its shoulders and summoning the people of the East to the struggle for freedom.

The sway of capitalist plunder and violence is being undermined. The ground is slipping from under the feet of the imperialist pillagers.

In the face of these great events, we appeal to you, toiling and dispossessed Mohammedan workers, in Russia and the East.

Mohammedans of Russia, Volga and Crimean Tartars, Kirghisi and Sarti in Siberia and Turkestan, Turcos and Tartars in the Trans-Caucasus, Chechenzi and mountain Cossacks ! All you, whose mosques and shrines have been destroyed, whose faith and customs have been violated by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia ! Hence-forward your faith and customs, your national and cultural departments, are declared free and inviolable ! Organise your national life freely and unimpeded. It is your right. Know that your rights, like those of all the peoples of Russia, will be guarded by the might of the revolution and its organs, the Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies !

Support this revolution and its representative Government !

Mohammedans of the East ! Persians, Turks, Arabs and Indians ! All you whose bodies and property, freedom and native land have been for centuries exploited by the European beasts of prey ! All you whose countries the plunderers who began the war now desire to share among themselves ! We declare that the secret treaties of the deposed Tsar as to the annexation of Constantinople, confirmed by the late Kerensky Government—are now null and void. The Russian Republic, and its Government, the Council of People's Commissars, are opposed to the annexation of foreign lands: Constantinople must remain in the hands of the Mohammedans.

We declare that the treaty for the division of Persia is null and void. Immediately after the cessation of military activities troops will be withdrawn from Persia and the Persians will be guaranteed the right of free self-determination.

We declare that the treaty for the division of Turkey and the subduction from it of Armenia, is null and void. Immediately after the cessation of military activities, the Armenians will be guaranteed the right of free self-determination of their political fate.

It is not from Russia and its revolutionary Government that you have to fear enslavement, but from the robbers of European imperialism, from those who have laid your native lands waste and converted them into their colonies.

Overthrow these robbers and enslavers of your lands ! Now, when war and ruin are breaking down the pillars of the old world, when the whole world is burning with indignation against the imperialist brigands, when the least spark of indignation bursts out in a mighty flame of revolution, when even the Indian Mohammedans, oppressed and tormented by the foreign yoke, are rising in revolt against their slave-drivers—now it is impossible to keep silent. Lose no time in throwing off the yoke of the ancient oppressors of your land ! Let them no longer violate your hearths ! You must yourselves be masters in your own land ! You yourselves must arrange your life as you yourselves see fit ! You have the right to do this, for your fate is in your own hands !

Comrades ! Brothers !

Advance firmly and resolutely towards an honest, democratic peace !

We bear the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the world on our banners !

Mohammedans in Russia !

Mohammedans in the East !

We look to you for sympathy and support in the work of renewing of the world !

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### **Hogarth's Message of Jan 4, 1918**

*(Under instructions from the British Government on Jan 4, 1918, Commander D.G. Hogarth of the British Arab Bureau delivered the following message to King Husein of the Hijaz, formerly Sherif of Mecca)*

“(1) The Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world. This can only be achieved by the Arabs themselves uniting and Great Britain and her Allies will pursue a policy with this ultimate unity in view.

(2) So far as Palestine is concerned we are determined that no people shall be subject to another, but :—

(a) in view of the fact that there are in Palestine shrines, wakfs and Holy Places, sacred in some cases to Moslems alone, to Jews alone, to Christians alone, and in others to two or all three, and in as much as these places are of interest to vast masses of people outside Palestine and Arabia, there must be a special regime to deal with these places approved by the world.

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(b) As regards the mosque of Omar it shall be considered as a Moslem concern alone and shall not be subjected directly or indirectly to any non-Moslem authority. K 8

(3) Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine and in as much as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realisation of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of realisation of this ideal.

In this connection this friendship of world Jewry to the Arab cause is equivalent to support in all States where the Jews have a political influence. The leaders of the movement are determined to bring about the success of Zionism by friendship and co-operation with the Arabs, and such an offer is not one to be lightly thrown aside."

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### British Declaration To Seven Of June 16, 1918

*(In response to a formal inquiry by seven Arab spokesmen from Ottoman Asia then resident in Cairo.)*

"His Majesty's Government have considered the memorial of the Seven with the greatest care. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the reasons why the memorialists desire to retain their anonymity, and the fact the memorial is anonymous has not in any way detracted from the importance which His Majesty's Government attribute to the document.

The areas mentioned in the memorandum fall into four categories :—

1. Areas in Arabia which were free and independent before the outbreak of war.

2. Areas emancipated from Turkish control by the action of the Arabs themselves during the present war.
3. Areas formerly under Ottoman dominion, occupied by the Allied forces during the present war.
4. Areas still under Turkish control.

In regard to the first two categories, His Majesty's Government recognise the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs inhabiting these areas and support them in their struggle for freedom.

In regard to the areas occupied by Allied forces, His Majesty's Government draw the attention of the memorialists to the texts of the proclamations issued respectively by the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief on the taking of Bagdad and Jerusalem. These proclamations embody the policy of His Majesty's Government that the future government of these regions should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed and this policy has and will continue to have the support of His Majesty's Government.

In regard to areas mentioned in the fourth category, it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the oppressed people of these areas should obtain their freedom and independence and towards the achievement of this object His Majesty's Government continue to labour.

His Majesty's Government are fully aware of, and take into consideration, the difficulties and dangers which beset those who work for the regeneration of the populations of the areas specified.

In spite, however, of these obstacles His Majesty's Government trust and believe that they can and will be overcome, and wish to give all support to those who desire to overcome them. They are prepared to consider any scheme of co-operation which is compatible with existing military operations and consistent with the political principles of His Majesty's Government and the Allies.

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**Allenby's Statement Of Oct. 17, 1918**

"I gave the Emir Feisal an official assurance that whatever measures might be taken during the period of military administration,

they were purely provisional and could not be allowed to prejudice the final settlement by the Peace Conference at which no doubt the Arabs would have a representative. I added that the instructions to the Military Governors would preclude their mixing in political affairs, and that I should remove them if I found anyone of them contravening these orders. I reminded the Emir Faisal that the Allies were in honour bound to endeavour to reach a settlement in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned and urged him to place his trust whole-heartedly in their good faith."

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### **"Anglo-French Declaration Of November 9, 1918**

"The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.

"In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognise such governments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function which the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to ensure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy."



## CHAPTER IV

### At The Paris Peace Conference

Seventy-two delegates from 26 nations and four dominions, dressed in sober black coats, attended the first plenary session of the Peace Conference which opened at Salle de la Paix in Paris on January 18, 1919. President of France sat at the end of the horse-shoe conference table facing a statue of peace bearing the torch of civilisation. The Conference decided to create the League of Nations at its session on Jan. 25, approved its Charter on Feb. 14, but its labours formally came to an end on June 28, 1919 when the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations were formally signed.

The U. S. President, Woodrow Wilson, was the most outstanding personality at the Peace Conference. His famous fourteen points had inspired among the people of the world the hope of the emergence of a new era in which consent of the people would determine the form of their government. The Allies, Britain and France in particular, had, during the war, made numerous statements of policy pledging independence for people under the rule of the Turks and Germans. 'Open covenants, openly arrived at, without any secret treaties,' the first of Wilson's fourteen points made the world people lend credence to these declarations'.

But 'open covenants, openly arrived at without secret treaties,' proved the first casualty at the Paris Peace Conference. The policy for the conduct of Conference was determined by a Council of Ten and the Council ruled against the world being given details of the proceedings. Secret agreements and understandings, reached between different Allied nations during the war, were sought to be given the stamp of world approval represented at the Conference. Secret discussions were held on the implications of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in which President Wilson also took part.

The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, was the first to demand on Jan. 30, 1919 the right for those who formed the League of Nations on Jan. 25, to hand out colonies and territories to the

nations they desired. President Wilson, however, resisted the suggestion on the plea that since the Covenant remained yet to be defined, any settlement on colonies would undermine the authority of the League. He also opposed sharing between the victors of the enemy territories on a colonial basis as that would be contrary to the Allied pledges. He pleaded for their being held in trust on behalf of the League of Nations until they were ready for self-government as independent States. At the secret meeting on the Sykes-Picot Agreement also he did not conceal his disgust with the Agreement and in fact, sought to have it declared lapsed since the very party at whose instance negotiations culminating in the agreement were held—the Czarist Russia—was no more and the successor Soviet Government had denounced the agreement. President Wilson further insisted on ascertaining the wishes of the people concerned even with regard to the form of their transitional Governments and secured the approval of the Council to send Commissions of Inquiry to German and Ottoman held territories. One of these was the King-Crane Commission which paid a 42-day visit (June 10 to July 21) to Turkey and her Arab territories and reported against the implementation of the Zionist programme. Britain and France did not assign their representatives to the Commission although originally they had agreed to do so.

But Britain, France, Italy and Japan were determined not to forego the spoils of war which they had agreed to share between themselves. They clashed with one another only to secure the best advantages for each. There was, however, complete accord among them on the distribution of German and Turkish Colonies between themselves. Their imperialist machinations brought about the compromise in the form of Mandates. The one for Palestine came formally into operation on September 29, 1923 when it was formally approved by the Council of the League.

Arabs were the worst sufferers of imperialist machinations. Both the Arabs and Zionists made representations to the conference, the former demanding complete independence and the latter wishing Palestine to be Declared National Home for the Jews. The Zionists succeeded in having the Balfour declaration included in the preamble to the Mandate with the support of the Western Powers. The

Mandates reflected the imperialist-oriented mood and working of League of Nations. While Balkan States, which were politically no more advanced than Syria and Lebanon, were given independence the Arab States were relegated to the status of Mandated territories despite their bitter opposition. Seeds of dissension, conflict and war were sown by the imperialist nations at the Paris Peace Conference even before they concluded their treaty with Germans which was also highly vindictive and repressive.

The U.S. intelligence report for President Wilson and The King Crane Commission report are important documents of the period. The latter reflects the wishes of the people concerned. In a separate note meant for circulation among the American delegates the King Crane Commission expressed concern at the European Powers craving to swallow the enemy territories. The Commission rightly lent support to the Arab point-of-view but its voice of reason had little effect on the European Powers who were determined to have their way. Britain was particularly keen to hold Palestine because of its strategic importance and to control approaches to the Suez Canal.

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### **Feisal's Memo To Peace Conference Of Jan. 1, 1919**

"The country from a line Alexandretta-Persia southward to the Indian Ocean is inhabited by 'Arabs'—by which we mean people of closely related Semitic stocks, all speaking the one language, Arabic. The non-Arabic-speaking elements in this area do not, I believe, exceed one per cent of the whole.

The aim of the Arab nationalist movement (of which my father became the leader in war after combined appeals from the Syrian and Mesopotamian branches) is to unite the Arabs eventually into one nation. As an old member of the Syrian Committee I commanded the Syrian revolt, and had under me Syrians, Mesopotamians, and Arabians.

We believe that our ideal of Arab unity in Asia is justified beyond need of argument. If argument is required, we would point to the general principles accepted by the Allies when the United States joined them, to our splendid past, to the tenacity with which our

race has for 600 years resisted Turkish attempts to absorb us, and, in a lesser degree, to what we tried our best to do in this war as one of the Allies.

My father has a privileged place among Arabs, as their successful leader, and as the head of their greatest family, and as Sherif of Mecca. He is convinced of the ultimate triumph of the ideal of unity if no attempt is made now to force it, by imposing an artificial political unity on the whole, or to hinder it, by dividing the area as spoils of war among great Powers.

The unity of the Arabs in Asia has been made more easy of late years, since the development of Railways, telegraphs and air-roads. In old days the area was too huge, and in parts necessarily too thinly peopled, to communicate common ideas readily.

The various provinces of Arab Asia-Syria, Iraq, Jezireh, Hedjaz, Nejd, Yemen—are very different economically and socially, and it is impossible to constrain them into one frame of government.

We believe that Syria, an agricultural and industrial area thickly peopled, with sedentary classes, is sufficiently advanced politically to manage her own internal affairs. We feel also that foreign technical advice and help will be a most valuable factor in our national growth. We are willing to pay for this help in cash; we cannot sacrifice for it any part of the freedom we have just won for ourselves by force of arms.

Jezireh and Iraq are two huge provinces, made up of three civilised towns, divided by large wastes thinly peopled by seminomadic tribes. The world wishes to exploit Mesopotamia rapidly, and we therefore believe that the system of government there will have to be buttressed by the men and material resources of a great foreign Power. We ask, however, that the Government be Arab, in principle and spirit, the selective rather than the elective principle being necessarily followed in the neglected districts, until time makes the broader basis possible. The main duty of the Arab Government there would be to oversee the educational processes which are to advance the tribes to the moral level of the towns.

The Hedjaz is mainly a tribal area, and the government will remain, as in the past, suited to patriarchal conditions. We appreciate

these better than Europe, and propose therefore to retain our complete independence there.

The Yemen and Nejd are not likely to submit their cases to the Peace Conference. They look after themselves, and adjust their own relations with the Hedjaz and elsewhere.

In Palestine the enormous majority of the people are Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principles we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot risk assuming the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have in this one province, so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee, so long as a representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country.

In discussing our provinces in detail I do not lay claim to superior competence. The powers will, I hope, find better means to give fuller effect to the aims of our national movement. I came to Europe, on behalf of my father and Arabs of Asia, to say that they are expecting the Powers at the Conference not to attach undue importance to superficial differences of condition and not to consider them only from the low ground of existing European material interests and supposed spheres. They expect the powers to think of them as one potential people, jealous of their language and liberty, and ask that no step be taken inconsistent with the prospect of an eventual union of these areas under one sovereign government.

In laying stress on the difference in the social condition of our provinces, I do not wish to give the impression that there exists any real conflict of ideals, interests, or character rendering our union impossible. The greatest obstacle we have to overcome is local ignorance for which the Turkish Government is largely responsible.

In our opinion, if our independence be conceded and our local competence established, the natural influences of race, language, and interest will soon draw us together into one people; but for this the Great Powers will have to ensure us open internal frontiers, common railways and telegraphs, and uniform systems of education. To achieve this they must lay aside the thought of individual profits, and of their old jealousies. In a word, we ask you not to force your white

civilisation upon us from your experience. In return we can offer you little but gratitude".

### U.S. Intelligence's Recommendations For President Wilson

*Extract relating to Palestine, submitted at the time of  
Peace Conference on Jan. 21, 1919*

1. It is recommended that there be established a separate State of Palestine.

The separation of the Palestinian area from Syria finds justification in the religious experience of mankind. The Jewish and Christian churches were born in Palestine and Jerusalem was for long years, at different periods, the capital of each. And while the relation of the Mohammedan to Palestine is not so intimate, from the beginning they have regarded Jerusalem as a Holy Place. Only by establishing Palestine as a separate State can justice be done to these great facts.

As drawn upon the map, the new State would control its own source of water power and irrigation, on Mount Hermon in the East to Jordan, a feature of great importance since the success of the new State would depend upon the possibilities of agricultural development.

2. It is recommended that this State be placed under Great Britain as a mandatory of the League of Nations.

Palestine would obviously need wise and firm guidance. Its population is without political experience, is racially composite, and could easily become distracted by fanaticism and bitter religious differences.

The success of Great Britain in dealing with similar situations her relation to Egypt, and her administrative achievements since General Allenby freed Palestine from the Turks, all indicate her as a logical mandatory.

3. It is recommended that the Jews be invited to return to Palestine and settle there, being assured by Conference of all proper assistance in so doing that may be consistent with the protection of the personal (especially the religious) and the property rights of the non-Jewish population, and being further assured that it will be the

policy of the League of Nations to recognise Palestine as a Jewish State as soon as it is a Jewish State in fact.

It is right that Palestine should become a Jewish State, if the Jews, being given the full opportunity, make it such. It was the cradle and home of their vital race, which has made large spiritual contributions to mankind, and is the only land in which they can hope to find a home of their own; they being in this last respect unique among significant peoples.

At present, however, the Jews form barely a sixth of the total population of 700,000 in Palestine, and whether they are to form a majority, or even a plurality, of the population in the future State remains uncertain. Palestine, in short, is far from being a Jewish country now. England, as mandatory, can be relied on to give the Jews the privileged position they should have, without sacrificing the rights of non-Jews.

4. It is recommended that the holy places and religious rights of all creeds in Palestine be placed under the protection of the League of Nations and its mandatory.

The basis of this recommendation is self-evident.

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**The Zionist Memorandum To Peace Conference  
(Feb. 8, 1919)**

The Zionist Organisation respectfully submits the following draft resolutions for the consideration of the Peace Conference.

1. The High Contracting Parties recognise the historic title of the Jewish People to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home.

2. The boundaries of Palestine shall be as declared in the schedule annexed hereto.

3. The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be vested in the League of Nations and the Government entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League.

4. Provision to be inserted relating to the application in Palestine of such of the general conditions attached to mandates as are suitable to the case.

5. The mandate shall be subject also to the following special conditions:—

(i) Palestine shall be placed under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish National Home and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non Jewish communities in Palestine or the right and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

(ii) To this end the Mandatory Power shall inter-alia.

(a) promote Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land, the established rights of the present non-Jewish population being safeguarded.

(b) Accept the co-operation in such measures of a council representative of the Jews of Palestine and of the world that may be established for the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine and entrust the organisation of Jewish education to such council

(c) On being satisfied that the constitution of such council precludes the making of private profit, offer to the council in priority any concession for public works or for the development of natural resources which it may be found desirable to grant.

(iii) The Mandatory Power shall encourage the widest measure of self-government for localities practicable in the conditions of the country.

(iv) There shall be for ever the fullest freedom of religious worship for all creeds in Palestine. There shall be no discrimination among the inhabitants with regard to citizenship and civil rights on the grounds of religion or race.

(v) Provision to be inserted relating to the control of Holy places.

#### Schedule

#### The Boundaries Of Palestine

The boundaries of Palestine shall follow the general lines set out below;—

Starting on the north at a point on the Mediteranean Sea in the vicinity of Sidone and following the water sheds of the foothills of Lebanon as far as *Jisr El Karaon*, thence to E L B I R E, following



the dividing line between the two basins of the *Wadi El Korn* and the *Wadi Etteim* thence in a southerly direction following the dividing line between the eastern and western slopes of the *Hermon*, to the vicinity west of *Beit Jenn*, thence eastward following the northern water sheds of the *Nahr Mughaniye* close to and west of *Hedjaz Railway*.

In the east a line close to and west of the *Hedjaz Railway* terminating in the *Gulf of Aqaba*.

In the south a frontier to be agreed upon with the *Egyptian Government*.

In the west the *Mediterranean Sea*, the details of the delimitations, or any necessary adjustments of detail, shall be settled by a special commission on which there shall be *Jewish representation*.

## STATEMENT

### *The Historic Title*

The claims of the Jews with regard to *Palestine* rest upon the following main considerations:—

(1) The land is the historic home of the Jews; there they achieved their greatest development, from that center, through their agency, there emanated spiritual and moral influences of Supreme value to mankind. By violence they were driven from *Palestine*, and through the ages they have never ceased to cherish the longing and the hope of a return.

(2) In some parts of the world, and particularly in *Eastern Europe*, the conditions of life of the millions of Jews are deplorable. Forming often a congested population, denied the opportunities which will make a healthy development possible, the need of fresh outlet is urgent, both for their own sake and in the interest of the population of other races, among whom they dwell. *Palestine* would offer one such outlet to the Jewish masses. It is the country above all others in which they would most wish to cast their lot. By the methods of economic development to which we shall refer later, *Palestine* can be made now, as it was in ancient times, the home of a prosperous population many times as numerous as that which now inhabits it.

(3) But Palestine is not large enough to contain more than a proportion of the Jews of the world. The greater part of the fourteen million or more scattered through all countries must remain in their present localities, and it will doubtless be one of the cares of the Peace Conference to ensure for them, wherever they have been oppressed, as for all peoples, equal rights and humane conditions. A Jewish National Home in Palestine will, however, be of high value to them also. Its influence will permeate the Jewries of the world; it will inspire these millions, hitherto often despairing, with a new hope; it will hold out before their eyes a high standard; it will help to make them even more useful citizens in the lands in which they dwell.

4. Such a Palestine would be of value also to the world at large whose real wealth consists in the healthy diversities of its civilization.

5. Lastly the land itself needs redemption. Much of it is left desolate. Its present condition is a standing reproach. Two things are necessary for that redemption—a stable and enlightened Government, and an addition to the present population which shall be energetic, intelligent, devoted to the country, and backed by the large financial resources that are indispensable for development. Such a population the Jews alone can supply.

Inspired by these ideas, Jewish activities particularly during the last thirty years have been directed to Palestine within the measure that the Turkish administrative system allowed. Some millions of pounds sterling have been spent in the country particularly in the foundation of Jewish agricultural settlements. These settlements have been, for the most part, highly successful.

With enterprise and skill the Jews have adopted modern scientific methods and have shown themselves to be capable agriculturists. Hebrew has been revived as a living language, it is the medium of instruction in the schools and the tongue is in daily use among the rising generation. The foundations of a Jewish university have been laid at Jerusalem and considerable funds have been contributed for the creation of its building and for its endowment. Since the British occupation, the Zionist organisation has expended in Palestine approximately £ 250,000 a month upon relief, education and sanitation. To promote the future development

of the country great sums will be needed for drainage, irrigation, roads, railways, harbours and public works of all kinds, as well as for land settlement and house-building. Assuming a political settlement under which the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine is assured, the Jews of the world will make every effort to provide the vast sums of money that will be needed."

(Here follow a recital of the Balfour Declaration and of its endorsement by the French Foreign Minister and reference to support of Zionism and the Balfour Declaration by other allied Governments)

### **Great Britain as Mandatory of the League of Nations**

We ask that Great Britain shall act as Mandatory of the League of Nations for Palestine. The selection of Great Britain as Mandatory is urged on the ground that this is the wish of Jews of the world and the League of Nations in selecting a Mandatory will follow, as far as possible, the popular wish of the people concerned.

The preference on the part of the Jews for a British Trusteeship is unquestionably the result of peculiar relationship of England to the Jewish Palestinian problem. The return of the Jews to Zion has not only been a remarkable feature in English literature, but in the domain of state-craft it has played its part, beginning with the readmission of Jews under Cromwell. It manifested itself particularly in the 19th century in the instructions given to British consular representatives in the Orient after the Damascus Incident; in the various Jewish Palestinian projects suggested by English non-Jews prior to 1881; in the letters of endorsement and support given by members of the Royal Family and Officers of the Government to Lawrence Oliphant and finally, in the three consecutive acts which definitely associated Great Britain with Zionism in the minds of the Jews viz the El Arish offer in 1901; the East African offer in 1903, and lastly the British Declaration in favour of Jewish National Home in Palestine in 1917. Moreover, the Jews who have gained political experience in many lands under a great variety of governmental systems, whole-heartedly appreciate the advanced and liberal policies adopted by Great Britain in her modern colonial administration.

(Here follows a recital of the selection of Great Britain as mandatory power by the American Jewish Congress and a conference of Palestine Jews at Jaffa.)

### **Boundaries**

The boundaries above outlined are what we consider essential for necessary economic foundation of the country. Palestine must have its natural outlets to the seas and the control of its rivers and their headwaters. The boundaries are sketched with the general economic needs and historic tradition of the country in mind, factors which necessarily must also be considered by the special commission in fixing the definite boundary lines. This commission will bear in mind that it is highly desirable in the interests of economical administration that the geographical area of Palestine should be as large as possible so that it may eventually contain a large and thriving population which could more easily bear the burdens of the modern civilized government than a small country with a necessary limitation of inhabitants.

The economic life of Palestine, like that of every other semi-arid country, depends on the available water supply. It is, therefore, of vital importance not only to secure all water resources already feeding the country but also to be able to conserve and control them at their sources.

The Hermon is Palestine's real 'Father of Waters' and cannot be severed from it without striking at the very root of its economic life. The Hermon not only needs reafforestation but also other works before it can again adequately serve as the water reservoir of the country. It must, therefore, be wholly under the control of those who will most willingly as well as most adequately restore it to its maximum utility. Some international arrangement must be made whereby the riparian rights of the people dwelling south of the Titi River may be fully protected. Properly cared for these headwaters can be made to serve in the development of the Lebanon as well as Palestine.

The fertile plains east of the Jordan, since the earliest Biblical times, have been linked economically and politically with the land west of the Jordan. The country which is now very

sparsely populated, in Roman times supported a great population. It could now serve admirably for colonisation on a large scale. A just regard for the economic needs of Palestine and Arabia demands that free access to the Hedjaz Railway throughout its length be accorded to both Governments.

An intensive development of the agriculture and other opportunities of Trans-Jordania make it imperative that Palestine shall have access to the Red Sea and opportunity of developing good harbours on the Gulf of Aqaba. Aqaba, it will be recalled, was the terminus of an important trade route of Palestine from the days of Solomon onwards. The ports developed in the Gulf of Aqaba should be free ports through which the commerce of the hinterland may pass on the same principle which guides us in suggesting that free access be given to the Hedjaz Railway.

#### **Proposals to the Mandatory Power**

In connection with the Government to be set up by the Mandatory of the League of Nations until such time as the people of Palestine shall be prepared to undertake the establishment of representative and responsible Government, proposals will be made, in due course, to the Mandatory Power to the following effect:

1. In any instrument establishing the constitution of Palestine the Declaration of the Peace Conference shall be recited as forming an integral part of that constitution.

2. The Jewish people shall be entitled to fair representation in the Executive and Legislative bodies and in the selection of public and civil servants. In giving such representation the Mandatory Power shall consult the Jewish council hereinafter mentioned.

Neither law nor custom shall preclude the appointment of a citizen of Palestine as chief of the executive.

3. That encouraging the self-government of localities the Mandatory Power shall secure the maintenance by local communities of proper standards of administration in matters of education, communal or regional activities. In granting or enlarging local autonomy regard shall be had to the readiness and ability of the

community to attain such standards. Local autonomous communities shall be empowered and encouraged to combine and co-operate for common purposes.

4. Education without distinction of race shall be assisted from public funds.

5. Hebrew shall be one of the official languages of Palestine and shall be employed in all documents, decrees, and announcements and on all stamps, coins and notes issued by the Government.

The Jewish Sabbath and Holy Days shall be recognised as days of rest.

7. All inhabitants continuing to reside in Palestine who on the day..... of 19..., have their domicile in Palestine, except those who elect in writing within six months from such date to retain their foreign citizenship, shall become citizens of Palestine, and they and all persons in Palestine or naturalized under the laws of Palestine after the—day of 19..., shall be citizens thereof and entitled to the protection of the Mandatory Power on behalf of the Government of Palestine.

#### **Land Commission**

Recognising that the General progress of Palestine must begin with the reform of the conditions governing land tenure and settlement, the Mandatory Power shall appoint a Commission (upon which the Jewish council shall have representation) with power:

(a) To make survey of the land and to schedule all lands that may be made available for close settlement, intensive cultivation and public use;

(b) To propose measures for determining and registering titles of ownership of land;

(c) To propose measures for supervising transactions in land with a view to preventing land speculation ;

(d) To propose measures for the close settlement, intensive cultivation, and public use of land, where necessary compulsory purchase at a fair pre-war price and further by making available

all wastelands, unoccupied and inadequately cultivated lands, or lands without legal owners, and state lands.

(e) To propose measures for the taxation and the tenure of land and in general any progressive measure in harmony with the policy of making the land available for close settlement and intensive cultivation.

(f) To propose measures whereby the Jewish Council may take over all lands available for close settlement and intensive cultivation.

(g) In all such measures the established rights of the present population shall be equitably safeguarded.

### **The Jewish Council For Palestine**

1. A Jewish Council for Palestine shall be elected by a Jewish Congress representative of the Jews of Palestine and of the entire world, which shall be convoked in Jerusalem on or before the first day of January 1920, or as soon thereafter as possible, by the Provisional Jewish Council hereinafter mentioned.

The Jewish Congress shall determine its functions as well as the constitution and functions of the Jewish Council in conformity with the purpose and spirit of the Declaration of the Peace Conference and of the powers conferred by the Mandatory Power upon the Jewish Council.

2. The Jewish Council shall be recognised as a legal entity and shall have power:—

(a) To co-operate and consult with and to assist the Government of Palestine in any and all matters affecting the Jewish people in Palestine and in all such cases to be, and to act, as the representative of the Jewish people.

(b) To participate in the development and administration of immigration, close land settlement, credit facilities, public works, services, and enterprises, and every other form of activity conducive

to the development of the country. The organisation of Jewish education to be entrusted to such Council.

(c) To acquire and hold real Estate.

(d) To acquire and exercise concessions for public works and the development of natural resources.

(e) With the consent of the Jewish inhabitants concerned or their accredited representatives, to assess such inhabitants for the purpose of stimulating and maintaining education: communal, charitable and other public institutions (including the Jewish Council) and other activities primarily concerned with the welfare of the Jewish people in Palestine.

(f) With the approval of the Mandatory power and upon such terms and conditions as the Mandatory Power may prescribe to administer the immigration laws of Palestine in so far as they affect Jewish immigration.

(g) With the approval of the Mandatory Power, to issue bonds, debentures, or other obligations, the proceeds of any or all of which to be expended by the Jewish Council for the benefit of the Jewish people or for the development of Palestine. The Jewish Council shall hold all of its property and income in trust for the benefit of the Jewish people.

3. A provisional Jewish Council of representatives of the Zionist Organisation of the Jewish population in Palestine and such other approved Jewish organisations as are willing to co-operate in the development of a Jewish Palestine shall be formed forthwith by the Zionist Organisation. Such provisional Jewish Council shall exercise all of the powers and perform all of the duties of the Jewish Council until such time as the Jewish Council shall be formally constituted by the Jewish Congress.

4. Finally when in the opinion of the Mandatory Power, the inhabitants of Palestine shall be able to undertake the establishment of Representative and Responsible Government, such steps shall be taken as will permit the establishment of such Government



through the exercise of a democratic franchise, without regard to race or faith, and the inhabitants of Palestine under such government, shall continue to enjoy equal civil and political rights as citizens irrespective of race or faith.....

(Here follows a description of the Zionist Organisation.)

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## **Summary Record Of Secret Discussion on Sykes-Picot Agreement**

*Summary Record Of A Secret Meeting Of The Supreme Council  
held on March 20, 1919 At Paris To Consider  
The Sykes-Picot Agreement*

M. Clemenceau suggested that M. Pichon should open the discussion.

M. Pichon began by explaining that the origin of this question was the agreement of May 1916 (Sykes-Picot) concluded between Great Britain and France in regard to Mesopotamia, Syria, and the adjoining regions. This agreement had two objects. First, to detach the Arabs from the Turks; second, to decide the claims of Great Britain and France. He then proceeded to explain the principles of the dispositions made on a map. The agreement fixed a zone coloured blue within which France would exercise direct administration, and a zone coloured red in which England would exercise direct administration. In addition, there was a zone coloured white enclosed by a blue line within which France should exercise indirect administration, known as Zone (A) and a corresponding zone enclosed in a red line within which Great Britain would exercise indirect administration Zone (B). At this stage it was unnecessary to say anything of the subsequent agreement with Italy. Within the A and B zones it was intended to favour the creation of an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. In area A France and in area B Great Britain should alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. In addition Great Britain was to be accorded the ports of Haifa and Acre. Haifa was to be a free port as regards the trade of France, and there was to be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa by the British railway, for which facilities were to be given. Alexandretta

which fell in the blue area, was to be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire, and there was to be freedom of traffic for British goods through Alexandretta by railway through the blue area. In addition, there were certain customs and political stipulations. Such were the general dispositions of 1916 which he emphasised were designed:—

(1) To favour the establishment of an Arab State or Confederation of States and to detach the Arabs from Turkey;

and

(2) To decide between the claims of Great Britain and France.

The above agreement confirmed, by an exchange of Notes between M. Paul Cambon and Sir Edward Grey (Lord Grey), declarations which had been made by Great Britain as early as 1912, in which Great Britain had disinterested herself and recognised the rights of France in Syria, subject only to Great Britain's insistence on keeping untouched her economic rights. In short, Great Britain had declared she had no political claims, but that her economic rights must remain intact in Syria.

Since the conclusion of the Agreement of 1916 there had been a long further correspondence and an exchange of many Notes between France and Great Britain concerning particularly various local interests. This brought us to the most recent period in which the French made, he would not say a protest against, but a series of observations in regard to, the British attitude in Syria. The whole series of these had recently been handed by the President of the Council to Lord Milner,

The incidents referred to in this correspondence were chiefly due to the disproportion in the relative contingents furnished by Great Britain and France to the campaign in Syria. It had only been possible for France to send a very small number of troops to Syria in consequence of the large demands made on her for the protection of French soil and to the prominent part played by her armies in Salonica. Great Britain, however, had interested herself far more in Turkish campaigns, and had sent many troops which had been led by General Allenby. From that disproportion there resulted a great many incidents. Eventually, the President of the Council had thought

it right to bring them before the British Government with a view to putting an end to the faction and the friction which now existed.

From all the declarations made by the British and French Governments he only wanted to quote one, namely, that of November 9, 1918. This was particularly important as showing the disinterested attitude of both Governments towards the Arabs. This declaration had been communicated shortly after its issue by the French Ambassador in Washington to President Wilson.

Mr. Lloyd George interpolated at this point that this announcement, which was the latest expression of policy by the two Governments, was more important than all the old agreements.

*M. Pichon then read the declaration of November 9, 1918 (See P. 64)*

As the difficulties between the two Governments continued, and as the French Government particularly did not wish them to reach a point where ultimate agreement would be compromised the President of the Council, on his visit to London in December 1918, had asked Mr. Lloyd George to confirm the agreement between the two countries. Mr. Lloyd George had replied that he saw no difficulty about the right of French in Syria and Cilicia, but he made demands for certain places which he thought should be included in the British zone, and which, under the 1916 agreement were in the French zone of influence, namely, Mosul. He also asked for Palestine. M. Clemenceau had, on his return to Paris, been desirous that this suggestion should be examined in a most favourable spirit. In consequence, he had ordered a scheme of agreement to be prepared, with the inclusion of Mosul in the British zone of influence, and this had been handed to the British Government on the 15th February, 1919. The letter which accompanied this proposal had asked for a recognition of the historic and traditional case for including the regions claimed in the French zone. It had pointed out that there was no Government in the world which had such a position as France in the regions claimed. It had given an exposition of the historic rights of France dating from the time of Louis XIV. M. Pichon continued by pointing out that French intervention in

Syria had been frequent, the last instance being case the of expedition organised in Syria and Lebanon in 1860, which had resulted in the establishment of the status of Lebanon. France, he pointed out, had a great number of hospitals in Syria. There were a great number of schools in many villages, and some 50,000 children were educated in French primary schools. There were also a number of secondary schools and one great university in Beyrout. Moreover the railway system of Syria was French, and included the Beyrout to Damascus line, and the Tripoli-Homs line, which latter it was proposed to prolong to the Euphrates and to unite with the Bagdad system. Altogether it was contemplated to have a system of 1,233 kilometres, of which 683 kilometres had already been constructed. Beyrout was entirely a French port. The gas and electricity works were French, and the same applied to the lighting along the coast. This was not the limit of French enterprise, for France had perfected the agriculture and the viticulture of Syria and had established many factories. No other country had anything like so complete a development in these regions. Hence, France could not abandon her rights. Moreover France strongly protested against any idea of dividing Syria. Syria had geographical and historic unity. the French Government frankly avowed that they did not want the responsibility of administering Palestine, though they would prefer. What they asked was:—

(1) That the whole Syria region should be treated as a unit:

and

(2) That France should become the mandatory of the League of Nations of this region.

On January 30 of this year Mr. Lloyd George had urged the Conference to reconsider the distribution of troops in Turkey and the Caucasus with the object of lightening the heavy burden which fell on Great Britain. As a result, the Military Representatives had been asked to prepare a plan. The scheme of the Military Representatives provided for:—

The occupation by France of Syria and Cilicia with 2 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade:

The occupation by Great Britain of Mesopotamia, including Mosul, by 2 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade:

The occupation by Italy of the Caucasus and Konia.

The economy which Great Britain would achieve by this plan would have amounted to 10 divisions of infantry and 4 divisions of cavalry. The plan of the Military Representatives had been placed on the Agenda Paper of the Conference, but at Lord Milner's request the subject had been adjourned and had never been discussed.

About this time a conversation had taken place between M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon and Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, as a result of which Sir Maurice Hankey had handed M. Pichon a map containing a British counter-proposal to the French proposal of February 15. This scheme provided for a great limitation of the territory to come under French influence, both on the east and on the south as regards the Jebel Druse. The French Government was quite unable to take this project into consideration. Recently Lord Milner had left a map with M. Clemenceau containing yet another project, which M. Pichon proceeded to explain, and which, he added, greatly circumscribed the French area. It was evident that the French Government could not look at this scheme either, even though they had the greatest desire to reach an agreement. No one felt more deeply than he what Great Britain and France owed to each other, and no one had a greater desire to reach an agreement. It was, however, quite impossible to accept a proposal such as that put forward by Lord Milner. It would be absolutely indefensible in the Chamber. It was enough for the Chamber to know that the Government were in negotiation with Great Britain for the handing over of Mosul to create a movement that had resulted in a proposal in the Budget Committee for a diminution of credits for Syria. This had not been a mere budget trick but represented a real movement of public opinion. French opinion would not admit that France could be even partly excluded after the sacrifices she had made in the war, even if she had not been able to play a great part in the Syrian campaign. In consequence, the minimum that France could accept was what had been put forward in the French Government's Note to Mr. Lloyd George,

the object of which had been to give satisfaction to his desire for the inclusion of Mosul in the British zone.

Mr. Lloyd George said that M. Pichon had opened as though the question of the mandate for Syria was one between Great Britain and France. There was, in fact, no such question so far as Great Britain was concerned. He wished to say at once that just as we had disinterested ourselves in 1912, so we now disinterested ourselves in 1919. If the Conference asked us to take Syria, we should reply in the negative. The British Government had definitely decided this because otherwise it would be said afterwards in France that they had created disturbances in order to keep the the French out. Hence, the British Government definitely intended to have nothing to do with Syria. The question of the extent to which Great Britain and France were concerned was cleared up in the interview he had with Mr Clemenceau in London, and at which he said that he wanted Mosul with the adjacent regions and Palestine.

As there was no question between France and Great Britain in regard to Syria, we could examine the question in as disinterested a spirit as we could a Carpathian boundary to be decided in accordance with the general principles accepted by the Conference. He wished to make this clear before General Allenby said what he had to say. In regard to Mosul, he wished to acknowledge the cordial spirit in which M. Pichon had met our desires.

But if there was a French public opinion there was also a British public opinion, and it must be remembered that the whole burden of the Syrian campaign had fallen upon Great Britain. The number of French troops taking part in the campaign had been so small as to make no difference. Sometimes they had been helpful, but not on all occasions. The British Empire and India had maintained from 900,000 to 1,000,000 troops in Turkey and the Caucasus. Their casualties had amounted to 125,000, the campaign had cost hundreds of millions of pounds. He himself had done his best to induce M. Clemenceau's predecessors to take part in the campaign. He had also pressed Marshal Foch on the subject, and to this day he had in his possession a rough plan drawn up by Marshal Foch during an air raid at Boulogne. He

had begged the French Government to cooperate, and had pointed out to them that it would enable them to occupy Syria, although, at the time, the British troops had not yet occupied Gaza. This had occurred in 1917 and 1918, at a time when the heaviest casualties in France also were being incurred by British troops. From that time onwards most of the heavy and continuous fighting in France had been done by British troops, although Marshal Petain had made a number of valuable smaller attacks. This was one of the reasons why he had felt justified in asking Marshal Foch for troops. He had referred to this in order to show that the reason we had fought so hard in Palestine was not because we had not been fighting in France. M. Pichon seemed to think that we were departing from the 1916 agreement in other respects to Mosul and Palestine. In fact we were not. M. Pichon had omitted in his lucid statement to explain that the blue area in which France was "allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they may desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States" did not include Damascus, Homs, Hama, or Aleppo. In area A France was "prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States . . . under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief.", Also in area A France would "have priority of right of enterprise and local loans . . . and . . . "shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States." Was France prepared to accept that? This, however, was not a question between Great Britain and France. It was a question between France and an agreement which we had signed with King Hussein.

(At this point M. Orlando and General Diaz entered).

M. Pichon said he wished to say one word. In the new agreements which were contemplated no direct administration whatsoever was claimed by France. Since the Agreement of 1916, the whole mandatory system had been adopted. If a mandate were granted by the League of Nations over these territories, all that he asked was that France should have that part put aside for her.

Mr. Lloyd George said that we could not do that. The League of Nations could not be used for putting aside our bargain

with King Hussein. He asked if M. Pichon intended to occupy Damascus with French troops? If he did, it would clearly be a violation of the Treaty with the Arabs.

M. Pichon said that France had no convention with King Hussein.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the whole of the agreement of 1916 (Sykes-Picot), was based on a letter from Sir Henry McMahon to King Hussein from which he quoted (See P. 47)

M. Pichon said that this undertaking had been made by Great Britain (*Angleterre*) alone. France had never seen it until a few weeks before Sir Maurice Hankey had handed him.

Mr. Lloyd George said the agreement might have been made by England (*Angleterre*) alone, but it was England (*Angleterre*) who had organised the whole of the Syrian campaign. There would have been no question of Syria but for England (*Angleterre*). Great Britain had put from 900,000 to 1,000,000 men in the field against Turkey, but Arab help had been essential; that was a point on which General Allenby could speak.

General Allenby said it had been invaluable.

Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said that it was on the basis of the above-quoted letter that King Hussein had put all his resources into the field which had helped us most materially to win the victory. France had for practical purposes accepted our undertaking to King Hussein in signing the 1916 agreement. This had not been M. Pichon, but his predecessors. He was bound to say that if the British Government now agreed that Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo should be included in the sphere of direct French influence, they would be breaking faith with the Arabs, and they could not face this. He was particularly anxious for M. Clemenceau to follow this. The agreement of 1916 had been signed subsequent to the letter to King Hussein. In the following extract from the agreement of 1916 France recognised Arab independence :—

“It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments :—



(1) That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States in the areas A and B marked on the annexed map under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief."

Hence, France, by this act, practically recognised our agreement with King Hussein by excluding Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo from the blue zone of direct administration, for the map attached to the agreement showed that Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo were included, not in the zone of direct administration but in the independent Arab State.

M. Pichon said that this had never been contested, but how could France be bound by an agreement the very existence of which was unknown to her at the time when the 1916 agreement was signed? In the 1916 agreement France had not in any way recognised the Hedjaz. They had undertaken to uphold "an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States," but not the King of Hedjaz. If France was promised a mandate for Syria, she would undertake to do nothing except in agreement with the Arab State or Confederation of States. This is the role which France demanded in Syria. If Great Britain would only promise her good offices, he believed that France could reach an understanding with Feisal.

President Wilson said that he would now seek to establish his place in the Conference. Up to the present he had none. He could only be here, like his colleague M. Orlando, as one of the representatives assembled to establish the peace of the world. This was his only interest, although, of course, he was a friend of both parties to the controversy. He was not indifferent to the understanding which had been reached between the British and French Governments, and was interested to know about the undertakings to King Hussein and the 1916 agreement, but it was not permissible for him to express an opinion thereon. He would, however, like to point out that one of the parties to the 1916 agreement had been Russia, and Russia had now disappeared. Hence the partnership of interest had been dissolved, since one of the parties had gone out. This seemed to him to alter the

basis of the agreement. The point of view of the United States of America was, however, indifferent to the claims both of Great Britain and France over peoples unless those peoples wanted them. One of the fundamental principles to which the United States of America adhered was the consent of the governed. This was ingrained in the United States of America thought. Hence, the only idea from the United States of America point of view was as to whether France would be agreeable to the Syrians. The same applied as to whether Great Britain would be agreeable to the inhabitants of Mesopotamia. (It might not be his business, but if the question was made his business, owing to the fact that it was brought before the Conference, the only way to deal with it was to discover the desires of the population of these regions.) He recalled that, in the Council of Ten, Resolutions had been adopted in regard to mandatories, and they contained a very carefully thought out graduation of different stages of mandate according to the civilisation of the peoples concerned. One of the elements in those mandates was the desire of the people over whom the mandate was to be exercised. The present controversy broadened out into very important questions. Cilicia, for example, from its geographical position, cut Armenia off from the Mediterranean. If there was one mandatory in the south, and another in the north of Armenia, there would be a great danger of friction, since the troublesome population lived in the south. Hence, the controversy broadened into a case affecting the peace of the whole world in this region. He hoped, therefore, that the question would be discussed from this point of view. If this were agreed to, he hoped that he might ask General Allenby certain questions. If the participation of M. Orlando and himself were recognised as a matter of right and not of courtesy, the question he wanted to know was whether the undertaking to King Hussein, and the 1916 agreement, provided an arrangement which would work. If not, and you asked his opinion, he would reply that we ought to ask what is the opinion of the people in the part of the world concerned. He was told that, if France insisted on occupying Damascus and Aleppo, there would be instant war. Feisal had said that he could not say how many men he had had in the field at one time, as it had been a fluctuating figure, but from first to last he had probably had 100,000 men.

General Allenby said that he had never had so many at one time.

President Wilson said that, nevertheless, from first to last France would have to count on having 100,000 troops against her. This would mean that France must send a large number of troops. He was greatly concerned in a fight between friends, since he was the friend of France and the friend of Feisal. He was very concerned to know if a "scrap" was developing. Hence, he asked that it might be taken for granted that this question was on the Council table, since it was one of interest to the peace of the world, and that it was not merely a question of agreement between France and Great Britain. The Turkish Empire at the present time was as much in solution as though it were made of quicksilver. Austria, at any rate, had been broken into pieces, and the pieces remained, but the Turkish Empire was in complete solution. The Councils of the world would have to take care of it. For his part, he was quite disinterested, since the United States of America did not want anything in Turkey. They would be only too delighted if France and Great Britain would undertake the responsibility. Lately, however, it had been put to him that he must approach his own people on this matter, and he intended to try, although it would mean some very good talking on his part. He admitted that the United States of America must take the responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, there was great antipathy in the United States of America to the assumption of these responsibilities. Even the Philippines were regarded as something hot in the hand that they would like to drop. If we said to the French Government "Occupy this region," what would happen? He had a method to propose of finding out, which he would develop later.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that General Allenby should be questioned at this point.

President Wilson asked the following question :—

If before we arrive at a permanent settlement under the League of Nations we invite France to occupy the region of Syria, even as narrowly defined, what would the result be?

General Allenby said there would be the strongest possible opposition by the whole of the Moslems, and especially by the

Arabs. Shortly after the capture of Damascus, Feisal had been allowed to occupy and administer the city. He had said that he would like to be helped in the administration. A little later, after the setting up of the military administration in these regions, General Allenby had put French administrators in the blue area. When they arrived Emir Feisal had said that he could not retain the command of the Arab Army if France occupied the ports. He had said that it meant that he was occupying a house without a door, and it would be said that he had broken faith with the Arab nation. Feisal had originally asked if he could occupy Beyrout and the ports. General Allenby had replied in the affirmative, but had told him that he must withdraw when the Allied Armies came along, and he had done so. To Feisal's protests against the occupation by the French of places in the blue zone, General Allenby had replied that he himself was in charge of the administration, as Commander-in-Chief; and that the French officers appointed as administrators must be regarded not as French officers, but as Allied military officers, Feisal had then said that he would admit it for the present, but would it last for ever? General Allenby had replied that the League of Nations intended to give the small nations the right of self-determination. Feisal had insisted that "if put under French control" he would oppose to the uttermost. General Allenby had replied that at present there was no French control, but only the control of the Allies, and that eventually Feisal's rights would be considered. Soon afterwards he had visited Beyrout, and there and in other places deputations had come to protest against the French administration. These had included various Christians, Orthodox and Protestants, as well as Mussulmans. General Allenby had again replied that it was not a French administration, but merely officers put in by himself as Allied Commander-in-Chief. Every time he had been in that country he had found the greatest opposition to French administration. He had done his utmost to make a *rapprochement* among the Arabs and the French, but without success. The French liaison officers did not get on well with the Arabs. M. Picot had been with him to Damascus and Aleppo and was perfectly conversant with the situation. M. Picot would say that General Allenby had done his best to create good feeling. Lately, Sir Mark Sykes had

been to Beyrout, Aleppo, and Damascus with M. Picot and had done his best. Nevertheless, the misunderstanding continued. If the French were given a mandate in Syria, there would be serious trouble and probably war. If Feisal undertook the direction of operations there might be a huge war covering the whole area, and the whole Arabs of the Hedjas would join. This would necessitate the employment of a very large force. This would probably involve Great Britain also if they were in Palestine. It might even involve them in Egypt, and the consequences would be incalculable.

He had gone with M. Picot to Damascus and had seen there Ali Riza el Rikaby Pasha, the Governor of the territory to the east of Damascus. The administration had not been doing well. There was practically no budget, and it had been necessary to give him advisers. General Allenby had given him two British Advisers, Majors Cornwallis and Sterling. M. Picot had subsequently sent a very good man named Captain Cousse, to replace a liaison officer (Captain Mercier) who had been there before, who had not got on with the Arabs because he had stood too much on his dignity. Even Captain Cousse, however, had not been able to get on well. Afterwards, General Allenby had sent a British financial expert, and had invited M. Picot to send a French financial expert. The British Adviser, Colonel Graves, had cooperated with M. Moulin, the French adviser. They reported very badly on the finance. There had practically been no budget. Then General Allenby had withdrawn Colonel Graves. M. Moulin was still there, but was meeting with great difficulties owing to Ali Riza el Rikaby's dislike of the French administration. General Allenby had visited Damascus with M. Picot and had there interviewed Riza el Rikaby Pasha. General Allenby produced at the Conference a document containing the gist of the communication made by him to Riza el Rikaby Pasha. A copy of this document in Arabic and English had been left with Riza el Rikaby Pasha.

In reply to Mr. Lloyd George he said at Damascus there was a brigade of infantry and two regiments of cavalry. The Sherifian troops were only used for police purposes, since the Sherifian Army was still in process of formation.

(At this point there was an adjournment).

President Wilson suggested that the fittest men that could be obtained should be selected to form an Inter Allied Commission to go to Syria, extending their inquiries, if they led them, beyond the confines of Syria. Their object should be to elucidate the state of opinion and the soil to be worked on by any mandatory. They should be asked to come back and tell the Conference what they found with regard to these matters. He made this suggestion, not because he lacked confidence in the experts whose views he had heard, such as Dr. Howard Bliss and General Allenby. These, however, had been involved in some way with the population, with special objects either educational or military. If we were to send a Commission of men with no previous contact with Syria, it would, at any rate, convince the world that the Conference had tried to do all it could to find the most scientific basis possible for a settlement. The Commission should be composed of an equal number of French, British, Italian and American representatives. He would send it with *carte blanche* to tell the facts as they found them.

M. Clemenceau said he adhered in principle to an inquiry, but it was necessary to have certain guarantees. The inquiry must not confine itself to Syria. Mandates were required for Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia, and other parts of the Turkish Empire as well as Syria. The peoples of these districts were not isolated. They were all connected by historical and religious and other links, including mutual feuds and old quarrels existed between all of them. Without contesting what General Allenby had said, he wished it to be recorded, if there were a process verbal, that many Syrians were not Arab, and that if the Syrians were put under the Arabs they would revolt. He knew quite well the great share taken by Feisal in the Syrian campaign, and he thought that the British were also a little afraid of it. The whole inquiry would be an extremely delicate one. Orientals were very timid and afraid to say what was at the back of their minds. It was very difficult to get the real feelings of the people. It was very important, therefore, that the enquiry should not be merely superficial. Hence he would ask for twenty-four hours of reflection before setting up

the Commission. He might like to send some French Arabs there as Feisal only represented one side of the Arab race. More, Feisal was practically a soldier of England. That was a fact that all the world knew. He said he would revolt if the French were at Damascus, but, as a matter of fact, French artillery had recently been sent there and had been received quite well. He had made every effort to bring himself to agree with the principles propounded by President Wilson, but something must be said for the historical claims and for the efforts that nations had made in different regions. For example, insistence on an Arab outlet to the sea would destroy the claim of one nation in that part of the world. The members of the Commission must be very carefully selected, and they must inquire into every Turkish mandate. Subject to these provisions he was prepared to accept President Wilson's proposal in principle.

Mr. Lloyd George said he had no objection to inquiry into Palestine and Mesopotamia, which were the regions in which the British Empire was principally concerned. Neither would he object to an inquiry into Armenia, in which they were not so closely concerned.

President Wilson said he saw advantages in a unified inquiry into Turkish mandates.

Mr. Lloyd George said if this extension was to be given to the Commission it was essential it should get to work at once, as the burden of military forces in Turkey fell mainly on the British.

Mr. Balfour said that he felt these proposals might postpone the making of peace.

President Wilson said this was not so. For the purposes of peace all that was necessary was to tell Turkey that she would have nothing.

Mr. Lloyd George said that Turkey was entitled to know who would be the mandatory for Turkish territory.

President Wilson said it was rather that they ought to know how much was to remain Turkish.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the question of who was to be mandatory of Anatolia would make all the difference for the arrangements for Turkey.

President Wilson said that Turkey was entitled to know if she was to have territory of her own, and that other parts of Turkey were to be placed under the League of Nations. Subsequently she would be informed who would be her next-door neighbour.

Mr. Lloyd George said he supposed that if the evidence were so overwhelming that, for example, the British Empire was ruled out of Mesopotamia they would be free to consider whether they could take a mandate elsewhere in Turkey?

President Wilson said this was an administrative matter and not one of sovereignty. Turkey was entitled to knowledge on all questions affecting the sovereignty.

Mr. Pichon suggested that in order to avoid delay, the Commission might divide into Sub-Commissions working in different sections.

Mr. Belfour asked whether it would be wise to include Western Anatolia in the purview of the Commission. Constantinople was mainly a military question—President Wilson said a strategic question—but south of the region which went with Constantinople came regions to which the Greeks laid claim.

Mr. Lloyd George said there was no suggestion that the Commission was to travel beyond Armenia

At Mr. Lloyd George's request :—

President Wilson undertook to draft the Terms of Reference to the Commission.

## **Ottoman Memorandum of 1919**

*(Extract Relating to Arab Lands)*

"5. *Arabia.* The Arab provinces lying to the south of the Turkish countries, and including Syria, Palestine, the Hedjaz, the Assyr, the Yemen, Iraq, and all the other regions which were recognised as forming an integral part of the Ottoman Empire before the war, would have a large measure of administrative



autonomy, under the sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. Representatives of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan would be appointed at the Holy Places (Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem), and will have a guard of honour of limited numbers.

The hallowed custom for sending every year the sacred caravan (surre) to the Holy Places shall be maintained with its usual ceremonies and in its usual form, as the despatch of this caravan is one of the ancient prerogatives of the Khilafate.

The distribution of the revenues of the pious foundations (vakfs) shall continue without hindrance as in the past. These vakfs were founded partly by the Ottoman Sultan and partly by private individuals, and have always been administered by the Khilafate. This system shall be maintained in its entirety.

The Governor of each autonomous province shall be appointed by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, except in the Hedjaz, to which may be granted a special organisation in agreement with the Power most directly interested in it. In all the Arab countries the Ottoman flag shall fly on the territory of the *smaret* (principality) or autonomous province. Justice shall be done in the name of His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, and the coinage shall bear his name Tughra.

6. *Egypt and Cyprus.* The Ottoman Government is quite willing to enter into negotiations at the proper moment with the Government of His Britannic Majesty with a view to define clearly the political status of Egypt and of the Island of Cyprus.

The Ottoman Government, having stated above its opinion as regard the new organisation of the Empire, reserve the right also of communicating subsequently to the Peace Conference its point of view regarding financial, economic and juridical questions.

It is understood that as soon as this organisation is settled, the Inter-Allied forces of occupation shall be withdrawn from Ottoman territory in a short time which shall be settled by agreement, unless their provisional retention is necessary in some parts of Arabia.

Nobody in Turkey is unaware of the gravity of the moment. The ideas of the Ottoman people are, however, well defined :

It will not accept the dismemberment of the Empire or its division under different mandates. No government may oppose the will of the people, among whom are counted populations from beyond the Tanurus even Nemads of the desert, who will not separate themselves from that Ottoman unity which has been established and hallowed for so many centuries.

From the manifestations of a great number of patriotic Committees formed in the provinces, and from the great meetings held in Constantinople (in which hundreds of thousands of citizens took part on every occasion) and from the language of the telegrams which the Government daily receives from all classes of the population, there emanates but one constant thought : unity and independence.

Trusting in the sentiments of justice of the Peace Conference the Ottoman people does not despair of reaching a solution in conformity with its legitimate aspirations and one fitted to ensure in the East that durable peace which is so greatly needed ;”

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### **Article 22 Of The Covenant Of The League Of Nations (1919)**

“Art. 22. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of Mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the council.

A permanent commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the council on all matters relating to the observance of the Mandates.<sup>3</sup>

### General Syrian Congress Resolutions of July 2, 1919

*(Adopted at the General Syrian Congress at Damascus on July 2, 1919 attended by representatives of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine)*

"We the undersigned members of the General Syrian Congress, meeting in Damascus on Wednesday, July 2nd, 1919, made up of representatives from the three Zones, viz., the Southern, Eastern, and Western, provided with credentials and authorizations by the inhabitants of our various districts, Moslems, Christians, and Jews, have agreed upon the following statement of the desires of the people of the country who have elected us to represent them to the American Section of the International Commission; the fifth article was passed by a very large majority; all the other articles were accepted unanimously.

1. We ask absolutely complete political independence for Syria within these boundaries. The Taurus System on the North; Rafah and a line running from Al Jauf to the south of the Syrian and the Hejazian line to Aqaba on the south; the Euphrates and Khabur River and a line extending east of the Abu Kamal to the east; and the Mediterranean on the west.

2. We ask that the Government of this Syrian country should be a democratic civil constitutional Monarchy on broad decentralization principles, safeguarding the rights of minorities, and that the King be the Emir Feisal, who carried on a glorious struggle in the cause of our liberation and merited our full confidence and entire reliance.

3. Considering the fact that the Arabs inhabiting the Syrian area are not naturally less gifted than other more advanced races and they are by no means less developed than the Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and Roumanians at the beginning of their independence, we protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the

League of Nations, placing us among the nations in their middle stage of development which stand in need of a mandatory power.

4. In the event of the rejection by the Peace Conference of this just protest for certain considerations that we may not understand, we, relying on the declarations of President Wilson that his object in waging war was to put an end to the ambition of conquest and colonization, can only regard the mandate mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations as equivalent to the rendering of economical and technical assistance that does not prejudice our complete assistance. And desiring that our country should not fall a prey to colonization and believing that the American Nation is farthest from any thought of colonization and has no political ambition in our country, we will seek technical and economical assistance from the United States of America, provided that such assistance does not exceed 20 years.

5. In the event of America not finding herself in a position to accept our desire for assistance, we will seek this assistance from Great Britain, also provided that such assistance does not infringe the complete independence and unity of our country and that the duration of such assistance does not exceed that mentioned in the previous article.

6. We do not acknowledge any right claimed by the French Government in any part whatever of our Syrian country and refuse that she should assist us or have a hand in our country under any circumstances and in any place.

"7. We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish Commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country, for we do not acknowledge their title but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities."

8. We ask that there should be no separation of the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, nor of the littoral western zone, which includes Lebanon, from the Syrian country. We desire that the unity of the country should be guaranteed against partition under whatever circumstances.

9. We ask complete independence for emancipated Mesopotamia and that there should be no economical barriers between the two countries.

10. The fundamental principles laid down by President Wilson in condemnation of secret treaties impel us to protest most emphatically against any treaty that stipulates the partition of our Syrian country and against any private engagement aiming at the establishment of Zionism in the southern part of Syria ; therefore we ask the complete annulment of these conventions and agreements.

The noble principles enunciated by President Wilson strengthen our confidence that our desires emanating from the depths of our heart, shall be the decisive factor in determining our future ; and that President Wilson and the free American people will be our supporters for the realization of our hopes, thereby proving their sincerity and noble sympathy with the aspiration of the weaker nations in general and our Arab people in particular.

We also have the fullest confidence that the Peace Conference will realize that we would not have risen against the Turks, with whom we had participated in all civil, political, and representative privileges, but for their violation of our national rights, and so will grant us our desires in full in order that our political rights may not be less after the war than they were before, since we have shed so much blood in the cause of our liberty and independence.

We request to be allowed to send a delegation to represent us at the Peace Conference to defend our rights and secure the realization of our aspirations.

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### **Instructions For King-Crane Commission**

*(Agreed to by President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and M. Orlando at the Supreme Council Meeting on Jan. 30, 1919.)*

It is the purpose of the Conference to separate from the Turkish Empire certain areas comprising, for example, Palestine, Syria, the Arab countries to the east of Palestine and Syria, Mesopotamia,

Armenia, Cilicia, and perhaps additional areas in Asia Minor, and to put the development of their people under the guidance of Governments which are to act as Mandatories of the League of Nations. It is expected that this will be done in accordance with the following resolutions adopted by the Representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan at a Conference held at the Quai d'Orsay on January 30, 1919.

"1. Having regard to the record of the German administration in the colonies formerly part of the German Empire, and to the menace which the possession by Germany of submarine bases in many parts of the world would necessarily constitute to the freedom and security of all nations, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that in no circumstances should any of the German Colonies be restored to Germany

"2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of the historical mis-government by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire,

"3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, to apply to these territories the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations.

"4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical positions, can

best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations.

"5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances

"6 They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.

"7. They further consider that other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the military training of the natives for other than police purposes, and the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League of Nations.

"8. Finally, they consider that there are territories, such as South West Africa and certain of the Islands in the South Pacific, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory state, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory state as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

"In every case of mandate, the mandatory state shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge".



And it is agreed that the administration of these mandates shall be in the spirit of the following document which was formally presented to the President of the United States on behalf of the Governments of Great Britain and France :

*Anglo-French Declaration of Nov. 9, 1918*

"The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.

"In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognise such governments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function which the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to ensure impartial and equal justice for all ; to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative ; to promote the diffusion of education ; and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy."

The Conference, therefore, feels obliged to acquaint itself as intimately as possible with the sentiments of the people of these regions with regard to the future administration of their affairs. You are requested, accordingly, to visit these regions to acquaint yourselves as fully as possible with the state of opinion there with regard to these matters, with the social, racial, and economic conditions, a knowledge of which might serve to guide the judgment of the Conference, and to form as definite an opinion as the circumstances and

the time at your disposal will permit, of the divisions of territory and assignment of mandates which will be most likely to promote the order, peace, and development of those peoples and countries."

25th March, 1919.

## King-Crane Commission Report of Aug. 28, 1919

### *(Extracts Relating to Palestine)*

#### *Wishes Of The People*

The Moslems constitute about four-fifths of the actual population of Palestine, according to a recent British census. Except for certain official groups they were practically unanimous for the independence of United Syria, and were responsive to the current political influence. The organizations met at Jaffa took the position that Syria is capable of self-government without a mandatory Power, but if one should be insisted upon by the Peace Conference, they preferred the United States.

At Jerusalem, however, and in all other places in Palestine, the programme of independence was affirmed. For the most part, the question of a mandate was referred, either in writing, or more often in response to questions, to the approaching Syria Congress at Damascus, at which they would have representation. Some Moslems especially in the South, maintained emphatically that they could accept no mandate whatever. It is evident that since the Damascus Congress later declared for American assistance, with the British as second choice, and emphatic refusal of the French, this is the programme to which the great majority of the Moslems of Palestine are committed. Probably most of them had it in mind when they declared for reference to Damascus.

The Christians of Palestine, who altogether constitute less than ten per cent of the population, showed more difference of opinion. Some groups in the north, as the Latin Catholics of Tiberias and Haifa and most of the Christians of Nazareth, were with the Moslems for independence and the reference to Damascus. Maronites and Greek Catholics, and usually the Latin Catholics, were for a French mandate. The Greek Orthodox everywhere, according to an

agreed programme, were for a British mandate, as were several scattering groups. None asked directly for the United States, though the opinion was expressed that if there were assurance that we would come, if asked, most Christians would favour this solution. The Christians were in general strongly in favour of a mandatory power, which should exercise a real control.

The Jews, who constitute a little more than ten per cent of the population, were all for Zionism under a British Mandate. The Moslem and Christian population was practically unanimous against Zionism, usually expressing themselves with great emphasis. This question was closely connected with that of the unity of all Syria under one Government.

#### 4. Zionism—

The Jews of Palestine declared themselves unanimously in favour of the Zionistic scheme in general, though they showed difference of opinion in regard to the details and the process of its realization. The elements of agreement may be stated as follows:

- (a) Palestine, with a fairly large area, to be set aside at once as a "national home" for the Jews.
- (b) Sooner or later the political rule of the land will become organized as a "Jewish Commonwealth".
- (c) At the start authorization will be given for the free immigration of Jews from any part of the world; for the unrestricted purchase of land by the Jews; and for the recognition of Hebrew as an official language.
- (d) Great Britain will be the mandatory power over Palestine, protecting the Jews and furthering the realization of the scheme.
- (e) The Great Powers of the world have declared in favour of the scheme, which merely awaits execution.

Differences exist especially along two lines:

- (a) Whether the Jewish Commonwealth should be set up soon after a considerable lapse of time

(b) Whether the chief emphasis should be upon a restoration of the ancient mode of life, ritual, exclusiveness and particularism of the Jews; or upon economic development in a thoroughly modern fashion, with afforestation, electrification of water-power, and general full utilization of resources.

## 5. Special Discussion

The Custody of the Holy Places—For four centuries the Turk has served as the peace between Moslems, Christians, and Jews, and even between the different sects of each, in the Holy Land. Nor has his function been merely nominal: being really a foreigner and having upon himself the responsibility of government, he has on the whole well maintained the *Status quo*, or policed slow and delicate changes in one direction or another. Now that his authority is gone, a substitute must be provided, whatever be the new regime. This might be the mandatory power. If however, any Roman Catholic power should receive the mandate, trouble would arise from the fact that at present the Catholics feel unfairly treated and claim increase of privilege at the expense of the Greek Orthodox. A Catholic power would be tempted promptly to disturb the equilibrium, especially during the eclipse of the power of Russia.

There is already a "Custodian of the Holy Places" for the Roman Catholics. Might not this idea be extended to the constitution of a permanent Commission for the Holy Places, on which might be placed this man, and representatives of Greek Christianity, Protestant Christianity, Sunnite Islam, Shiite Islam, and Judaism. The Commission might be given authority and means to guard and care for all the places in Palestine that are sacred to the three religions, and to adjudicate all disputes about thier custody. Its composition should ensure conservatism and promote harmony.

## Recommendation Regarding Palestine

5. We recommend in the fifth place, serious modifications of the extreme Zionist Programme for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews looking finally to making Palestine a distinctly Jewish State.

(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favour, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to the recommendations here made.

(2) The Commission was abundantly supplied with literature on the Zionist programme by the Zionist commission to Palestine; heard in conferences much concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims and personally saw something of what had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the devotion of many of colonists, and for their success, by modern methods in overcoming great natural obstacles.

(3) The Commission recognised also that definite encouragement had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often-quoted statement, in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour statement are adhered to-favouring the 'establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people' 'it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine'-it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist programme must be greatly modified. For 'a national home for the Jewish people' is not equivalent to making Palestine a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the 'civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine'. The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conferences with Jewish representatives; that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present Jewish inhabitants of Palestine by various forms of purchase.

In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the following principle as one of the four great ends for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting: 'The settlement of every question whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship on the basis of free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the

material interests or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery'. If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that non-Jewish population of Palestine, nearly nine-tenths of the whole, are emphatically against the entire Zionist programme. The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration and steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the peoples' rights, though it kept within the forms of law.

It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist programme is not confined to Palestine but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria as our conferences clearly showed. More than 72 per cent-1350 in all of all petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist programme. Only two requests, those for a united Syria and independence, had a larger support. This general feeling was only voiced by the 'General Syrian Congress' in the seventh, eighth, and tenth resolutions of their statement.

The Peace conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not to be lightly flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist programme could be carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought that a force of not less than fifty thousand would be required even to initiate the programme. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of Zionist programme on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a right to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.

There is a further consideration that can not justly be ignored, if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jewish State, however gradually that may take place. That consideration

**Confidential Appendix For U.S. Delegates Only***(Extracts)**1. For and Against Zionism—*

The arguments in favour of Zionism as presented by its supporters have often been stated and need not now be presented in detail. The chief elements are that Palestine belonged once to the Jews, and they were driven out by force; for two thousand years they have been longing and praying to come back; while the Jews of the world are now far too numerous to be collected in Palestine, they are entitled to have somewhere a State, which can be a refuge to the oppressed among them, and an expression of their continuance and unity; despite proposals at Paris, there is persecution of the Jews in Poland at the present moment; there is a prospect of the disintegration of the Jews in Western civilization, and their coalescence with the nations where they reside; they should have an opportunity to restore their ancient language and culture and preserve them in the old environment; there is no need of displacing the present population, for with afforestation, modern methods of agriculture, utilization of waterpower, reclamation of wastelands, scientific irrigation, and the like, the land can contain several times its present number of inhabitants; if some of the present population desire to sell their lands, they will receive a good price and there is plenty of room for them in other Arab countries; the Jewish colonies have been a great benefit to the native Arabs by teaching methods of agriculture, improving sanitation, and the like; the unfolding of the Zionist plan would bring great prosperity to all in the land, both present population and immigrants.

The native Arabs and Christians, who so unitedly oppose Zionism, urge the following principle consideration: the land is owned and occupied by them; Arabs were there before the Jews came; the Jews were immigrants who treated the former inhabitants with the greatest cruelty, and who remained a comparatively short time; they were unable to maintain control over the whole land or even union among themselves; they were expelled by the Romans and formed permanent residence elsewhere 2000 years ago; the Arabs conquered the land 1300 years ago and have remained ever since; it is their actual home, and not merely a residence of long ago; as Christians and Moslems, they can honour all the Holy Places whereas

the Jews can honour only their own; the Jews are a religion and not a nation; they will, if given control, forbid the use of the Arabic language, the measure which caused the break between the Young Turks and the Arabs; the Jewish colonies have shown no benevolence to the Arabs in their neighbourhood; it is denied that their activities have influenced the Arabs towards progress; the Jews have much money, education, and shrewdness, and will soon buy out and manoeuvre away the present inhabitants; the Arabs are friendly toward the Jews long resident in the land who use the Arabic language; they will resist to the uttermost the immigration of foreign Jews and the establishment of a Jewish Government.

*French Feeling toward the British—*

It is evident that the French feel resentment toward the British as not having played a fair game in the Syria area. Without going into historical details, the Sykes-Picot Agreement provided that France should have ownership or influence in a large area, including Damascus and Cilicia, and extending to Sivas and Harpoot, while England should be in a similar position toward the former Turkish area southeast of this. At the present moment, France is threatened with the loss of all her sphere, while England complacently holds all that was then assigned to her and extends her influence toward much of the rest. America, by showing interest in Armenia, and even by the sending of the Commission on Mandates to Syria, seems to the French to be an accomplice of England in despoiling France. The French feel that the English took advantage of their dire necessity, by reason of which they were obliged to keep practically all of their men in France, to occupy more than a due share of Syria, and to seduce the affection of the Arabs. They also resent the payment by the English to the Emir Feisal of a large monthly subsidy which they claim covers a multitude of bribes, and enables the British to stand off and show clean hands while Arab agents do dirty work in their interest. They feel that in arming the Arabs, the British are again working against the French. They claim further that the British are more or less directly responsible for the undeniably strong anti-French feeling shown by practically all the Moslem and non-Catholic Christian elements of Syria. They feel that Britain has been unable to resist the desire to connect Egypt with



Mesopotamia under one control as a bulwark of India and a new field for profitable commercial exploitation.

It cannot be denied that some of the French contentions are difficult of refutation, and that the whole situation is such that British honour would seem cleaner if Britain were to withdraw wholly from Syria. Yet the aversion of the people to France, however it may have arisen, is so great and deep-seated that England cannot leave Syria to France without seeming to abandon her friends to their enemies, a process which would probably react strongly in Egypt and elsewhere in the Moslem world. There is good reason then for the position of many Englishmen, who are strongly desirous that America should take the whole situation off their hands including with the French and Arab entanglements, the promises to Zionism.

## 2. French "Rights"—

The denial in the 'Damascus Programme' that the French have "rights" anywhere in Syria leads to an inquiry into the basis on which such rights might be claimed. In brief, there have been in Syria Roman Catholic missionary workers, using principally the French language, for several centuries. These have developed an extensive system of churches, schools, and monasteries. France has had commercial relations and small groups of resident citizens since the Middle Ages. French has long been the principal western language used in Syria. France has taken a special interest in the Maronites, and intervened on their behalf in the Lebanon in 1860.

None of these relationships, however, give the least "right" to claim territory or mandatory control. Otherwise it could be held that America, through her missionary work and business relationships, had acquired a measure of political rights in India, China, South America, and Syria itself. France herself could claim all of Turkey with nearly the same justification. It would compromise all the missionary work in the world if the doctrine were admitted that such work establishes political claims. No doubt the French have acquired many personal relationships and sentimental attachments. But there is no reason why any tie that France has had with Syria in the past should be severed or even weakened under the control of another mandatory power, or in an independent Syria.

## CHAPTER V

### Palestine Under Mandate Up To 1939

The creation of mandates under article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which formed part of the Peace Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1918, marked new departures in international law in relations between people of one country and another. It accorded, for the first time in history, legal recognition for principles of Trusteeship, Tutelage and Mandates and gave birth to the concept of suzerainty of one nation over another.

The system emerged as a compromise between the Allied Power's craving for distribution among themselves of German and Turkish territories and the U.S. President Mr. Wilson's insistence on implementing his war-time pledge of self-government to the enemy-held territories. The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers at its meeting in Paris on Jan. 30 1919, exactly three months after the Turks signed the armistice, decided to deprive the enemy powers of all their foreign territories,

The partisanship for the Europeans made the Western powers agree upon setting up independent states in the Balkans. But in Asia and Africa they tried to evolve some form of an international control and administration. Joint administration by all the powers was considered impracticable and opposed to the interests of the people. The friction and conflict experienced in Egypt, Samoa and the New Hebrides even under the administration of two powers only weighed the scales against the alternative of a condominium. Mandatory system emerged as a suitable alternative. Analogies for the system were discovered in the delegation of quasi sovereign power to the British and Dutch Chartered Companies and the control of the Ionian isles on behalf of the powers by Great Britain in 1815 and of Morocco by France under the Alegiciras treaty of 1906. There were also precedents of individuals being appointed as mandatories of powers. King Leopold of Belgium, for instance, had been put in control the international free State of Congo and Prince George of Greece was made Governor of Crete in 1838.

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations bears the mark of Wilson's draftsmanship. It enjoined a sacred trust on

civilization to promote the well-being of communities not yet able to stand on their own and help them to independence. It divided the territories into three classes according to the varying stage of their development. Those forming part of the Ottoman empire whose independence could be provisionally recognized, those in German Central Africa for whom the mandatory was made responsible for promoting the moral and material welfare of the people and those which could be best administered under the laws of the mandatories as integral part of its territories. In the first category, class (A), came Iraq and Palestine assigned to Britain, and Syria assigned to France. In the second, class (B), were listed Tanganyika, Ruanda, Urundi, Togoland and Cameroons. Ruanda Urundi were assigned to Belgium, a major portion of Togoland and Cameroons to France and the rest with Tanganyika to Britain. S.W. Africa, Samoa, New Guinea, islands north of the equator in the West Pacific, and the tiny island of Nauru fell in the third category, class (c), assigned respectively to the Union of South Africa, Newzealand, Australia, Japan and Great Britain.

The terms of reference of the mandates were not defined by the League nor did it assign them to the mandatories. That was done by the Supreme Council of Ten of the Allied and Associated Powers to whom, in fact, these territories were ceded under the Treaty of Versailles. But the terms of reference of the mandates and the choice of the mandatory was submitted to for confirmation by the Council of the League of Nations. The Council under the Covenant was vested with the authority to define 'the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the mandtory if not perviously agreed upon by the members of the League.' Although the United States did not formally join the League of Nations as a member, it exercised right of prior consent and approval as an Associated Power to ensure equality of treatment in commerce to all nations. The mandatories were forbidden to recruit local inhabitants as defence personnel for service outside the mandated territory. The inhabitants of mandated territories were guaranteed freedom of conscience and religion subject to restrictions in the interest of maintenance of order and morals. The Mandatories were required to prevent abuses like arms and liquor traffic and slave trade and not to set up fortifications, naval or military bases or give military training to the natives

except for police purposes and for the defence of the territories. In respect of Togoland and Cameroons France was allowed to use the local inhabitants for military purposes outside the local territories but she agreed to accept the restrictions imposed in respect of the rest.

The fact that the Treaty of Versailles had not ceded the territories involved to the League of Nations but to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers 'who were obliged to place the territories under mandatories on behalf of the League,' gave immediate rise to dispute among jurists as to the location of sovereignty. Did it vest in the mandatory, in the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in the League of Nations, in the local Communities or in various combinations of them all? In *Rex Versus Christian* the South African Supreme Court ruled in 1924 that the territories were not ceded at all but placed by Germany at the disposal of the Allies to be administered under mandate, a status new to international law. But despite the fact that the Mandatory Power could issue passports to people under its administration, raised troops, appointed officials and courts and protected their foreign interests, the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations pointed towards *de facto* sovereignty vesting with the League of Nations while *de jure* sovereignty could vest with none except the local people. The Principle Allied Powers in reply to a German protest asserted that 'the Mandatory Powers in so far as they may be appointed trustees of the League of Nations will derive no benefit from such trusteeship. The Mandates' difference from Protectorates which confer on the Protecting Powers rights over the local population and against other nations, while the mandatories assumed obligations as guardians both towards the population and the League of Nations which had unqualified right of supervision and could even alter the mandate, further lend force to the contention that *de facto* sovereignty of the territories vested in the League. This was also acknowledged by Article 80 of the U.N. Charter years later which put the mandated territories in status quo until changed by appropriate action in accord with that instrument.

The mandatories were required to submit annual reports to the League. A Permanent Mandates Commission comprising 9 members was set up to scrutinize reports. Members were nominated by Governments of Belgium, Great Britain, Holland, France, Italy,

Japan, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, selected for personal merit and not as representatives of Governments under whom they could hold no office. The selection was subject to approval by the Council of the League. A Swiss and a German joined the Commission later and a Norwegian replaced the Swede.

The Commission could receive petitions but was not authorised to grant hearing to the petitioners. It was also not allowed by the League Council to visit the territories concerned for an on-the-spot verification of complaints.

Britain took the assignment of Palestine mandate for granted. The Mandate for Palestine initially drafted by Britain in December 1920, underwent alterations in 1921 because of developments in Syria and Trans-Jordan, and still further modifications shortly before its provisional approval by the Council of the League of Nations in July 1922. Foreign Office held charge of Palestine Civil Administration up to February 1921 when Colonial Office was entrusted with charge of class A mandates. Since the Ottoman empire, not having ratified the Treaty of Sevres, still exercised *de Jure* jurisdiction over the territories, Britain was only a *de facto* ruler. The Ottomans formally ceded the territories under the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923 and the terms of the Mandate were finally approved by the Council of the League on September 29, 1923 when it formally came into force.

While the Mandates for Syria and Iraq enjoined an obligation on the Mandatory Powers to produce an organic law for the territories within three years and facilitate the progressive development of these countries as independent States, the Mandate for Palestine contained no such clause and provided for the development of self governing institutions only. The failure of a specific mention of such obligation as in the case of Syria and Iraq could not, however, nullify the terms of the covenant which clearly enjoined such an obligation and which the council was required to implement.

The terms of the mandate included the implementation of the Balfour Declaration for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine and provided for the recognition of a Jewish Agency as a public body for advising the Administration in matters connected with the establishment of such a home. The Agency could also be authorized to exploit the natural resources of the

country and run public works, and utilities. Reference to Arab political rights or pledges to Sherif Hussein of Mecca and Emir Feisal were conspicuous by their absence.

But years before the mandate came into force, Zionists started acting as though they had already secured Palestine as their national home. Judge Louis Brandeis of the U. S. Supreme Court, during his visit to Palestine in July 1919 asked the Chief British Administrator in Jerusalem, General Louis Bols, to submit ordinances before their promulgation to the Zionist Commission! Eight months later, in March 1920, General Bols formally complained to London: "my own authority and that of every department of my administration is claimed, or impinged upon, by the Zionist Commission and I am definitely of opinion that this state of affairs cannot continue without grave danger to the public peace and to the prejudice of my administration."

General Bols also exposed how flagrantly the British had violated their pledge of maintaining the *status quo* on their entry into the city. He said: "It is no use saying to the Muslim and Christian elements of the population that our declaration as to the maintenance of the *status quo* on our entry into Jerusalem has been observed. Facts witness otherwise: The introduction of the Hebrew tongue as an official language; the setting up of a Jewish judiciary; the whole fabric of government of the Zionist Commission of which they are all aware; the special travelling privileges to members of the Zionist Commission; these have firmly and absolutely convinced the non-Jewish elements of our partiality."

Complaining that on the other hand the Zionist Commission accused him and his officers of anti-Zionism, General Bols observed: "It is manifestly impossible to please partisans who officially claim nothing more than a 'National Home', but in reality will be satisfied with nothing less than a Jewish State and all that it politically implies."

On July 1, 1920 Palestine was placed under Civil Administration with Herbert Samuel at its head as High Commissioner. Apart from the High Commissioner, a noted Zionist himself, Britain chose Zionist Jews for key offices such as that of Attorney-General—Norman Bentwich—, Director of Immigration—Albert Haym—

son—, and Principal Assistant Secretary to the Government—Max Nurock. They set to work immediately upon a series of laws designed to facilitate acquisition of land by the Jews and an Immigration Ordinance allowing 16,500 Jews to enter Palestine during the first year. The Zionist companies were granted concessions over state lands, and natural resources of the country. An act ostensibly to protect tenants against eviction enabled Zionists to acquire 40,000 acres of land comprising 18 villages from the absentee landlords resulting in eviction of 685 Arab agricultural families some of whom remained to be settled till the termination of the mandate. The Administration pursued a patently pro-Zionist and anti-Arab policy. The intense resentment this policy evoked among the Arabs, led to serious riots in 1920, 1921, 1924, 1929, 1933 and finally led to a nationwide rebellion against the mandatory power from 1936-1939.

All the Commissions of inquiry set up to investigate the riots—Palin in 1920, Haycraft in 1921, Shaw in 1930, and Royal (Peel) Commission in 1937—attributed them to the Arab fear of their being swamped by the Zionists and dispossessed of their homeland. The Peel Commission recommended partition of Palestine to set up a Jewish State but a technical commission headed by Sir John Woodhead rejected partition as a solution since practical difficulties proved insurmountable. London Conference of Feb. 1939 resulted in the evolution of a new policy envisaging an independent binational state of Palestine and limiting Jewish immigration beyond 100,000 except with the consent of the Arabs, thus bringing in political criterion besides the economic absorptive capacity which was laid down in the statement of 1922, saying that whole of Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish National Home. This statement was bitterly attacked by the Zionists. The Permanent Mandates Commission in June 1939 held that the policy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with interpretations which in agreement with the Mandatory Power and the Council of the League of Nations, the Permanent Mandates Commission had placed upon the Palestine Mandate. The opinion of the commission was however, advisory. The outbreak of Second World War in 1939 prevented its consideration by the council of the League of Nations

Communists' role in Palestine during this period deserves a little mention. The 1919 wave of emigrants brought with it some Communists and they joined hands with other Jews in 1920 to found the General Federation of Jewish Labour in Haifa. They at first worked within Poale Zion (workers of Zion) but in Sept. 1920 formed a new Party, Mifleget Poalim Sozialistim, (Socialist Workers Party) which was charged with the responsibility of Jaffa riots of 1921. With its leadership arrested and deported, members returned to Poale Zion but in September 1922 formed an illegal rival Communist Party. In 1924 it became a member of the Comintern and the same year it was ousted from Histadrut, the Jewish General Federation of Labour. From this year till 1939 it concentrated on Arabization of the movement and actively encouraged Arab national movement and revolt against the British.

The Communists described Zionists as 'reactionary' and later as 'fascists.' They asserted Palestine belonged to the Arabs. 'Out of the Zionist Hell', was a slogan often raised by them and they even organized return of immigrants to the USSR. They took leading part in the 1933 riots in league with the newly formed Istiqlal Party led by a leftwinger, Hamdi Hussaini from Gaza, but the Government put the blame on other Arab nationalist leaders. In the 1936 national rebellion two Communists, Nimr Uda and Faud Nasir, were attached to the General Staff of the Arab Higher Committee. Nimr Uda acted as Intelligence Chief of the Arab military units and Faud Nasir as Deputy to the Commander, Abdul Qadir Hussaini. Before the outbreak of the rebellion they demanded the outlawing of Hagana, a Jewish para-military defence organisation, originally set up to guard settlements but now engaged in terrorist attacks on the Arabs. The rebellion dealt a severe blow to the Communists. At the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 they found themselves left with an executive but no membership. Britain using tanks and machine-guns, and employing barbarically repressive methods, crushed the rebellion. The outbreak of war made the Arabs also call it off so as to be in a better position to protect their lands against Nazi invasion.



**Ottoman Peace Treaty Of Sevres Of Aug. 10, 1920**  
**Section VII—Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine**

"Art. 94. The High contracting Parties agree that Syria and Mesopotamia shall, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Art. 22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations), be provisionally recognised as independent States subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.

A commission shall be constituted within fifteen days from the coming into force of the present treaty to trace on the spot the frontiers line described in Article 27, 11 (2) and (3). This commission will be composed of three members nominated by France, Great Britain, and Italy respectively, and one member nominated by Turkey; it will be assisted by a representative of Mesopotamia for the Mesopotamia frontier.

The determination of the other frontiers of the said States, and the selection of the Mandatories, will be made by the Principal Allied Powers.

Art. 95. The High Contracting Parties agree to entrust, by application of the provisions of Article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a Mandatory to be selected by the said Powers. The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

The Mandatory undertakes to appoint, as soon as possible, a special commission to study and regulate all questions and claims relating to the different religious communities. In the composition of this commission the religious interests concerned will be taken into account. The chairman of the commission will be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations.

Art. 96. The terms of the mandates in respect of the above territories will be formulated by the Principal Allied Powers and submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for approval.

Art. 97. Turkey hereby undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of Article 132, to accept any decisions which may be taken in relation to the questions dealt with in this section'.

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### **Churchill's Statement On Palestine Of July 1, 1922**

"The Secretary of State for the colonies has given renewed consideration to the existing political situation in Palestine with a very earnest desire to arrive at a settlement of the outstanding questions which have given rise to uncertainty and unrest among certain sections of the population. After consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine the following Statement has been drawn up. It summarises the essential parts of the correspondence that has already taken place between the Secretary of State and a Delegation from the Moslem-Christian Society of Palestine, which has for sometime been in England, and it states the further conclusions which have since been reached.

The tension which has prevailed from time to time in Palestine is mainly due to apprehensions, which are entertained both by sections of the Arab and by sections of the Jewish population. These apprehensions, so far as the Arabs are concerned, are partly based upon exaggerated interpretation of the meaning of the Declaration favouring the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine made on behalf of His Majesty's Government on 2nd November 1917. Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become 'as Jewish as England is English'. His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to, do not contemplate

that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a home should be founded in *Palestine*. In this connection it has been observed with satisfaction that at the meeting of the Zionist Congress, the supreme governing body of the Zionist organisation, held at Carlsbad in September 1921, a resolution was passed expressing as the official statement of Zionist aims the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community, the upbuilding of which may assure to each of its people an undisturbed national development.

It is also necessary to point out that the Zionist Commission in Palestine, now termed the Palestine Zionist Executive, has not desired to possess, and does not possess, any share in the general administration of the country. Nor does the special position assigned to Zionist organisation in Article 4 of the Draft Mandate for Palestine imply any such functions. The special position relates to measures to be taken in Palestine affecting the Jewish population, and contemplates that the organisation may assist in the general development of the country, but does not entitle it to share in any degree in its Government.

Further, it is contemplated that the status of all citizens in Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never been intended that they, or any section of them, should possess any other juridical status.

So far as the Jewish population of Palestine are concerned, it appears that some among them are apprehensive that His Majesty's Government may depart from the policy embodied in the Declaration of 1917. It is necessary, therefore, once more to affirm that these fears are unfounded, and that the Declaration, reaffirmed by the Conference of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sevres is not susceptible of change.

During the last three generations the Jews have re-created in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected

Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community then, with its town and country population; its political, religious and social organisations, its own life, has in fact 'national characteristics'. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection.

This then is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews.

For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its number by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment. Hitherto the immigration has fulfilled these conditions. The number of immigrants since the British occupation has been about 25,000.

It is necessary also to ensure that persons who are politically undesirable are excluded from Palestine and every precaution has been and will be taken by the Administration to that end.

It is intended that a special committee should be established in Palestine, consisting entirely of members of the new Legislative Council, elected by the people, to confer with the Administration upon matters relating to the regulation of immigration. Should any difference of opinion arise between this committee and the Administration, the matter will be referred to His Majesty's Government, who will give it special consideration. In addition, under Article 81 of the draft Palestine Order in Council, any religious community or considerable section of population of Palestine will have a general right to appeal, through the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State, to the League of Nations on any matter on which they may consider that the terms of the mandate are not being fulfilled by the Government of Palestine.

With reference to the constitution which now it is intended to establish in Palestine, the draft of which has already been published, it is desirable to make certain points clear. In the first place, it is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent national Government should be at once established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the 24th October 1915 from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sherif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of Hejaz. The letter is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the Vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of Jordan was thus excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge.

Nevertheless, it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to foster the establishment of a full measure of self Government in

Palestine. But they are of opinion that, in the special circumstances of that country, this should be accomplished by gradual stages and not suddenly. The first step was taken when, on the institution of a civil Administration, the nominated Advisory Council, which now exists, was established. It was stated at the time by the High Commissioner that this was the first step in the development of self-governing institutions, and it is now proposed to take a second step by the establishment of a Legislative Council containing a large proportion of members elected on a wide franchise. It was proposed in the published draft that three of the members of this Council should be non-official persons nominated by the High Commissioner but representations having been made in opposition to this provision, based on cogent considerations, the Secretary of State is prepared to omit it. The Legislative Council would then consist of the High Commissioner as President and twelve elected and ten official members. The secretary of State is of opinion that before a further measure of self government is extended to Palestine and the Assembly placed in control over the Executive, it would be wise to allow some time to elapse. During this period the institutions of the country will have become well established, its financial credit will be based on firm foundations, and the Palestinian officials, will have been enabled to gain experience of sound methods of government. After a few years the situation will again be reviewed, and if the experience of the working of the constitution now to be established so warranted, a larger share of authority would then be extended to the selected representatives of the people.

The Secretary of State would point out that already the present Administration has transferred to a Supreme Council elected by the Moslem community of Palestine the entire control of Moslem religious endowments (wakfs), and of the Moslem religious courts. To this council the Administration has also voluntarily restored considerable revenues derived from ancient endowments which had been sequestered by the Turkish Government. The education Department is also advised by a committee representative of all sections of the population and the Department of Commerce and Industry has the benefit of cooperation of the chambers of commerce which have been established in the principal centres. It is the

intention of the Administration to associate in an increased degree similar representative committees with the various Departments of the Government.

The Secretary of State believes that a policy upon these lines, coupled with the maintenance of the fullest religious liberty in Palestine and scrupulous regard for the rights of each community with reference to its Holy Places, cannot but commend itself to the various sections of the population, and upon this basis may be built up that spirit of cooperation upon which the future progress and prosperity of the Holy Land must largely depend".

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## **MANDATE FOR PALESTINE**

(24. 7. 1922)

'The Council of the League of Nations:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22, of the covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them ; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country ; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country ; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine ; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for approval ;and

Whereas His Brittanic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following Provisions ; and

Whereas by the aforementioned Article 22 (Paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of League of Nations.

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows :

Art. 1. The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of Administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

Art. 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Art 3. The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy

Art 4. An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of Jewish national home and the interests of Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are, in the opinion of the Mandatory, appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Brittanic Majesty's Government to secure the cooperation of



all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of a Jewish national home

Art 5. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power

Art 6. The Administration of Palestine while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate such Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish agency referred to in Art 4, close settlement by Jews on the land including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

Art 7. The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take their permanent residence in Palestine.

Art 8. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on August 1st 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

Art 9. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various people and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall

be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders,

Art 10. Pending the making of special extradition; agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign powers shall apply to Palestine .

Art 11. The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership and control of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services or utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country having regard among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4, to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

Art 12. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequatur to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to the citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

Art. 13. All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing free access to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirement of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall

be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect, and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

Art. 14. A special commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of the commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the commission shall not be appointed, or enter upon its functions, without the approval of the Council.

Art. 15. The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

Art. 16. The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measure shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

Art. 17. The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the forces necessary, for the preservation of peace and

order, also for the defence of the country, subject however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes no military, naval, or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

Art. 18. The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

I. Subject as aforesaid to the other provisions of this mandate the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

Art. 19. The Mandatory shall adhere, on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial

navigation and postal, telegraphic, and wireless communication or literacy, artistic or industrial property.

Art. 20. The Mandatory shall cooperate, on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social, and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

Art. 21. The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure the equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nations of all State Members of the League of Nations.

(1) 'Antiquity' means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year A.D. 1700.

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorisation referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export license from the said Department.

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7) Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorisations act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

Art 22. English, Arabic, and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

Art 23. The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

Art 24. The Mandatory shall make to the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

Art. 25. In the territories lying between Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions; and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

Art. 26. The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled

by negotiations, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Art. 27. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

Art. 28. In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities."

### **White Paper on British Policy on Palestine**

**May 17, 1939**

"In the statement on Palestine, issued on 9th November 1938, His Majesty's Government announced their intention to invite representatives of the Arabs of Palestine, of certain neighbouring countries and of the Jewish Agency to confer with them in London regarding future policy. It was their sincere hope that, as a result of full, free, and frank discussions, some understanding might be reached. Conferences recently took place with Arab and Jewish delegations, lasting for a period of several weeks, and served the purpose of a complete exchange of views between the British Ministers and the Arab and Jewish representatives. In the light of the discussions as well as of the situation in Palestine and of the Reports of the Royal Commission and the Partition Commission, certain proposals were formulated by His Majesty's Government and were laid before the Arab and Jewish delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement. Neither the Arab nor the Jewish delegations felt able to accept these proposals; and the conferences, therefore, did not result in an agreement. Accordingly His Majesty's Government are free to formulate their own policy, and after careful consideration they

have decided to adhere generally to the proposals which were finally submitted to, and discussed with the Arab and Jewish delegations.

2. The Mandate for Palestine, the terms of which were confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, has governed the policy of successive British Governments for nearly 20 years. It embodies the Balfour Declaration and imposes on the Mandatory four main obligations. These obligations are set out in Articles 2, 6 and 13 of the Mandate. There is no dispute regarding the interpretation of one of these obligations, that touching the protection of and access to Holy Places and religious buildings or sites. The other three main obligations are generally as follows :—

(i) To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on the land.

(ii) To safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race and religion, and, whilst facilitating Jewish immigration and settlement, to ensure that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.

(iii) To place the country under such political administrative and economic conditions as will secure the development of self-governing institutions.

3. The Royal Commission and previous commissions of inquiry have drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression "a national home for the Jewish people," and they have found in this ambiguity and the uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews. His Majesty's Government are convinced that in the interests of peace and the well-being of the whole people of Palestine a clear definition of policy and objectives is essential. The proposal of partition recommended by the Royal Commission would have afforded such clarity, but the establishment of self-supporting independent Arab and Jewish States within Palestine has been found to be



impracticable. It has, therefore, been necessary for His Majesty's Government to devise an alternative policy which will, consistently with their obligations to Arabs and Jews meet the needs of the situation in Palestine. Their views and proposals are set forth below under the three heads (i) The Constitution, (ii) Immigration, and (iii) Land.

### The Constitution

4. It has been urged that the expression 'a national home for the Jewish people' offered a prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish State or Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the view, which was expressed by the Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at the time of the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognised that an ultimate Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration. But, with the Royal Commission, His Majesty's Government believe that framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied, could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. That Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish State might be held to be implied in the passage from the Command Paper of 1922 which reads as follows :—

'Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that 'Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English'. His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated the disappearance or the subordination of the Arab population, language, or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the (Balfour) Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine*.'

But this statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as the assurances which have been given

to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.

5. The nature of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was further described in the Command Paper of 1922 as follows :

'During the last two or three generations the Jews have re-created in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs : an elected Assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns ; elected councils in the towns and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew Press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national characteristics'. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish Community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection.'

6. His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the Declaration of 1917 and regard it as an authoritative and comprehensive description of the character of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. It envisaged the further development of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world. Evidence that His Majesty's Government have been

carrying out their obligation in this respect is to be found in the facts, that since the statement of 1922 was published, more than 300,000 Jews have immigrated to Palestine, and that the population of the National Home has risen to some 450,000 ; or approaching a third of the entire population of the country. Nor has the Jewish community failed to take full advantage of the opportunities given to it. The growth of the Jewish National Home and its achievements in many fields are a remarkable constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world and must be, in particular, a source of pride to the Jewish people.

7. In the recent discussions the Arab delegations have repeated the contention that Palestine was included within the area in which Sir Henry McMahon, on behalf of the British Government, in October 1915, undertook to recognise and support Arab independence. The validity of this claim, based on the terms of correspondence which passed between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca, was thoroughly and carefully investigated by British and Arab representatives during the recent conferences in London. Their Report, which has been published, states that both the Arabs and British representatives endeavoured to understand the point of the other party but that they were unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the correspondence. There is no use to summarise here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty's Government regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as regards some of the phrases used. For their part they can only adhere, for reasons given by their representatives in the Report, to the view that the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge, and they therefore can not agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claims that Palestine should be converted into an Arabs State

8. His Majesty's Government are charged as the Mandatory authority to secure the development of self-governing institutions in Palestine. Apart from this specific obligation, they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the Mandate system that the population of Palestine should remain for ever under Mandatory tutelage. It is proper that the people of the country should, as early as possible, enjoy the rights of self-government which are

exercised by the the people of the neighbouring countries. His Majesty's Government are unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which government in Palestine will eventually take, but their objective is self-government, and they desire to see established ultimately an independent Palestine State. It should be a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.

9. The establishment of an independent State and the complete relinquishment of Mandatory control in Palestine would require such relations between the Arabs and Jews as would make good government possible. Moreover, the growth of self-governing institutions in Palestine, as in other countries, must be an evolutionary process. A transitional period will be required before independence is achieved through which ultimate responsibility for the Government of the country will be retained by His Majesty's Government as the Mandatory authority, while the people of the country are taking an increasing share in the Government, and understanding and cooperation among them are growing. It will be the constant endeavour of His Majesty's Government to promote good relations between the Arabs and the Jews.

10. In the light of these considerations His Majesty's Government make the following declaration of their intentions regarding the future government of Palestine:—

(1) The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. This proposal for the establishment of the independent State would involve consultations with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.

(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.

(3) The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the government of the country. During the transitional period the people of Palestine will

be given an increasing part in the government of their country. Both sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the machinery of government, and the process will be carried on whether or not they both avail themselves of it.

(4) As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine, steps will be taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the government of their country, the objective being to place Palestinians in charge of all the Departments of Government, with the assistance of British advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. With this object in view His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain Departments, with British advisers. The Palestine heads of Departments will sit on the Executive Council, which advises the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as heads of Departments approximately in proportion to their respective populations. The number of Palestinians in charge of Departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of Departments are Palestinians, exercising the administrative and advisory functions which are at present performed by British officials. When that stage is reached consideration will be given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestinian heads of Departments.

(5) His Majesty's Government make no proposal at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature. Nevertheless they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery.

(6) At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the independent Palestine State.

(7) His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph (i) or in the constitu-

tion contemplated by sub paragraph (6) adequate provision has been made for:—

(a) the security of, and freedom of access to, the Holy Places, and the protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies;

(b) the protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home;

(c) such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances then existing.

His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.

(8) His Majesty's Government will do every thing in their power to create conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being within ten years. If, at the end of ten years, it appears to His Majesty's Government that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement. If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the cooperation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.

11. During the transitional period steps will be taken to increase the powers and responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils.

12. Under Article 6 of the Mandate, the Administration of Palestine, 'while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced,' is required to 'foster Jewish immigration under suitable conditions. Beyond the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to be

Palestine must be based sooner or later on mutual tolerance and goodwill; the peace, security and progress of the Jewish National Home itself requires this. Therefore His Majesty's Government, after earnest consideration, and taking into account the extent to which the growth of the Jewish National Home has been facilitated over the last twenty years, have decided that the time has come to adopt in principle the second of the alternatives referred to above.

14. It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be stopped forthwith. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a proposal. It would damage the whole of the financial and economic system of Palestine and thus affect adversely the interests of Arabs and Jews alike. Moreover, in the view of His Majesty's Government, abruptly to stop further immigration would be unjust to the Jewish National Home. But above all, His Majesty's Government are conscious of the present unhappy plight of large numbers of Jews who seek a refuge from certain European countries, and they believe Palestine can and should make a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world problem. In all these circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with their Mandatory obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the manner best calculated to serve the interests of whole people of Palestine, by adopting the following proposals regarding immigration:

(1) Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows:—

(a) For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed, on the understanding that a shortage in any one year may be added to the quota for subsequent years, within the five year period, if economic absorptive capacity permits.

(b) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependants.

2. The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted.

(3) After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

4. His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.

15. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over five years which is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population.

### III Land

16. The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the Mandate, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land", and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews. The Reports of several expert commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab lands whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and considerable land-



less Arab population is not soon to be created. In the circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publication of this statement of policy and the High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.

17. The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation. In the light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the "rights and position of Arab population will be duly preserved," to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or restriction of the transfer of land.

18. In framing these proposals His Majesty's Government have sincerely endeavoured to act in strict accordance with their obligations under the Mandate to both the Arabs and the Jews. The vagueness of the phrases employed in some instances to describe these obligations has led to controversy and has made the task of interpretation difficult. His Majesty's Government cannot hope to satisfy the partisans of one party or the other in such controversy as the Mandate has aroused. Their purpose is to be just as between the two peoples in Palestine whose destinies in that country have been affected by the great events of recent years, and who, since they live side by side, must learn to practise mutual tolerance, goodwill and co-operation. In looking to the future, His Majesty's Government are not blind to the fact that some events of the past make the task of creating these relations difficult, but they are encouraged by the knowledge that at many times and in many places in Palestine during recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants have lived in friendship together. Each community has much to contribute to the welfare of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace in which to assist in increasing the well-being of the whole people of the country. The responsibility which falls on them, no less than upon His Majesty's Government, to co-operate together to ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country is revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews, and Christians, throughout the world who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people."

## CHAPTER VI

### Wartime And Early Postwar Developments

Zionists, demand for conversion of whole of Palestine into a Jewish Commonwealth ; emergence of the League of Arab States ; and increasing U.S. intervention on the side of the Zionists highlighted the wartime and early postwar developments after 1939.

The White Paper of 1939 had incensed the Jews. They had called a general strike for the day following the publication of the White Paper. Looting of Arab shops, stoning of police and shooting of a British Police constable took place during the one day strike. The White Paper was also rejected by the Arabs who insisted on independence for Palestine as an Arab State, although a small section among them favoured the acceptance of the new policy while expressing doubts about the sincerity of the British in implementing the policy.

New land transfer regulations were enforced in Palestine on Feb. 28, 1940 and the British guards tightened checks against illegal immigrants. The Zionists lodged a strong protest against these measures but in vain. With the outbreak of War, the United States became the centre of World Zionist activity. The persecution of the Jews begun by Hitler with Nuremberg Laws of 1935 which stripped them of their citizenship rights and set them apart as a degraded class, turned, after the outbreak of war, into mass murder of Jews in gas chambers and crematoriums located in Poland which resulted in the elimination of 6,000,000 of them by 1945. The news trickled out of Europe bit by bit and horrified the world. In the United States, the home of 5,000,000 Jews then, it won for the Zionists wide sympathy and support. An extraordinary conference of Zionists, sponsored by the American Zionists but participated in by representatives from Europe and Palestine including members of the Jewish Agency Executive, held at Biltmore Hotel in New York on May 11, 1942 demanded establishment of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth and opening the gates of Palestine to Jewish immigration with the Jewish Agency vested with powers to control immigration and with authority for

upbuilding the country. The programme was endorsed the following November in Jerusalem by the Inner General Council, the Supreme Wartime Policy making body of the Zionist movement and formed the basis of Zionist demands for settlement of the Palestine problem first by the Mandatory power and then by the United Nations.

The Zionists fought the war on the side of the British but at the same time they organised a campaign to secure repeal of the 1939 policy through violent, terroristic, methods. Some 27,000 Jews joined the British Army and secured the formation of a separate Jewish Brigade to serve as the nucleus for their warlike campaign against the British and Arabs later. They set up a network of links with military installations in the Middle East for theft of arms and ammunition to equip their underground forces. Hagana, Irgun Zvei Leumi, and Stern Gang were the principal Jewish para-military and terroristic organizations. Hagana was officially linked with the Jewish Agency and was estimated to have a total strength of 64,000, Irgun Zvei Leumi some 3,000 to 5,000, and Stern Gang comprised some 200 to 300 dangerous fanatics according to a British White Paper published in 1946. *Hoshomer* (watchmen) to guard Jewish Agricultural settlements in late 1880's were the fore-runners of the Hagana which took shape as a para-military illegal arms wing of the Zionist movement after World War I in which all able-bodied Zionists were supposed to take part. Irvin Zvei Leumi was formed by revisionists who split from Hagana in 1935 and the Stern Gang comprised men who split away from the Irgun in 1942. All the three cooperated with one another when it suited their purpose, but the Jewish Agency which controlled Hagana denied responsibility for outrageous acts of terrorism committed by the Irgun and Stern groups.

The Zionists stepped up their terroristic activities after the Battle of Al Alamin when the tide of war appeared definitely to have turned in favour of the Allies. In 1943 a publicly held trial established Zionist complicity in the theft of arms. On Nov. 6, 1944 two Sternists shot dead British Secretary of State, Lord Moyne, in Cairo in revenge against his declaration in the House of Lords on June 9, 1942 that the Jews were not the descendants of the ancient Hebrews and had no legitimate claim to the Holy land and for pursuing an anti Zionist policy as also for rigging up the Arab League as a counter force to

Zionism. Inside Palestine Government buildings were blown up, lines of communication and railway tracks cut, British personnel assassinated and some of them hanged and used as booby traps in reprisal against hanging of the Jewish terrorists. The acts of terrorism mounted after the war and a British Statement of Information relating to Acts of violence (Jewish) issued on July 24, 1946, placed the blame on the Jewish Agency which, however, challenged the information as unauthentic.

Arabs, on the other hand remained quiescent throughout the war and lent active support to the Allies in their war effort. Some 12,000 recruited in the British Army and fought on their side. Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, declared in his Mansion House address, on May 29, 1941 that "Britain will give full support to any Arab unity scheme that commands general approval". Iraqi Prime Minister, General Nuri Al Said's fertile crescent scheme, submitted to Richard G. Casey Minister of State in Middle East in December, 1942 was the first outcome of Mr. Eden's exhortation. It recommended the unification of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan into greater Syria and the latter's merger with Iraq as a first step in the formation of a League of Arab States. Mr Eden reaffirmed in the House of Commons on February 24, 1943, Britain's support for Arab unity movement but stated that "clearly the initiative would have to come from the Arabs themselves." Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa Pasha Al Nahas, now took the lead to bring into being the League of Arab States. Elaborate exploratory talks were held by him with delegates from Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon between July 1943 and February 1944 and a General Conference on Arab unity was later convened by him at Alexandria from Sept. 25 to Oct. 7, 1944. The conference adopted a protocol announcing that the signatories had decided to create "a League of the independent Arab States for the purpose, in part, of coordinating political plans so as to ensure their cooperation and protecting their independence and sovereignty against every aggression by suitable means. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia declared war against the Axis Powers between February 24, and March 1, 1945—Iraq had already done so in January 1943—at the suggestion of Britain and the United States to entitle them to participate in the conference on international organization, which was later held in San Francisco on April 25, to

June 26, 1945. Six of the participating Arab States signed the Pact of the Arab League on March 22, 1945, thus formally bringing into existence the Arab bloc as a regional arrangement. Yemen ratified the Pact as the seventh member on May 11, 1945 when the San Francisco conference, which gave birth to the United Nations Organization, was still in progress.

The British Labour Party Conference On April 23, 1944 demanded the scrapping of the 1939 White Paper and in effect conversion of Palestine into a Jewish State. The Party, however, effected a shift in its policy when it was voted into power on July 27, 1945. Shiploads of illegal Jewish immigrants were held in detention camps in Cyprus. The preliminary report of Earl G. Harrison, U. S. representative on the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees, submitted to President Truman in August 1945, focussed attention in America on the plight of the Jewish refugees in Europe who had escaped extermination at the hands of the Nazis and their overwhelming desire for rehabilitation in Palestine. Harrison supported Jewish Agency's plea for immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. President Truman immediately endorsed the recommendation in an open personal appeal to Lord Attlee. Britain, however, wanted United States to share its burden and responsibility in Palestine. An Anglo-American Committee was the outcome of the British plea. The U. S. however, made it clear that it would not assume military obligations under any circumstances but was ready to offer financial assistance. The Joint Committee's Terms of reference were announced on November 13, 1945 and it began its work on Jan. 4, 1946 and submitted its report on April 20, 1946. The Committee held hearings in Washington and London, toured Palestine and neighbouring Arab States, and also visited Displaced Persons camps in Europe before formulating its 91-Page report which recommended the progressive development of the country into a unitary, bilateral Arab Jewish State ; which was rejected both by the Arabs and the Jews ; repeal of land laws of 1940 and issue of 100,000 immigration certificates. The Jewish Agency in its memorandum to the British Government on May 22, 1945, it may be stated, had demanded immediate announcement of a decision to establish Palestine, undivided and undiminished as a Jewish State and vesting the Jewish Agency with control of Jewish immigration. It also

demanding that an international loan be raised to finance the immigration of first million Jews to Palestine; that reparations in kind from Germany be granted to Jewish people for the rebuilding of Palestine, German property being used for resettlement of Jews from Germany as the first step; and that free international facilities be provided for the exit and transit of all Jews to Palestine. The Arabs, on the other hand, reiterated their demand for independence of Palestine as an Arab State. While they had sympathies with the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution, they could be settled in the United States and elsewhere. There was no justification for inflicting them on the people of Palestine, much to their detriment.

The Arab Heads of States at their conference in Inchass in May 1946, also reaffirmed the Arab character of Palestine. The Zionists increased their pressure in Palestine by combining terroristic attacks with illegal immigration on an unprecedented scale. Blowing up of King David Hotel in Jerusalem killing 91 people was the worst act of terrorism of the year. Britain and U. S. conferred again between June and July 1946 to work out a plan for regional autonomy as a basis of settlement in Palestine.

For the next seven months Britain tried to explore possibilities of reaching an amicable settlement of the Palestine question with the Jews and Arabs. Public debate on the Anglo-American Committee's report threw up various suggestions for settlement including partition, federation, cantonization and a multiple varieties of these. A plan for a federal State, known as the Morrison Plan, did not get approval of President Truman who by now was the most zealous supporter of the Zionist cause while another, the final in the series, called Bevin Plan, proposing division of Palestine into two zones each predominantly Arab or Jewish and setting of a federal Government did not find acceptance of the parties concerned. Arabs who held formal discussions with British representatives insisted on independence for Palestine as only an Arab State while Jews who held informal talks wanted the land as a whole and undiminished as their National Home and State. Harassed by Zionist terrorism and President Truman's zeal and unwilling to take stern repressive measures against the Jews and embroil itself further with Arab countries Britain announced on Feb. 18, 1947 upon the failure of the talks, its decision to refer the whole question to the United Nations.

## Zionist Biltmore Programme Of May 11, 1942

*(Text of resolution adopted by the American Zionist Congress at Biltmore Hotel, New York, on May 11, 1942 with representatives from Europe and Palestine including members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency attending and later endorsed in Jerusalem in November, by the Inner General Council, the supreme wartime policymaking body of the Zionist movement)*

"1. American Zionists assembled in this extraordinary conference reaffirm their unequivocal devotion to the cause of democratic freedom and international justice to which the people of the United States, allied with the other United Nations, have dedicated themselves, and give expression to their faith in the ultimate victory of humanity and justice over lawlessness and brute force.

2. This Conference offers a message of hope and encouragement to their fellow-Jews in the Ghettos and concentration camps of Hitler-dominated Europe and prays that their hour of liberation may not be far distant.

3. The Conference sends its warmest greetings to the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem, to the Va'ad Leumi, and to the whole Yishuv in Palestine, and expresses its profound admiration for their steadfastness and achievements in the face of peril and great difficulties. The Jewish men and women in field and factory and the thousands of Jewish soldiers in Palestine in the Near East, who have acquitted themselves with honour and distinction in Greece, Ethiopia, Syria, Libya, and on other battlefields, have shown themselves worthy of their people and ready to assume the rights and responsibilities of nationhood.

4. In our generation, and in particular in the course of the past twenty years, the Jewish people have awakened and transformed their ancient homeland; from 50,000 at the end of the last war their numbers have increased to more than 500,000. They have made the waste places to wear fruit and the desert blossom. Their pioneering achievements in agriculture and in industry embodying new patterns of co-operative endeavour, have written a notable page in the history of colonization.

5. In the new values thus created, their Arab neighbours in Palestine have shared. The Jewish people in its own work of national

redemption welcomes the economic, agricultural and national development of the Arab peoples and States. The Conference reaffirms the stand previously adopted at Congresses of the World Zionist Organization, expressing the readiness and desire of the Jewish people for full co-operation with their Arab neighbours.

6. The Conference calls for the fulfilment of the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate which "*recognizing the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine,*" was to afford them the opportunity as stated by President Wilson, to found there a Jewish Commonwealth.

The Conference affirms its unalterable rejection of the White Paper of May 1939, and denies its moral or legal validity. The White Paper seeks to limit, and in fact to nullify Jewish rights to immigration and settlement in Palestine and, as stated by Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons in May 1939, "constitutes a breach and repudiation of the Balfour Declaration". The policy of the White Paper is cruel and indefensible in its denial of sanctuary to Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution; and at a time when Palestine has become a focal point in the war front of the United Nations, and Palestine Jewry must provide all available manpower for farm and factory and camp, it is in indirect conflict with the interests of the Allied war effort.

7. In the struggle against the forces of aggression and tyranny, of which Jews were the earliest victims, and which now menace the Jewish National Home, recognition must be given to the right of the Jews of Palestine to play their full part in the war effort and in the defence of their country, through a Jewish military for fighting under its own flag and under the high command of the United Nations.

8. The Conference declares that the new world order that will follow victory cannot be established on foundations of peace, justice and equality, unless the problem of Jewish homelessness is finally solved.

The Conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with the control of immigration into Palestine and with necessary authority for up-building the country,



including the development of its unoccupied and un-cultivated lands, and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world.

Then and only then will the age-old wrong to the Jewish people be righted".



### **General Nuri Al Sa'id's Fertile Crescent Scheme**

*(Submitted to Rechard G. Casey*

*British Resident Minister in Cairo in Dec. 1942)*

"In my view the only fair solution, and indeed the only hope of securing permanent peace, contentment and progress in these Arab areas is for the United Nations to declare now :

(1) That Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan shall be reunited into one State.

(2) That the form of government of this State, whether monarchical or republican, whether unitary or federal, shall be decided by the peoples of this State themselves.

(3) That there shall be created an Arab League to which Iraq and Syria will adhere at once and which can be joined by the Arab States at will.

(4) That this Arab League shall have a permanent Council nominated by the member States, and presided over by one of the rulers of the States who shall be chosen in a manner acceptable to the States concerned.

(5) The Arab League Council shall be responsible for the following :—

(a) Defence.

(b) Foreign Affairs.

(c) Currency.

(d) Communications.

(e) Customs.

(f) Protection of Minority rights.

(6) The Jews in Palestine shall be given semi-autonomy. They shall have the right to their own rural and Urban district

administration including schools, health institutes and police, subject to general supervision by the Syrian State.

(7) Jerusalem shall be a city to which members of all religions shall have free access for pilgrimage and worship. A special commission composed of representatives of the three theocratic religions shall be set up to ensure this.

(8) That if they demand it, the Maronites in the Lebanon shall be granted a privileged regime such as they possessed during the last year of the Ottoman Empire. This special regime like those to be set up in paragraph 6 and 7 above shall rest on an International Guarantee.

It is possible in the manner suggested above to create a confederation of Arab States including Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Transjordan at the beginning, to which other Arab States may later adhere, then a great many of the difficulties which have faced Great Britain and France in the Near East during the past two decades will disappear. The Arabs of Palestine at present fear that they will become a minority in the Jewish State, and therefore bitterly oppose the grant of special rights to the Jews, but this hostility will be allayed if Palestine became part of a large strong Arab State. The Jews could establish their National Home in those parts of Palestine, where they are now the majority with a greater feeling of security, because there would be more goodwill on the part of their Arab neighbours, and as semi-autonomous community in a much larger State their economic opportunities would increase.

The British Empire is not founded on negations but on positive ideals. Free institutions and free co-operation give it a living force of tremendous strength. Upon this foundation of free co-operation a true union of many diverse peoples and countries has been formed, depending less upon stipulation and statistics and more upon the nobler and more permanent principles which are written on the heart and conscience of man. If an opportunity is given to the Arab people to establish such a free co-operation among themselves they will be prepared to deal generously with all the Jews living in their midst whether in Palestine or elsewhere. Conditions and guarantees there must be, but let them not constitute a dead hand lest they become a

dead letter, as so many minority provisions in European constitutions became during the past twenty years.

If my proposals meet with favour they will require careful examination, so that the appropriate steps are taken at the right time and in the right order. Obviously, the union of the various parts of historic Syria must come first. It may at first take the form of a federation of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan, each State continuing its own local administration, leaving defence, foreign relations, currency and the customs to the Central Government. On the other hand it may be found possible to unite Syria at once, making provision for the Jewish enclaves and the Jerusalem regime at the same time. Steps should be taken at once to define these enclaves and for this purpose it would be necessary to prepare an accurate ethnographical map of Palestine showing the number of Arabs and Jews in each Nahya and town, also, a map on the same scale showing the land under cultivation and the land which can be cultivated intensely in the near future. An inquiry should also be made as to the number of Jews who have settled in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in September, 1939.

To secure Arab union sacrifices of sovereignty and vested interests may have to be made. Similar sacrifices have been made in the British Dominions and can be equally demanded from Arab leaders.

I have throughout assumed that as France before the war declared that she was prepared to grant independence to Syria and Lebanon, she will not be allowed by the United Nations to repudiate her offers, nor to obstruct any Federation of Arab States by insisting on old privileges and antiquated rights."

### **The Pact Of The Arab League Of March 22, 1945**

*(Originally Signed by Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Transjordan, and later by Yemen on May 11, 1945.)*

Art. 1. The League of the Arab States is composed of the independent Arab States which have signed this pact.

Any independent Arab State has the right to become a member of the League. If it desires to do so, it shall submit a request which will be deposited with the permanent Secretariat-General and

submitted to the Council at the first meeting held after the submission of the request.

Art. 2. The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the relations between the member States; the co-ordination of their policies in order to achieve co-operation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. It has also as its purpose the close co-operation of the member States, with due regard to the organization and circumstances of each State, on the following matters:—

A. Economic and financial affairs, including commercial relations, customs, currency, and questions of agriculture and industries.

B. Communications; this includes railroads, aviation, navigation, telegraphs and posts.

C. Cultural Affairs.

D. Nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, and extradition of criminals.

E. Local affairs.

F. Health problems.

Art. 3. The League shall possess a Council composed of the representatives of the member States of the League; each State shall have a single vote, irrespective of the number of its representatives.

It shall be the task of the Council to achieve the realization of the objectives of the League and to supervise the execution of agreements which the member States have concluded on the questions enumerated in the preceding article, or on any other questions.

It likewise shall be the Council's task to decide upon the means by which the League is to co-operate with the international bodies to be created in the future in order to guarantee security and peace and regulate economic and social relations.

Art. 4. For each of the questions listed in Art. 2 there shall be set up a special committee in which member States of the League shall be represented. These committees shall be charged with the task of laying down the principles and extent of co-operation. Such principles shall be formulated as draft agreements, to be submitted to the Council for examination preparatory to their adoption by the aforesaid States.

Representatives of the other Arab countries may take part in the work of the aforesaid committees. The Council shall determine the conditions under which these representatives may be permitted to participate and the rules governing such representation.

Art. 5. Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes arising between two or more member States of the League is prohibited. If there should arise among them a difference which does not concern a State's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and if the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of the difference, the decision of the Council shall then be enforceable and obligatory.

In such a case the States between whom the difference has arisen shall not participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.

The Council may lend its good offices to the settlement of all differences which threaten to lead to war between two member States, or a member State and a third State, with a view to bringing about their reconciliation.

Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be taken by majority vote.

Art. 6. In case of aggression or threat of aggression by one State against a member State, the State which has been attacked or threatened with aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the Council.

The Council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures necessary to repulse the aggression. If the aggressor is a member State, his vote shall not be counted in determining unanimity.

If, as a result of the attack, the government of the State attacked finds itself unable to communicate with the Council, that State's representative in the Council shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council for the purpose indicated in the foregoing paragraph. In the event that this representative is unable to communicate with the Council, any member State of the League shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council.

Art. 7. Unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all member States of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only upon those States which have accepted them.

In either case the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in each member State according to its respective fundamental laws.

Art. 8. Each member State shall respect the systems of government established in the other member States and regard them as exclusive concerns of those States. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government.

Art. 9. States of the League which desire to establish closer cooperation and stronger bonds than are provided by this Pact may conclude agreements to that end.

Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the future between a member State and another State shall not be binding or restrictive upon other members.

Art. 10. The permanent seat of the League of Arab States is established in Cairo. The Council, may, however, assemble at any other place it may designate.

Art. 11. The Council of the League shall convene in ordinary session twice a year in March and in October. It shall convene in extraordinary session upon the request of two member States of the League whenever the need arises.

Art. 12. The League shall have a permanent Secretariat-General which shall consist of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries and an appropriate number of officials.

The Council of the League shall appoint the Secretary-General by a majority of two-thirds of the States of the League. The Secretary-General, with the approval of the Council, shall appoint the Assistant Secretaries and principal officials of the League.

The Council of the League shall establish an administrative regulation for the functions of the Secretariat-General and matters relating to the staff.

The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador and the Assistant Secretaries that of Ministers plenipotentiary.

The first Secretary-General of the League is named in annex to this Pact.

Art. 13. The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft budget of the League and shall submit it to the Council for approval before the beginning of each fiscal year.

The Council shall fix the share of the expenses to be borne by each State of the League. This share may be reconsidered if necessary.

Art. 14. The members of the Council of the League, as well as the members of the committees and the officials who are to be designated in the administrative regulation, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity when engaged in the exercise of their functions.

The buildings occupied by the organs of the League shall be inviolable.

Art. 15. The first meeting of the Council shall be convened at the invitation of the Head of the Egyptian Government. Thereafter it shall be convened at the invitation of the Secretary-General.

The representatives of the member States of the League shall alternatively assume the Presidency of the Council at each of its ordinary sessions.

Art. 16. Except in cases specifically indicated in this Pact, a majority vote of the Council shall be sufficient to make enforceable decisions on the following matters.

A. Matters relating to personnel.

B. Adoption of the budget of the League.

C. Establishment of the administrative regulations for the Council, the committees and the Secretariat-General.

D. Decisions to adjourn the sessions.

Art. 17. Each member State of the League shall deposit with the Secretariat-General one copy of every treaty or agreement concluded or to be concluded in the future between itself and another member State of the League or a third State.

Art. 18. If a member State contemplates withdrawal from the League, it shall inform the Council of its intention one year before such withdrawal is to go into effect.

The Council of the League may consider any State which fails to fulfil its obligations under this Pact as having become separated from the League, this to go into effect upon a unanimous decision of the States, not counting the State concerned.

Art. 19. This Pact may be amended with the consent of two thirds of the States belonging to the League, especially in order to make firmer and stronger the ties between the member States, to create an Arab Tribunal of Arbitration and to regulate the relations of the League with any international bodies to be created in the future to guarantee security and peace.

Final action on an amendment cannot be taken prior to the session following the session in which the motion was initiated.

If a State does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at such time as the amendment goes into effect, without being bound by provisions of the preceding article.

Art. 20. This Pact and its Annexes shall be ratified according to the basic laws in force among the High Contracting Parties.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General of the Council and the Pact shall become operative as regards each ratifying State fifteen days after the Secretariat-General has received the instruments of ratification from four States.

This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic language on this 8th day of Rabi 11, thirteen hundred and sixty four (22 March 1945), in one copy which shall be deposited in the safe keeping of the Secretariat-General. An indetical copy shall be delivered to each State of the League.

(1) *Annex Regarding Palestine.* Since the termination of the last great war the rule of the Ottoman Empire over the Arab countries, among them Palestine, which had become detached from the Empire, has come to an end. She has come to be independent in herself, not subordinate to any other State.

The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her future was to be settled by the parties concerned.

However, even though she was as yet unable to control her own affairs, the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919 made



provision for a regime based upon recognition of her independence.

Her international existence and independence in the legal sense cannot, therefore, be questioned any more than could the independence of the other Arab countries.

Although the outward manifestations of this independence have remained obscured for reasons beyond her control, this should not be allowed to interfere with her participation in the work of the Council of the League.

The States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League are therefore of the opinion that considering the special circumstances of Palestine, and until that country can effectively exercise its independence, the Council of the League shall take charge of the selection of Arab representative from Palestine to take part in its work.

(2) *Annex Regarding Co-operation With Countries which Are Not Members of the Council of the League :*

*Whereas the member States of the League will have to deal in the Council as well as in the committees with matters which will benefit and affect the Arab world at large.*

And whereas the Council has to take into account the aspirations of the Arab countries which are not members of the Council and has to work toward their realization;

Now therefore, it particularly behooves the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League to enjoin the Council of the League, when considering the admission of the countries to participation in the committees referred to in the Pact, that it should do its utmost to co-operate with them, and further more, that it should spare no effort to learn their needs and understand their aspirations and hopes; and that it should work thenceforth for their best interests and the safeguarding of their future with all the political means at its disposal.

(3) *Annex Regarding the Appointment of a Secretary-General of the League.* The States signatory to this Pact have agreed to appoint His Excellency Abdul-Rahman Azzam Bey, to be Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.

This appointment is made for two years. The Council of the League shall hereafter determine the new regulations for the Secretariat-General.

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**President Roosevelt's Letter To King Ibn Saud of  
April 5, 1945 ●**

"Great and Good Friend,

I have received the communication which Your Majesty sent me under date of March 13, 1945, in which you refer to the question of Palestine and to the continuing interests of the Arabs in current developments affecting that country.

I am gratified that your Majesty took this occasion to bring your views on this question to my attention to the statements which you make in your letter. I am also mindful of the memorable conversation which we had not so long ago and in the course of which I had an opportunity to obtain so vivid an impression of your Majesty's sentiments on this question.

Your Majesty will recall that on previous occasions I communicated to you the attitude of the American Government toward Palestine and made clear our desire that no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Your Majesty will also doubtless recall that during our recent conversation I assured you that I would take no action, in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of this Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people.

It gives me pleasure to renew to your Majesty the assurances which you have previously received regarding the attitude of my Government and my own, as Chief Executive, with regard to the question of Palestine and to inform you that the policy of this Government in this respect is unchanged.

I desire also at this time to send you my best wishes for your Majesty's continued good health and for the welfare of your people."

Your Good Friend,

His Majesty

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

ABDUL AZIZ IBN ABDUR RAHMAL AL FAISAL

AL SAUD, *King of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh*

### **Recommendations Of The Anglo-American Committee On Palestine And Related Problems Of April 20, 1946**

*Recommendation No. 1.* We have to report that such information as we received about countries other than Palestine gave no hope of substantial assistance in finding homes for Jews wishing or impelled to leave Europe.

But Palestine alone cannot meet the immigration needs of the Jewish victims, victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution; the whole world shares responsibility for them and indeed for the resettlement of all displaced persons.

We therefore recommend that our Governments together, and in association with other countries should endeavour immediately to find new homes for all such 'displaced persons', irrespective of creed or nationality, whose ties with their former communities have been irreparably broken.

Though emigration will solve the problems of some victims of persecution, the over-whelming majority, including a considerable number of Jews, will continue to live in Europe. We recommend therefore that our Governments endeavour to secure that immediate effect is given to the provisions of the United Nations Charter calling for universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. We recommend (a) that 100,000 certificates be authorised immediately for the admission into Palestine of Jews who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution; (b) that these certificates be awarded as far as possible in 1946 and that actual immigration be pushed forward as rapidly as conditions will permit.

3. In order to dispose, once and for all, of the exclusive claims of Jews and Arabs to Palestine, we regard it as essential that

a clear statement of the following principles should be made :

I That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine.

II That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State.

III That the form of government ultimately to be established, shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths.

Thus Palestine must ultimately become a State which guards the rights and interests of Moslems, Jews and Christians alike, and accords to the inhabitants, as a whole, the fullest measure of self-government, consistent with the three paramount principles set forth above.

4. We have reached the conclusion that the hostility between Jews and Arabs and in particular, the determination of each to achieve domination, if necessary by violence, make it almost certain that now, and for sometime to come, any attempt to establish either an independent Palestinian State or independent Palestinian States would result in civil strife such as might threaten the peace of the world.

We therefore recommend that, until this hostility disappears, the Government of Palestine be continued as at present under mandate pending the execution of a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations.

5. Looking towards a form of ultimate self-government, consistent with the three principles laid down in Recommendation No. 3 we recommend that the mandatory or trustee should proclaim the principle that Arab economic, educational and political advancement in Palestine is of equal importance with that of the Jews, and should at once prepare measures designed to bridge the gap which now exists and raise the Arab standard of living to that of the Jews, and so bring the two peoples to a full appreciation of their common interest and common destiny in the land where both belong.

6. We recommend that, pending the early reference to the United Nations and the execution of a trusteeship agreement, the mandatory should administer Palestine according to the mandate

which declares with regard to immigration that the administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions”.

No 7. (a) we recommend that the Land Transfers Regulations of 1940 be rescinded and replaced by regulations based on a policy of freedom in the sale, lease or use of land, irrespective of race, community, or creed, and providing adequate protection for the interests of small owners and tenant cultivators; (b) We further recommend that steps be taken to render nugatory and to prohibit provisions in conveyances, leases and agreements relating to land which stipulate that only members of one race, community or creed may be employed on, or about, or in connection therewith; (c) We recommend that the Government should exercise such close supervision over the Holy Places and localities such as the sea of Galilee and its vicinity as will protect them from desecration and from use which offend the conscience of religious people, and that such laws as are required for this purpose, be enacted forthwith.

8. Various plans for large-scale agricultural and industrial development in Palestine have been presented for our consideration; these projects, if successfully carried into effect, could not only greatly enlarge the capacity of the country to support an increasing population but also raise the living standards of Jew and Arab alike.

We are not in a position to assess the soundness of these specific plans, but we cannot state too strongly that, however technically feasible they may be, they will fail unless there is peace in Palestine. Moreover their full success requires the willing co-operation of adjacent Arab States, since they are not merely Palestinian projects. We recommend therefore that the examination, discussion and execution of these plans be conducted, from the start and throughout, in full consultation and co-operation not only with the Jewish Agency but also with the governments of the neighbouring Arab States directly affected.

9. We recommend that in the interests of the conciliation of the two peoples and of general improvement of the Arab standard of living, the educational system of both Jews and Arabs be reformed

including the introduction of compulsory education within a reasonable time.

10. We recommend that, if this Report is adopted, it should be made clear beyond all doubt to both Jews and Arabs that any attempt from either side, by threats of violence, by terrorism, or by the reorganization or use of illegal armies to prevent its execution will be resolutely suppressed.

Furthermore, we express the view that the Jewish Agency should at once resume active co-operation with the Mandatory in the suppression of terrorism and of illegal immigration, and in the maintenance of that law and order throughout Palestine which is essential for the good of all, including the new immigrants.

## CHAPTER VII

### Palestine in UN and Birth of Israel

On April 2, 1947 Sir Alexander Cadogan, head of the U. K. delegation to the U.N., in a letter to the Acting Secretary-General, Dr. Victor Hoo, communicated the request of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to "place the question of Palestine on the agenda of the General Assembly at its next regular Annual Session and summon a Special Session to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for the consideration of the question by the regular session."

With the concurrence of a majority of the members—Ethiopia dissenting—a Special Session of the General Assembly—the first in its history—was summoned to meet at Flushing Meadow in New York on April 28, and continued in session till May 15, 1947 when a Special Committee on Palestine comprising representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia was constituted with "widest powers to ascertain and record facts and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to report to the General Assembly by September 1, 1947."

Before the resolution was finally adopted by the plenary session of the General Assembly, a vigorous debate took place in the First Committee between protagonists of the Arab and Jewish points of view on the question. Representatives of the Jewish Agency and Arab Higher Committee of Palestine were also afforded an opportunity to place their views on record. Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia sought to have "the termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence", also included in the agenda but without success. But all delegates agreed that independence for Palestine was the ultimate objective. The Arab representatives, however, stressed that independence was the real issue, all that was necessary was to apply the principles of the Charter and declare Palestine as an independent, democratic State. The only proper way to make the General Assembly become seized of the issue was to notify the termination of the Mandate, and submit a

draft trusteeship agreement preparatory to Palestine's emergence as a sovereign State. Inclusion of the Balfour declaration in the preamble to the Mandate was *ultravires* the Covenant of the League of Nations and hence null and void. Jewish refugee problem could not be linked with the Palestine question. They also protested against the terms of reference of the UNSCOP permitting it to visit displaced persons camps and omitting therefrom reference to future government of Palestine and its independence. David Ben Gurion, Dr Abba Hilel Silver, Moshe Shertok, Hayim Greenberg, Mrs. Rose Halorin Nahum Goldman and Dr. Emanuel Newman comprised the Jewish delegation and Mr. Henry Kattan, Emile Ghory, Raja Hussein, Wasef Kamal, Isa Nakleh and Rasem Khaledi, the Arab Higher Committee delegation to the First Committee.

The USSR representative expressed the view in the General Assembly that the task of the UNSCOP was "to reconcile the lawful interests of Arabs and Jews in Palestine, if possible by the creation of a single Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for Arabs and Jews and if not by two separate States, one Arab and one Jewish." This marked a shift in the earlier policy of the Soviet Union and the Palestine Communist Party favouring the creation of an Arab State of Palestine. Iran wanted that no instructions be issued by Governments to members of the Committee.

After 16 public and 86 private meetings, including one in Jerusalem, tour of Palestine and visit to some displaced persons camps, the Special Committee submitted on August 31, 1947 a 91-page majority report comprising 11 unanimous recommendations and one by a majority vote. The Arabs had boycotted the Committee during its tour of Palestine but the Jewish representatives appeared before it to stress their demand for the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine.

The majority plan recommended partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish States after a transitional two-year period of trusteeship under the U.N. with Economic Union and an international sed city of Jerusalem. The transitional period was recommended to begin on Sept. 1, 1947 and the United Kingdom to be appointed as the Trustee for the purposes of interim administration. Uruguay and Guatemala dissented from the UNSCOP's 12th recommendation that in the appraisal of Palestine question it be accepted as



incontrovertible that any solution of Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish Problem in general. Representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay were the signatories to the majority report.

Representatives of India, Iran and Yugoslavia in their minority report recommended the creation of an independent federal State of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital after a transitional period not exceeding three years. National Defence, Foreign relations, Immigration, Currency, Taxation for federal purposes, Foreign and inter-State Waterways, Transport and Commerce, Copy-right and Patents should form the Federal subjects and the Arab and Jewish Governments in their respective areas should have full powers of local self government and authority over other subjects. The minority plan also recommended an elected head of State and a bicameral legislature for the federation, one elected on the basis of proportional representation of population as a whole and the other with equal representatives of Jews and Arabs; legislation to be by a majority vote in both the houses; disagreements being referred to an arbitral body of five with at least 2 Arabs and 2 Jews. Federal Court which should have at least four Arabs and three Jews should be elected by both the Chambers of Federal Legislature. An international commission of three representatives each of Arabs, Jews and U.N. should determine the economic absorptive capacity for purposes of immigration during the transitional period.

The report came up for consideration before the second Annual Session of the General Assembly on Sept. 23, 1947. The Assembly set up an Ad' hoc Committee comprising all its members and referred to it the following agenda:

"Question of Palestine; Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine", as proposed by U. K., and

"Termination of Mandate over Palestine and recognition of its independence as one State", as proposed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

The Ad' hoc Committee at its first meeting held on Sept. 25, 1947 decided to invite representatives of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency to present their views on the question.

The Arab Higher Committee spokesman told the Ad' hoc Committee on Sept. 30, that the Arabs were firmly opposed to the dissection and partition of Palestine and segregation of any portion

of the land or people as also to giving special and preferential rights to the minority. There was no legal or moral basis for Jewish claims on Palestine. The Balfour declaration and Art. 6 of the Mandate were ultravires the League of Nations Covenant. The Jews had been offered land in Uganda by the U. K. and in Biro-Bidjan by the USSR and they could be settled there. Palestine must be declared an Arab State as a whole. A Constituent Assembly would decide the future constitution of the country which would guarantee fundamental human rights, freedom of worship and legitimate rights and interests of the immigrants. UNSCOP had not heard the views of the Palestine Arabs and its report could not form the basis of a settlement. Arabs could accept neither the majority nor the minority plan as both envisaged partition in one form or another and were opposed to their interests.

Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt questioned the competence of the United Nations to partition a country against the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants. Syria and Egypt proposed a formal reference to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal issues raised.

At the suggestion of the chairman three Sub-Committees were constituted to attempt reconciliation between Arab and Jewish view points; to draw up a plan in accordance with the recommendations of the majority of the UNSCOP and to draw up a plan according to the proposals put forth by Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria. Sir Mohd Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan was elected the Chairman of this Sub-Committee.

The Ad hoc Committee began consideration of reports of Sub-Committee one recommending a partition plan with Economic Union and international status for Jerusalem, and of the second Sub-Committee comprising three resolutions: (a) reference to the International Court of Justice of eight legal issues, (b) the Jewish refugee problem and (c) a plan for the independent Arab State of Palestine.

Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Saudi Arabia contended in the Ad hoc Committee that recommendations of the First Sub-Committee were beyond the scope of the Charter, ultravires and illegal. United Kingdom, El Salvador, Yugoslavia, Colombia, Belgium

and Mexico said that they would vote for neither. Colombia supported the second Sub-Committee's recommendation for reference of certain issues to the International Court of Justice. Canada, Poland, Uruguay, Sweden, Newzealand, U.S.A., Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, USSR and Guatemala supported the majority plan for partition which although not perfect was, in their view, the most equitable solution of the problem under the present circumstances.

Resolution on reference of legal issues to the International Court of Justice was voted in two parts (I to VII), and (VIII). The first part received 18 votes in favour and 25 against with 11 abstentions. But the question whether U.N. or any organ thereof was competent to take and enforce a decision to partition a country against the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants was defeated by a majority of only one vote. It received 20 votes in favour, 21 against with 13 abstentions. The Committee approved the majority plan and recommended it for adoption to the General Assembly. Egypt, Iraq and Syria declared the decision was illegal and void and reserved their Government's right to consider it as such.

The General Assembly held general debate on the plan for Palestine's partition in its plenary meetings on Nov. 26, to Nov. 29, 1947, when it adopted the plan with 33 votes in favour, 13 against and 10 abstentions. All Afro-Asian countries with the exception of Union of S. Africa and Philippines voted against the resolution.

During the debate in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly the plan was supported with misgivings by Sweden, Canada, Brazil, the United States, Poland, Uruguay, Netherlands, Newzealand and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Belgium and Guatemala, but bitterly opposed by Philippines, Yemen, Greece, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Haiti, Pakistan, Cuba and Iraq as violating the Charter and beyond the competence of the General Assembly. On Nov. 28, Colombia proposed reference back of the issue to the Ad'hoc Committee, Iran adjournment till Jan. 15 and France a 24-hour adjournment which was adopted. Lebanon complained that no demarche was attempted with the Arabs—Iceland challenged the statement and put forward a compromise plan which the U.S. opposed as coinciding with the minority plan and demanded immediate voting. Russia also opposed the Lebanon plan. Syria said

Ad hoc Committee Chairman had asked Saudi Arabia to consult with U.S. for conciliation but no reply had been received from the latter and hence Iranian proposal for adjournment should be adopted.

The U. S. President Truman now swung into action to bulldoze Philippines, Haiti and Liberia into conforming with U. S. support of the plan to secure the necessary two-third majority for the passage of the resolution. The Zionists and the American delegation to the U.N. employed tactics bordering on black-mail to force these nations to change their stand and win other votes, upon which grave concern was later expressed in the U. S. Senate. Sir Mohd. Zafrullah Khan gave an eloquent expression to the resentment and concern of independent world opinion on the big powers' machinations to shift their burden on to the Arabs. The adoption of the resolution was denounced by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen as 'immoral and illegal' and they declared that their governments were not bound by it. "It would promote war not peace in the Middle East," warned Sir Zafrullah Khan.

Those voting in favour of the resolution were Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Newzealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian SSSR, Union of S. Africa, U.S.A., USSR, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Votes against the resolution were cast by Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen.

Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia abstained from voting on the resolution.

Sir Mohd. Zafrullah Khan's warning that the resolution would promote not peace but war in the Middle East proved prophetic. The passage of the resolution triggered off violent communal clashes in Palestine with 2,000 dead by January. The resolution required the Mandate to end not later than Aug. 1, 1948, and independent Jewish and Arab States to be formed not later than Oct. 1, 1948, and requested the Security Council to take measures to implement the

decision and regard as breach of peace any attempt to alter the boundaries by force and supplement the authorization of the Palestine Commission, comprising representatives of Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and Philippines, with such powers as it may deem necessary. The Security Council, however, postponed decision on the question taking mere note of it on Dec. 9, 1947 and instead, on April 1, 1948, invoking for the first time its powers under Article 20 of the Charter, requested the Secretary General to summon a Special Session of the General Assembly for further consideration of the question of the future Government of the Palestine. The General Assembly accordingly convened in Special Session on April 16, 1948.

The US now suggested Trusteeship for Palestine with a Governor-General appointed by the General Assembly and responsible to the Trusteeship Council with powers to legislate by decree. The Nov. 29, 1947 resolution, the U.S. delegate said, could not be implemented without use of much force and bloodshed. He wanted the First Committee to study without delay all aspects of Trusteeship suggestion.

The U.S. proposal drew qualified support from delegates of Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Greece, India, Liberia, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, and Sweden, but was strongly opposed by Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR and Yugoslavia who charged UK and US with designs to wreck the Nov. 29, 1947 plan which, in their view, was the fairest and most equitable solution of the Palestine problem. Jewish Agency also bitterly opposed the plan while Arab Higher Committee was favourably disposed to it provided that it was made clear that its intention was to lead Palestine to independence as a single democratic State in which the legitimate rights of different sections of the society would be safeguarded. Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen reiterated their view that the General Assembly resolution of Nov. 29, 1947 was illegal and it would enhance the prestige of the Assembly if it rescinded an erroneous and illegal decision. Bolivia, Norway and Panama suggested suspension, without prejudice, of the resolution of Nov. 29, 1947 to deal with the emergency situation in the Holy Land. Lebanon made a fervent appeal to the Jewish Agency to abandon their plan for an independent State

which, even if viable, will face constant hostility; and elect to live in a unitary democratic Palestine. Jewish Agency representative, however declared before the First Committee that a provisional Jewish Government would start functioning in Palestine in accordance with the spirit of the U. N. resolution from May 16.

Inside Palestine the Zionists mounted a big offensive against the Arabs to secure firm position for themselves on the termination of the Mandate. Entire Arab population of Deir Yassein, including women and children, was brutally massacred to spread terror among the Arabs and make them flee the land. The successful conclusion of two military operations, Nachon and Jephtha, launched on April 1, and April 18, resulted in securing for the State of Israel a much larger portion of the land than allotted to it under the U.N. resolution.

The State of Israel was proclaimed at 10 A.M. on May 14, 1948 to coincide with the Jewish Sabbath. The U.S. delegation was still busy lecturing the U.N. delegates on the merits of U.S. Trusteeship plan when the Soviet Ambassador informed him that President Truman had already accorded de facto recognition to the State of Israel. Shortly thereafter the U.S. delegate read out to the General Assembly President Truman's message to that effect and a White House statement that the U.S. desire to obtain a truce in Palestine will in no way be lessened by the proclamation of the Jewish State.

Syria, Egypt and Labanon accused the U.S. of duping the Arabs by convening the Special Session. The real object of the U.S. appeared to be to present them with a fait accompli. The U.S. action, the Egyptian delegate said, would result in grave consequences for peace in the region.

At its concluding meeting on May 14, 1948 the Assembly adopted a resolution appointing a Mediator to attempt reconciliation in Palestine and appealed to all Governments to co-operate with him and the Truce Commission appointed by the Security Council resolution of April 23, 1948. The Palestine Commission was relieved of its responsibility. A Committee of the Assembly composed of representatives of China, France, the USSR, the U. K. and the U.S. met on May 20, 1948 and appointed Count Folke Bernadotte as the United Nations Mediator in Palestine.

### British Request For Special Session

*Letter Dated April 2, 1947 From Sir Alexander Cadogan, head of U.K. Delegation to U.N. to the Acting Secy. General, Dr. Victor Hoo.*

"I have received the following message from my Government. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to place the question of Palestine on the agenda of the General Assembly at its next regular Annual Session. They will submit to the Assembly an account of their administration of the League of Nations Mandate and will ask the Assembly to make recommendations, under Article 10 of the Charter concerning the future Government of Palestine.

In making the request, His Majesty's Government draw the attention of the Secretary-General to the desirability of an early settlement in Palestine and to the risk that the General Assembly might not be able to decide upon its recommendations at its next regular annual session unless some preliminary study of the question had previously been made under the auspices of the United Nations. They therefore request the Secretary-General to summon, as soon as possible, a special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration, at the regular session of the Assembly of the question referred to in the preceding paragraph."

### League Of Nations Resolution Of April 18, 1946

"The Assembly,

\* Recalling that Article 22 of the Covenant applies to certain territories placed under mandate the principle that the well-being and development of peoples not yet able to stand alone in the strenuous conditions of the modern world form a sacred trust of civilisation :

"1. Expresses its satisfaction with the manner in which the organs of the League have performed the function entrusted to them with respect to the mandates system and in particular pays tribute to the work accomplished by the Permanent Mandates Commission ;

"2. Recalls the role of the League in Iraq to progress from its status under an 'A' Mandate to a condition of complete

independence, welcomes the termination of the mandated status of Syria, the Lebanon and Transjordan, which have, since the last session of the Assembly, become independent members of the world community ;

"3. Recognises that, on the termination of the League's existence, its functions with respect to the mandated territories will come to an end, but notes that Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations embody principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League ;

"4. Takes note of the expressed intentions of the Members of the League now administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them for the well-being and development of the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective Mandates, until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory Powers."

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### **British Act On Termination Of Mandate of April 29, 1948**

'ACT OF PARLIAMENT to make provision with respect to the termination of His Majesty's jurisdiction in Palestine, and for purposes connected therewith—[11 & 12 Geo. 6. c. 27]—29th April, 1948.

"BE it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows :—

"1—(1) On the fifteenth day of May, nineteen hundred and forty-eight, or such earlier date as His Majesty may by Order in Council declare to be the date on which the mandate in respect of Palestine accepted by His Majesty on behalf of the League of Nations will be relinquished (in this Act referred to as 'the appointed day'), all jurisdiction of His Majesty in Palestine shall determine, and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall cease to be responsible for the government of Palestine.

"(2) Nothing in this Act shall affect the jurisdiction of His Majesty, or any powers of the Admiralty, the Army Council or the



Air Council, or of any other authority, in relation to any of His Majesty's forces which may be in Palestine on or after the appointed day."

### Arab Stand On Concessions

*Maximum Arab concessions put forward at a conference between States of Arab League & U.K. in London From Sept. 9 to Oct. 2, 1946 and from Jan. 23 to Feb. 14 1947, (as stated By Syrian delegate on May 10, 1947 before the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, on May 12, 1947.)*

'These concessions included :

Creation of a provisional executive council to be composed of Arabs and Jews and presided over by the British representative;

summoning by free election in which all citizens of Palestine, without discrimination as to nationality, creed, or faith, would participate, of a Constituent Assembly to promulgate an organic, democratic constitution guaranteeing :—

the unity of the State with the elected legislature,

the sanctity of the holy places with freedom of access and worship ;

religious courts for matters of personal status ;

rights of citizenship;

the right to employ the Hebrew language as a second official language in areas where speakers of that language form an absolute majority;

communal parliamentary representation in proportion to the number of citizens;

further immigration to be prohibited until the independent Government of Palestine provides otherwise;

supervision by the United Nations over the status of the Holy Places and shrines;

after the election and convocation of Parliament, the elected head of the State to assume power under the constitution, thereupon terminating the Mandate, and declaring Palestine a completely independent State;

*(It had been contemplated, the Syrian representative said, that these steps would take a maximum of two years.)*

### General Assembly Resolution of May 5, 1947 on Hearings.

*(Jointly proposed by Chile, Uruguay, the Byelo-russian SSR, Yugoslavia and Argentina).*

1. The General Assembly Resolves.

1. That the First Committee grant hearing to the Jewish Agency for Palestine on the question before the Committee.
2. To send to that same Committee for its decision those other communications of similar character from the Palestinian population which have been received, by this special session of the General Assembly or may later be submitted to it."

On May 7, 1947 President proposed that the General Assembly adopt the following resolution :

The General Assembly affirms that the decision of the First Committee to grant a hearing to the Arab Higher Committee gives a correct interpretation to the Assembly's intention."

### **Creation of Special Committee**

*General Assembly resolution adopted at its plenary session held on May 15, 1947.*

"Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations has been called into special session for the purpose of constituting and instructing a Special Committee to prepare for the consideration at the next regular session of the Assembly a report on the question of Palestine;

*The General Assembly Resolves that :*

1. A Special Committee be created for the above-mentioned purpose consisting of the representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia;
2. The Special Committee shall have the widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine ;
3. The Special Committee shall determine its own procedure ;
4. The Special Committee shall conduct investigations in Palestine and wherever it may deem useful receive and examine written or oral testimony, whichever it may consider appropriate in each case from the Mandatory Power, from representatives of the population of Palestine, from Government and from such organizations and individuals as it may deem necessary ;
5. The Special Committee shall give most careful consideration to the religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity ;

6. The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine;

7. The Special Committee's report shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not later than 1 September 1947, in order that it may be circulated to the Members of the United Nations in time for consideration by second regular Session of the General Assembly;

#### *The General Assembly*

*Requests* the Secretary General to enter into suitable arrangements with the proper authorities of any State in whose territory the Special Committee may wish to sit or travel, to provide necessary facilities, and to assign appropriate Staff to the Special Committee;

9. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of a representative and an alternate representative from each Government represented on the Special Committee on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances".

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#### **Appeal For Peace**

*Special General Assembly Sessions Resolution of 14 May 1947*

"The General Assembly calls upon all Governments and peoples and particularly upon the inhabitants of Palestine to refrain, pending action by the General Assembly on the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, from the threat or use of force or any other action which might create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early settlement of the question of Palestine"

#### **Arab Higher Committee's Boycott.**

*(Text of cable from Arab Higher Committee To U.N. Secretary-General regarding their right to appoint a Liaison officer with the Special Committee.)*

"Arab Higher Committee Palestine desire convey to United Nations that after thoroughly studying the deliberations and circumstances under which the Palestine fact finding committee was formed and the discussions leading to terms of reference; they resolved that Palestine Arabs should abstain from collaboration and desist from appearing before said Committee for following main reasons : Firstly United Nations refusal adopt natural course of inserting termination

mandate and declaration independence in agenda Special United Nations Session and in terms of reference. Secondly, failure detach Jewish world refugees from Palestine problem; Thirdly, replacing interests Palestine inhabitants by insertion world religious interests although these are not subject of contention. Furthermore Palestine Arabs natural rights are selfevident and cannot continue to be subject to investigation but deserve to be recognized on the basis of principles of United Nations Charter".

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### Sub-Committee It's Recommendations

#### Resolution No. I

#### DRAFT RESOLUTION REFERRING CERTAIN LEGAL QUESTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

"*Considering* that the Palestine Question raises certain legal issues connected, *inter alia*, with the inherent right of the indigenous population of Palestine to their country and to determine its future, the pledges and assurances given to the Arabs in the first World War regarding the independence of Arab countries, including Palestine, the validity and scope of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, the effect on the Mandate of the dissolution of the League of Nations and of the declaration by the Mandatory Power of its intentions to withdraw from Palestine ;

"*Considering* that the Palestine question also raises other legal issues connected with the competence of the United Nations to recommend any solution contrary to Covenant of the League of Nations or the Charter of the United Nations, or to the wishes of the majority of the people of Palestine ;

"*Considering* that doubts have been expressed by several Member States concerning the legality under the Charter of any action by the United Nations, or by any Member State or group of Member States, to enforce any proposal which is contrary to the wishes, or is made without the consent, of the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine ;

"*Considering* that these questions involve legal issues which so far have not been pronounced upon by any impartial or competent tribunal, and it is essential that such questions be authoritatively determined before the United Nations can recommend a solution of the Palestine question in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.

*"The General Assembly of the United Nations Resolves* to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion under Article 96 of the Chapter IV of the Statute of the Court on the following questions :

"(i) Whether the indigenous population of Palestine has not an inherent right to Palestine and to determine its future constitution and government ;

"(ii) Whether the pledges and assurances given by Great Britain to the Arabs during the first World War (including the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918) concerning the independence and future of Arab countries at the end of the war did not include Palestine ;

"(iii) Whether the Balfour Declaration, which was made without the knowledge or consent of the indigenous population of Palestine, was valid and binding on the people of Palestine, or consistent with the earlier and subsequent pledges and assurances given to the Arabs ;

"(iv) Whether the provisions of the Mandate for Palestine regarding the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine are in conformity or consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations (in particular Article 22), or are compatible with the provisions of the Mandate relating to the development of self-government and the preservation of the rights and position of the Arabs of Palestine ;

"(v) Whether the legal basis for the Mandate for Palestine has not disappeared with the dissolution of the League of Nations, and whether it is not the duty of the Mandatory Power to hand over power and administration to a Government of Palestine representing the rightful people of Palestine ;

"(vi) Whether a plan to partition Palestine without the consent of the majority of its people is consistent with the objectives of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and with the provisions of the Mandate for Palestine ;

"(vii) Whether the United Nations is competent to recommend either of the two plans and recommendations of the majority or minority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, or any other solution involving partition of the territory of Palestine,

or a permanent trusteeship over any city or part of Palestine, without the consent of the majority of the people of Palestine ;

“(viii) Whether the United Nations, or any of its Member States, is competent to enforce or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning the constitution and future Government of Palestine, in particular, any plan of partition which is contrary to the wishes, or adopted without the consent of, the inhabitants of Palestine.

“*The General Assembly* instructs the Secretary-General to transmit this resolution to the International Court of Justice, accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon the questions under reference.”

*Resolution No. II.*

**DRAFT RESOLUTION ON JEWISH REFUGEES AND  
DISPLACED PERSONS**

“*The General Assembly*, having regard to the unanimous recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, that the General Assembly undertake immediately the initiation and execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews will be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency for the alleviation of their plight and of the Palestine problem ;

“*Bearing in mind* that genuine refugees and displaced persons constitute a problem which is international in scope and character ;

“*Considering* that the question of refugees and displaced persons is indivisible in character as regards its possible solution ;

“*Considering* that it is the duty of the Governments concerned to make provision for the return of refugees and displaced persons to the countries of which they are nationals ;

“*Being further of the opinion* that where repatriation proves impossible, solution should be sought by way of resettlement in the territories of the Members of the United Nations which are willing and in a position to absorb these refugees and displaced persons :

“*Considering* that Palestine, despite its very small area and limited resources, has also had a disproportionately large number of Jewish immigrants and cannot take any more without serious

injury to the economy of the country and the rights and position of the indigenous population ;

“*Considering* that many other countries with much greater area and larger resources have not taken their due share of Jewish refugees and displaced persons ;

“*Having* adopted a resolution (No. 62 (1)) on 15 December 1946 calling for the creation of an international refugee organization with a view to the solution of the refugee problem through the combined efforts of the United Nations : and

“*Taking* note of the assumption on 1 July 1947 by the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization of operational responsibility for displaced persons and refugees ;

“*Recommends* :

“(i) That countries of origin should be requested to take back the Jewish refugees and displaced persons belonging to them, and to render them all possible assistance to resettle in life ;

“(ii) That those Jewish refugees and displaced persons who cannot be repatriated should be absorbed in the territories of Members of the United Nations in proportion to their area, economic resources, per capita income, population and other relevant factors ;

“(iii) That a Special Committee of the General Assembly should be set up to recommend for acceptance of the Members of the United Nations a scheme of quotas of Jewish refugees and displaced persons to be resettled in their respective territories, and that the Special Committee should, as far as possible, work in consultation with the International Refugee Organization or its Preparatory Commission ”

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### *Resolution No. III*

#### DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE CONSTITUTION AND FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

“*The General Assembly*, taking note of the declaration by the Mandatory Power of its intention to withdraw from Palestine ;

“*Considering* that Palestine is a mandated territory whose independence was provisionally recognized by virtue of paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations ;

“Recognizing that the only solution in consonance with the objectives of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations is one that is acceptable to the majority of the people of Palestine :

“Being satisfied that the partition of Palestine is unjust, illegal and impracticable and that the only just and workable solution is the immediate establishment of a unitary, democratic, and independent State, with adequate safeguards for minorities ;

“Believing that peaceful and orderly transfer of power from the Mandatory to the Government of the people of Palestine is necessary in the interest of all concerned ;

“Recommends :

“1. That a Provisional Government, representative of all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength, should be set up as early as possible in Palestine ;

“2. That the powers and functions of the present Administration of Palestine should be vested in the Provisional Government as soon as the latter is constituted ;

“3. That the Mandatory Power should begin the withdrawal of its forces and services from Palestine as soon as the Provisional Government is installed, and should complete the withdrawal within one year.

“4. That the Provisional Government should, as soon as practicable, enact an electoral law for the setting up of a Constituent Assembly, prepare an electoral register, and hold elections for the Constituent Assembly ;

“5. That the Constituent Assembly should also function as a Legislature and that the Provisional Government should be responsible to it until elections for a Legislature are held under the new constitution ;

“6. That while the task of framing a constitution for Palestine must be left to the Constituent Assembly, the following basic principles shall be strictly adhered to :

“(i) Palestine shall be a unitary and sovereign state ;

“(ii) It shall have a democratic constitution, with an elected Legislature and an Executive responsible to the Legislature ;

“(iii) The constitution shall provide guarantees for the sanctity



of the Holy Places, covering inviolability, maintenance, freedom of access and freedom of worship in accordance with the *status quo* ;

“(iv) The constitution shall guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion; and freedom of religious belief and practice in accordance with the *status quo* (including the maintenance of separate religious courts to deal with matters of personal status) ;

“(v) The constitution shall guarantee the rights of religious bodies or other societies and individuals to maintain, in addition to educational establishments administered by public authority, educational institutions of their own, subject to normal government supervision and inspection ;

“(vi) The constitution shall recognize the right of Jews to employ Hebrew as a second official language in areas in which they are in a majority ;

“(vii) The Law of Naturalization and Citizenship shall provide, amongst other conditions, that the applicant should be a legal resident of Palestine for a continuous period to be determined by the Constituent Assembly ;

“(viii) The constitution shall ensure adequate representation in the Legislature for all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength ;

“(ix) The constitution shall also provide for adequate reflection in the Executive and the Administration of the distribution of representation in the Legislature ;

“(x) The constitution shall authorize the Legislature to invest local authorities with wide discretion in matters connected with education, health and other social services ;

“(xi) The constitution shall provide for the setting up of a Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of which shall include, *inter alia*, the power to pronounce upon the constitutional validity of all legislation, and it shall be open to any aggrieved party to have recourse to that tribunal ;

“(xii) The guarantees contained in the constitution concerning the rights and safeguards of the minorities shall not be subject to amendment or modification without the consent of the minority concerned expressed through a majority of its representatives in the Legislature.”

### Arab Suggestions For a Compromise

*Principles proposed by Labanon on behalf of Arab States to form the basis of a compromise formula at 128th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on Nov. 29, 1947)*

1. A federal independent State shall be set up in Palestine not later than 1 August 1948.

2. The Government of the independent State of Palestine shall be constituted on a Federal basis and shall comprise a federal government and cantonal governments of Jewish and Arab cantons.

3. The delimitation of cantons shall be effected with a view to leaving as few Arab and Jewish minorities as possible in each canton.

4. The population of Palestine shall elect by direct universal suffrage a Constituent Assembly which shall draft the future constitution of the Federal State of Palestine. The Constituent Assembly shall comprise all the elements of the population in proportion to the number of their respective citizens.

5. The Constituent Assembly in defining the powers of the Federal State of Palestine, as well as the powers of the judicial and legislative organs; in defining the functions of the cantonal governments and in defining the relationships between the cantonal governments and the Federal State will be guided by the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America as well as the constitutions of the individual States of the United States of America.

6. Among other necessary and essential provisions, the constitution shall provide for the protection of the Holy Places, freedom of access, visit and worship, in accordance with the Status quo, as well as the safeguarding of the rights of religious establishments of all nationalities which are now found in Palestine."

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### U.N. General Assembly's Resolution On The Partition of Palestine

*(Resolution 181 (II) A adopted at the 128th plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on Nov. 29, 1947)*

*The General Assembly,*

*Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for*

the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session;

*Having constituted* a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

*Having received and examined* the report of the Special Committee (document A 1364) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee :

*Considers* that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations ;

*Takes Note* of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1, August 1948 ;

*Recommends* to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below :

*Requests that*

(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation ;

(b) The Security Council consider if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution ;

(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution.

(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan ;

*Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect ;*

*Appeals to all Governments and to all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations.*

### **Plan of Partition With Economic Union**

#### **Part I. Future Constitution And Government of Palestine**

##### **A—Termination of Mandate, Partition And Independence**

1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948

The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the Mandate and evacuate such area.

The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than February 1, 1948.

3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in Part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948.

The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in Parts II and III below.

4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.

##### **B. Steps Preparatory To Independence**

1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented

on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.

2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission, which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The Mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent coordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.

In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required.

The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.

On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in Part II of this are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by State boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.

4. The Commission after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organisations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.

If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.

5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government

acting under the Commission shall have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.

6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.

7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.

8. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.

This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command shall be exercised by the Commission.

9. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.

The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are: (a) Palestine citizens residing in that State and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in that State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.

Arabs and Jews residing in the city of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively.

Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.

During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission.

10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The constitutions of the States shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include *inter alia* provisions for :

(a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation ; and an executive body responsible to the legislature ;

(c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

(d) Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association ;

(e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the city of Jerusalem subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.

11. The Commission shall appoint preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in Section D below.

12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.

13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of the government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.

14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.

The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.

The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.

15. The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.

### **C. Declaration**

A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the Provisional government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain inter-alia the following clauses.

#### **General Provision**

The stipulations contained in the declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official



action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

### CHAPTER I—*Holy Places, Religious Buildings And Sites*

1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.

3. Holy places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious building, or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State.

No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly recommendations.

5. The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and religious rights appertaining thereto,

are being properly applied and respected and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the sites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full cooperation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.

## CHAPTER 2—RELIGIOUS AND MINORITY RIGHTS

1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals shall be ensured to all.

2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.

3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

7. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

8. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Council shall be paid previous to dispossession.

### CHAPTER 3—CITIZENSHIP, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS.

*Citizenship.* Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arab and Jews, who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.

Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.

2. *International Conventions.* (a) The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any

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1. The following stipulation shall be added to declaration concerning the Jewish State "In the Jewish State adequate facilities shall be given to the Arab-speaking citizens for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, in the Legislature, before the courts and in the administration."

In the declaration concerning the Arab State the words "by an Arab in the Jewish State" should be replaced by the words "by a Jew in the Arab State".

right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.

(b) Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

3. Financial obligations. (a) The State shall respect and fulfill all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by mandatoy Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.

(b) These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.

(c) A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom, and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to the Court.

(d) Commercial concessions, granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession holder and the State.

#### *CHAPTER IV*

##### *Miscellaneous Provisions*

1. The provisions of Chapters I and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Any member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances.

2. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either Party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement:

#### **D. Economic Union And Transit**

1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit. The undertaking shall be drafted by the Commission provided for in Section B, Paragraph I, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and co-operation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for the other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948, the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.

#### *The Economic Union Of Palestine*

2. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be :—

(a) A Customs Union :

(b) A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate.

(c) Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways ; inter-state highways ; postal, telephone and telegraphic services and ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce ;

(d) Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation ; land reclamation and soil conservation.

(e) Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.

3. There shall be established a Joint Economic Board which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years ; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.

4. The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to advise in and either directly or by delegation the measures necessary

to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organization and administration necessary to fulfill its functions.

5. The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the joint Economic Board. The Board's decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.

6. In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of that part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to cooperate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including dispensation of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.

7. In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be the planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the city of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project.

8. In regard to the joint currency system the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.

9. So far as is consistent with paragraph 2 (b) above, each State may operate its own Central Bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licences and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate the joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources—each State shall have available, in any twelve months' period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure

consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months' period ending 31 December 1947.

10. All economic authority not specifically vested in the joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.

11. There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States and the City of Jerusalem.

12. The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by the Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.

13. The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the joint Economic Board.

(a) The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services ;

(b) The administrative expenses of the joint Economic Board.

(c) The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine consisting of :

(i) The service of the outstanding public debt ;

(ii) The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of Chapter 3 above.

14. After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner : not less than five per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem ; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social service in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State's contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the

prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenues may be revised by the joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.

15. All International conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communication services under the jurisdiction of the joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority vote of the joint Economic Board.

16. The joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine's exports fair and equal access to world markets.

17. All enterprises operated by the joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.

#### *Freedom Of Transit And Visit*

18. The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the city of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each State and the city shall control residence within its borders.

#### *Termination, modification and interpretation of the undertaking*

19. The undertaking and treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.

20. During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.

21. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

#### *E—ASSETS*

1. The movable assets of the administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the city of Jerusalem.



land of Tamra to the north westernmost corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea.

The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan river at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follows the western side of that road in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the sub-districts of Beisan, Nablus and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub-district boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-wards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and Faqu'a, to the boundary of the sub-districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point north-east of Nuris. Thence it proceeds first northwestwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zir'in, and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, then north-westwards along the district boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway. From here the boundary runs south-westwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh. Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point to the village of El Buteimat. From here it follows the northern and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar'ara, rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi'Ara ; and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Qaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line halfway between the railway and the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya, Jaljuliya and Ras el Ein road to a point just east of Ras el Ein station ; whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lydd and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south-west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand

el'Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu el Fadil to the northeast corner of the lands of Beer Ya'Aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport). Thence the boundary line follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the northeast corner of El Na'ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village, and the southern boundary of, 'Innaba village. Thence it turns north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El Qubab, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusha, Seidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the north-eastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza, and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezim to the Gaza district boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El Mismiya, El Kabira and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi.

From the southern point of intersection the boundary line runs north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunus and Minat El Qila, and southeastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a southwesterly direction; passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir, Esh Sharqiya and Ibdis. From the south-east corner of the Ibdis village it runs to a point southwest of the built-up area of Beit 'Affa crossing the Hebron-El-Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southwards along the western village boundary of El Faluja to the Beersheba sub-district boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of Arab el Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the sub-districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the northwest of the town. It then turns southeastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a point situated one kilometre to the west of it. From here it turns northeastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab' and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometre, whence it turns

eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron subdistrict boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras Ez Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160.

About five kilometres northeast of Ras ez Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Trans-Jordan frontier in the Dead Sea.

The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat el Qila and Nabi Yunus, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the northwest corner of the lands of Beit Tima. Thence it runs east of El Jiya, across the village of El Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the south-east corner of Dimra, the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving off the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the southeast corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns northwest for two kilometres, turning again in a south-westerly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the northwest corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza'a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns southeastwards to Kh. el. Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba—El' Auja main road to the west of Kh. El Mushrif. From there it joins Wadi el Zaiyatin just to the west of El Subeita. From there it turns to the north-east and then to southeast following this Wadi and passes to the east of 'Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi Ajrim and

Wadi Lissan to the point where Wadi Lissan crosses the Egyptian frontier.

The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street upto its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the southwest of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying southeast of the junction, to the west of Miqve Yisrael lands, to the north-west of Holon local council, to the north of the line linking up the north-western corner of Holon with the north-east corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of the Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State.

### **B. Jewish State**

The northeastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Trans-Jordan. It includes the whole of Hula Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan sub-district, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gibboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Jewish section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat et Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza subdistrict and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza sub-district, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron sub-district boundary line to Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State.

to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.

5. *Legislative organization.* A Legislative Council elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the statute of the city, nor shall any law regulation or official action prevail over them. The statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances, in case the Council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.

6. *Administration of justice.* The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the city shall be subject to it.

7. *Economic union and economic regime.* The city of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory of the city.

The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union ; on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals.

8. *Freedom of transit and visit ; control of residents.* Subject to considerations of security and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within, the borders of the city shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.

9. *Relations with the Arab and Jewish States.* Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be associated with the

the city and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connection with the international administration of the city.

10. *Official languages.* Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages as may be required.

11. *Citizenship.* All the residents shall become *ipso facto* citizens of the city of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens, or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to part 1, Section B, Paragraph 9 of this plan.

The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the city outside its territory.

12. *Freedoms of Citizens.* (a) Subject to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the city shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion [and worship, language, education, speech and Press, assembly and association, and petition.

(b) No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.

(c) All persons within the city shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

(d) The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

(e) Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measures shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

(f) The city shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively; in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural tradition.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while

conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the city may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

(g) No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the city of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

13. *Holy Places.* (a) Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

(b) Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.

(c) Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repairs. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

(d) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the city. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or which would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

14. *Special Powers of the Governor in Respect of the Holy Places, Religious Buildings and Sites in the City and in any Part of Palestine.*

(a) The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the city of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor.

(b) With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine

outside the city, the Governor shall determine on the ground of powers granted to him by the constitutions of both States whether the provisions of the constitutions of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.

(c) The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rights of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings or sites in any part of Palestine.

In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.

(D) *Duration of The Special Regime.* The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the afore-mentioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to re-examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the city shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the regime of the city.

#### **Part IV. Capitulations**

States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the city of Jerusalem.

#### **President Truman's Statement of March 25, 1948 On U.N. Trusteeship For Palestine**

"It is vital that the American people have a clear understanding of the position of the United States in the United Nations regarding Palestine.



The country vigorously supported the plan for partition with economic union recommended by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and by the General Assembly. We have explored every possibility consistent with the basic principles of the Charter for giving effect to that solution. Unfortunately, it has become clear that the partition plan cannot be carried out at this time by peaceful means. We could not undertake to impose this solution on people of Palestine by the use of American troops, both on Charter grounds and as a matter of national policy.

The United Kingdom has announced its firm intention to abandon its mandate in Palestine on May 15. Unless emergency action is taken, there will be no Public authority in Palestine on that date capable of preserving law and order. Violence and bloodshed will descend upon the Holy land. Large-scale fighting among the people of that country will be the inevitable result. Such fighting would infect the entire Middle East and could lead to consequence of the gravest sort involving the peace of this nation and of the world.

These dangers are imminent. Responsible Governments in the United Nations cannot face this prospect without acting promptly to prevent it. The United States has proposed to the Security Council a temporary United Nations Trusteeship for Palestine to provide a Government to keep the peace. Such Trusteeship was proposed only after we had exhausted every effort to find a way to carry out partition by peaceful means. Trusteeship is not proposed as a substitute for the partition plan but as an effort to fill the vacuum soon to be created by the termination of the mandate on May 15. The Trusteeship does not prejudice the character of the final political settlement. It would establish the conditions of order which are essential to a peaceful settlement.

If we are to avert tragedy in Palestine, an immediate truce must be reached between the Arabs and Jews of that country. I am instructing Ambassador Austin to urge upon the Security Council in the strongest terms that representatives of the Arab and Jews be called at once to the Council table to arrange such a truce.

The United States is prepared to lend every appropriate assistance to the United Nations in preventing bloodshed and in reaching a peaceful settlement. If the United Nations agrees to a

temporary trusteeship, we must take our share of the necessary responsibility. Our regard for the United Nations, for the peace of the world, and for our self-interest does not permit us to do less.

With such a truce and such a trusteeship, a peaceful settlement is yet possible, without them open warfare is just over the horizon. American policy in this emergency period is based squarely upon the recognition of this inescapable fact.\*

### **Security Council's Resolution Of March 5, 1948**

#### *"The Security Council*

*Having received* the resolution of General Assembly of 29 November 1947 on Palestine, and having received from the United Nations Palestine Commission its first monthly report and its first special report on the problem of security in Palestine ;

*Resolves* to call on the permanent members of the Council to consult and to inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make as a result of such consultations, recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission with a view to implementing the resolution of the General Assembly. The Security Council requests the permanent Members to report to it on the results of their consultations within ten days; and

Appeals to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine".

### **Report By Permanent Members of March 19, 1948**

"The consultations among the permanent Members of the Security Council and informal communications with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory power, the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee, held since March 5, 1948, have developed the following facts regarding the situation with respect to Palestine.

1. The Jewish Agency accepts the partition plan, considers it to be the irreducible minimum acceptable to the Jews, and insists upon the implementation of the plan without modification.
2. The Arab Higher Committee rejects any solution based on

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\* (Dept of state Bulletin Vol 18 No 457 April 4, 1948)

partition in any form and considers that the only acceptable solution is the formation of one independent State for the whole of Palestine, whose constitution would be based on democratic principles and which would include adequate safeguards for minorities and the safety of the Holy Places.

3. No modifications in the essentials of the partition plan are acceptable to the Jewish Agency and no modifications would make the plan acceptable to the Arab Higher Committee.

4. The Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power, the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee have indicated that the partition plan cannot be implemented by peaceful means under present conditions.

5. The Mandatory Power has confirmed that a considerable number of incursions of illegal arms and armed elements into Palestine have occurred by land and sea.

6. The gradual withdrawal of the military forces of the Mandatory Power will, in the absence of agreement, result in increasing violence and disorder in Palestine. Warfare of a guerrilla type grows more violently constantly.

7. If the mandate is terminated prior to a peaceful solution of the problem, large-scale fighting between the two communities can be expected.

## PART II

1. As a result of the consultations of the permanent Members regarding the situation with respect to Palestine, they find and report that a continuation of the infiltration into Palestine, by land and by sea, of groups and persons with the purpose of taking part in violence would aggravate still further the situation and recommend :

(a) That the Security Council should make it clear to the parties and Governments concerned that the Security Council is determined not to permit the existence of a threat to international peace in Palestine ; and

(b) That the Security Council should take further action by all means available to it to bring about the immediate cessation of violence and the restoration of peace and order in Palestine.

**Resolution Calling For Truce of April 1, 1948**

*"The Security Council*

In the exercise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Notes* the increasing violence and disorder in Palestine and believes that it is of the utmost urgency that an immediate truce be effected in Palestine ;

*Calls* upon the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee to make representatives available to the Security Council for the purpose of arranging a truce between the Arab and Jewish Communities of Palestine, and emphasizes the heavy responsibility which would fall upon any party failing to observe such a truce;

*Calls upon* Arab and Jewish armed groups in Palestine to cease acts of violence immediately".

**Request for Special Session of Assembly of April 1, 1948**

*"The Security Council*

*Having*, on 1 December 1947, received the resolution of the General Assembly concerning Palestine dated 29 November 1947, and

*Having* taking note of the United Nations Palestine Commission's First and Second Monthly Progress Reports and first Special Report on the problem of Security, and

*Having* on 5 March 1948 called on the permanent members of the Council to consult, and

*Having* taken note of the reports made concerning these consultations,

*Requests* the Secretary-General in accordance with Article 20 of the United Nations Charter, to convoke a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future Government of Palestine."

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**Call For Cease-fire**

*Security Council Resolution of April 17, 1948 (S/ 723)*

*Considering* the Council's resolution of 1 April 1948 and the conversations held by its President with the representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee with a view to arranging a truce between Arabs and Jews in Palestine ;

*Considering that*, as stated in that resolution ; it is of the utmost urgency to bring about the immediate cessation of acts of violence in Palestine, and to establish conditions of peace and order in that country ;

*Considering* that the United Kingdom Government, so long as it remains the Mandatory Power, is responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in Palestine and should continue to take all steps necessary to that end, and that in so doing it should receive the co-operation and support of the Security Council in particular, as well as all Members of the United Nations.

### *The Security Council*

1. *Calls upon* all persons and organizations in Palestine, and especially upon the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency to take immediately, without prejudice to their rights, claims or positions, and as a contribution to the well-being and permanent interest of Palestine, the following measures :

(a) cease all activities, of a military or paramilitary nature, as well as acts of violence, terrorism and sabotage ;

(b) Refrain from bringing and from assisting and encouraging the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals, whatever their origin ;

(c) Refrain from importing, or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation or acquisition of weapons and war materials ;

(d) Refrain, pending further consideration of the future Government of Palestine by the General Assembly from any political activity which might prejudice the rights, claims, or positions of either community ;

(e) Co-operate with the Mandatory authorities for the effective maintenance of law and order and of essential services, particularly those relating to transportation ; communications, health and food and water supplies ;

(f) Refrain from any action which will endanger the safety of the Holy Places in Palestine and from any action which would interfere with access to all shrines and sanctuaries for the purpose of worship by those who have an established right to visit and worship at them ;

2. *Requests* the United Kingdom Government, for so long as it

remains the Mandatory Power, to use its best efforts to bring all those concerned in Palestine to accept the measures set forth under paragraph 1 above and, subject to retaining the freedom of action of its own forces, to supervise the execution of these measures by all those concerned and to keep the Security Council and the General Assembly currently informed on the situation in Palestine,

3. Calls upon all Governments, and particularly those of the countries neighbouring Palestine, to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the measures set out under paragraph 1 above, and particularly those referring to the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals, weapons and war materials.

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#### **S.C. Resolution of April 23, 1948 on Truce Commission.**

Referring to its resolution of 17 April 1948, calling upon all parties concerned to comply with specific terms for a truce in Palestine,

##### *The Security Council*

Establishes a Truce Commission for Palestine composed of representatives of those members of the Security Council which have their consular offices in Jerusalem, noting, however, that the representative of Syria has indicated that his Government is not prepared to serve on the Commission. The function of the Commission shall be to assist the Security Council in supervising the implementation by the parties of the resolution of the Security Council of 17 April 1948 ;

*Requests* the Commission to report to the President of the Security Council within four days regarding its activities and development of the situation, and subsequently to keep the Security Council informed with respect thereto ;

The Commission, its members, their assistants and its personnel shall be entitled to travel, separately or together, wherever the Commission deems necessary to carry out its tasks. The Secretary General of the United Nations shall furnish the Commission with such personnel and assistance as it may require, taking into account the special urgency of the situation with respect to Palestine"

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**General Assembly Resolution Of May 14 1948. (S186 (S-2))  
Appointing U.N. Mediator.**

*The General Assembly*

*I*

*Taking account* of the present situation in regard to Palestine;

*I. Strongly affirms* its support of the efforts of the Security Council to secure a truce in Palestine and calls upon all Governments organizations and persons to co-operate in making effective such a truce ;

*II*

*1. Empowers* a United Nations Mediator in Palestine to be chosen by a Committee of the General Assembly composed of representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, to exercise the following functions :

(a) To use his good offices with the local and community authorities in Palestine to :

(i) Arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the safety and well-being of the population of Palestine ;

(ii) Assume the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine ;

(iii) Promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine ;

(b) To co-operate with the Truce Commission for Palestine appointed by the Security Council in its resolution of 23 April 1948 (S/727) ;

(c) To invite, as seems to him advisable, with a view to the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine, the assistance and co-operation of appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the World Health Organization, of the International Red Cross, and of other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character ;

*1. Instructs* the United Nations Mediator to render progress reports monthly, or more frequently as he deems necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations ;

*3. Directs* the United Nations Mediator to conform in his activities with the provisions of this resolution and with such

instructions as the General Assembly or the Security Council may issue:

4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the United Nations Mediator an emolument equal to that paid to the President of the International Court of Justice, and to provide the Mediator with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Mediator by the General Assembly;

### III

Relieves the Palestine Commission from the further exercise of responsibilities under resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947.

—O—

*Statement From President Truman read out in G.A. on May 14, 1948,*

"This Government has been informed that a Jewish State has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the Provisional Government thereof. The United States recognizes the Provisional Government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel"

*Statement Issued By White House On May 14, 1948*

"The desire of the United States to obtain a truce in Palestine will in no way be lessened by the Proclamation of the Jewish State. We hope that the new Jewish State will join with the Security Council Truce Commission in redoubled efforts to bring an end to the fighting, which has been, throughout the United Nations consideration of Palestine a principal objective of this Government.

—O—

### **Israeli Proclamation Of Independence**

*Cablegram Dated 15 May 1948 from the Foreign Secretary  
of the Provisional Government of Israel to the U. N.*

*Secretary-General*

"(I) have (the) honour to inform you National Council for Jewish State consisting of members of elected representatives (of) Jewish bodies (in) Palestine which had applied to (the) United Nations Palestine Commission for recognition as Provisional Council Government under part one B four of resolution of General Assembly of 29 November 1947 met Yesterday 14 May and issued proclamation declaring following:

'On 29 November 1947 General Assembly of United Nations

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Note : The Committee met on May 20 to appoint Count Folke Bernadote as the Mediator



Behalf Provisional Government of Israel"

MOSHE SHERTOK  
*Foreign Secretary*

**Letter To Truman**

*Letter from the Agent of the Provisional Government of Israel to the President of the United States dated May 15, 1948.*

My Dear Mr. President :

I have the honour to notify you that the State of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution of November 29, 1947, and that a provisional Government has been charged to assume the rights and duties of government for preserving law and order within the boundaries of Israel, for defending the State against external aggression, and for discharging the obligations of Israel to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law. The Act of Independence will become effective at one minute after six o'clock on the evening of 14 May 1948, Washington time.

With full knowledge of the deep bond of sympathy which has existed and has been strengthened over the past thirty years between the Government of the United States and Jewish people of Palestine, I have been authorized by the Provisional Government of the new State to tender this message and to express the hope that your Government will recognize and will welcome Israel into the Community of the Nations.

Very respectfully yours,

Eliahu Epstein,  
*Agent Provisional Government of Israel*  
—o—

Cable dated 15 May 1948 From the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to the Secretary-General of U. N.

"On the occasion of the intervention of Arab States in Palestine to restore law and order and to prevent disturbances prevailing in Palestine from spreading into their territories and to check further bloodshed, I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the following statement before the General Assembly and the Security Council.

1. Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire, subject to its

rule of law and enjoying full representation in its Parliament, the great majority of its population was composed of Arabs with a small minority of Jews enjoying all rights alike with all the remaining citizens and liable only to such charges as all others were. Never were they as minority the subject of any discrimination on account of their creed. Holy Places were protected and accessible to all without distinction.

2. The Arabs have constantly been seeking their freedom and independence ; when the Second World War broke out and the Allies declared that they were fighting to restore freedom to the nations, the Arabs sided with the Allies and placed all their means at their disposal and in fact fought with them for the realization of their national aspirations and their independence. Great Britain took upon herself the recognition of the independence of the Arab countries in Asia including Palestine. The Arabs' effort was felt and duly appreciated in winning victory.

3. Great Britain issued a declaration in 1917 in which expression was made of its sympathy with the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. When this was brought to the knowledge of the Arabs they did not fail to express their resentment and opposition to such expression of policy and when they protested formally to Great Britain the latter made the necessary reassurances with a confirmation of the view that such a declaration did not affect in any degree their rights nor their freedom and independence and that the said declaration did not prejudice the political position of the Arabs of Palestine notwithstanding the illegality of the said declaration. The British Government's interpretation of it was that it meant no more than the establishment of a spiritual abode for the Jews in Palestine without their being any ulterior political motives such as the creation of a Jewish State, that being further the expressed views of the Jewish leaders at the time.

4. When the war ended Great Britain did not fulfil its pledges. Instead Palestine was placed under a Mandate entrusted to Great Britain. The terms of the Mandate provided for the safeguarding of the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine and their preparation for eventual independence to which they were entitled by virtue of the Covenant of the League of Nations which admitted that inhabitants of Palestine were fit for it.

5. Great Britain, however, placed Palestine in such a position as made it possible for the Jews to flood the country with waves of immigrants and factually helped their establishment on the soil despite the saturation of the land with its population which did exceed the absorptive capacity of the country economically and otherwise, thereby neglecting the provided for interests and the rights of its lawful inhabitants. The Arabs used all means at all times to express their deep concern and anxiety at such a policy which they felt was undermining their future and their very existence. But all such times they were met with utter disregard and harsh treatment such as jails, exile, etc.

6. And whereas Palestine is an Arab country falling in the heart of the Arab countries and attached to the Arab world with all bonds spiritual, historical, economical and strategical, the Arab States as well as Eastern countries, whether through their people or Governments could not but concern and interest themselves with the fate of Palestine. This is why they took upon themselves the task of handling its case before the international institutions generally and particularly before Great Britain, insisting upon a solution for the problem based upon undertaking given to them and upon democratic principles. A round-table conference was held early in 1939 in London in which Arab States took part asking for the safeguarding of the independence of Arab Palestine as a whole. That conference resulted in the issue of the well-known White Paper in which Great Britain defined its policy towards Palestine, admitting its right to independence while laying down at the same time certain provisions for the exercise of such independence. Great Britain did therein further declare that its obligations regarding the establishment of the Jewish National Home have been completely fulfilled as the National Home had been established. But unfortunately the underlying policy of the White Paper was not carried out, which led to an increasingly bad situation and, in fact, resulted in complete prejudice and disregard to Arab interests.

7. During the time that the Second World War was raging the respective Governments of the Arab States began to co-ordinate their views and actions for the useful purpose of better securing co-operation regarding not only their present and future but for playing their part in the establishment of lasting world peace.

The problem of Palestine did not at any time during mutual consultation fail to absorb its due share of attention and interest. It was a result of those consultations that then emerged the present Arab League as instrument for the realization of their own peace, security and welfare. The Arab League Charter declared that Palestine had become an independent country since its separation from the Ottoman Empire but that all the appertaining external rights and privileges attendant upon formal independence had to be subdued temporarily for reasons beyond the will of its people. It was a happy coincidence which gave rise to the hopes of the Arab States then that the United Nations was brought to existence soon after. And accordingly the Arab States unhesitatingly participated in its creation and membership out of deep belief in that institution, its ideals and high aims.

8. Since then the Arab League, through its member States, unceasingly endeavoured by all its means, whether with the Mandatory or with the United Nations, to find a fair and just solution for the problem of Palestine, based on democratic principles and consistent with the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant as well as the United Nations Charter, a solution which would be lasting and would ensure peace and security in that land leading to prosperity, but such solution invariably conflicted with opposition from Zionists and with their demand as they then started to openly declare their insistence upon a Jewish State and in fact bent upon full preparations with arms and fortifications to impose their own solution by force.

9. When the General Assembly made its recommendations on 29 November 1947 for the solution of the Palestine problem on the basis of partition providing for the establishment of two States, one Arab and one Jewish, with an international regime of trusteeship for the city of Jerusalem, the Arab States expressed the warning that such a solution was prejudicial to the rights of Arab inhabitants of Palestine to independence and was contradictory to democratic principles and to the League of Nations as well as the United Nations Charter. The Arabs then rejected such a scheme declaring that it was not susceptible of execution by peaceful means and that its imposition by force constituted a threat to peace and security in the area.

The apprehensions of Arab States proved to be well-founded as

the disturbances of which they had warned soon swept the country, and armed conflict took place between its two peoples who started to combat against each other and shed each other's blood. Consequently, the United Nations realized the mistake upon which the recommendation of partition was made and turned to search for an outlet.

10. Now that the Mandate over Palestine has come to an end, leaving no legally constituted authority behind in order to administer law and order in the country and afford the necessary and adequate protection to life and property, the Arab States declare as follows :—

(a) The right to set up a Government in Palestine pertains to its inhabitants under the principles of self-determination recognized by the Covenant of the League of Nations as well as the United Nations Charter ;

(b) Peace and order have been completely upset in Palestine, and, in consequence of Jewish aggression approximately over a quarter of million of the Arab population have been compelled to leave their homes and emigrate to neighbouring Arab countries. The prevailing events in Palestine exposed the concealed aggressive intentions of the Zionists and their imperialist motives as clearly shown in their acts committed upon those peaceful Arabs and villages of Deir Yassein, Tiberias and other places, as well as their encroachment upon the buildings and bodies of the inviolable consular codes manifested by their attack upon the consulate in Jerusalem.

(c) The Mandatory has already announced that on the termination of the Mandate it will no longer be responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Palestine except in the camps and areas actually occupied by its forces, and only to the extent necessary for the security of these forces and their withdrawal. This leaves Palestine absolutely without any administrative authority entitled to maintain, and capable of maintaining, a machinery of administration of the country adequate for the purpose of ensuring due protection of life and property. There is further the threat that this lawlessness may spread to the neighbouring Arab States where feeling is already very tense on account of the prevailing conditions in Palestine.

(d) It was the sincere wish of the Arab States that the United Nations might succeed in arriving at a fair and just solution of the Palestine problem, thus establishing a lasting peace for the country

under the precepts of the democratic principles in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations and the United Nations Charter.

(e) They are responsible in any case by virtue of their responsibility as members of the Arab League which is a regional organization within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The recent disturbances in Palestine further constitute a serious and direct threat to peace and security within the territories of the Arab States themselves. For these reasons, and considering that the Security of Palestine is a sacred trust for them, and out of anxiousness to check the further deterioration of the prevailing conditions and to prevent the spread of disorder and lawlessness into the neighbouring Arab lands, and in order to fill the vacuum created by the termination of the Mandate and the failure to replace it by any legally constituted authority, the Arab Governments find themselves compelled to intervene for the sole purpose of restoring peace and security and establishing law and order in Palestine.

The Arab States recognize that the independence and sovereignty of Palestine which was so far subject to the British Mandate has now, with the termination of the Mandate, become established in fact and maintain that the lawful inhabitants alone are competent and entitled to set up an administration in Palestine for the discharge of all governmental functions without any external interference. As soon as that stage is reached the intervention of the Arab States, which is confined to the restoration of peace and establishment of law and order, shall be put an end to, and the Sovereign State of Palestine will be competent in cooperation with the other States members of the Arab League, to take every step for the promotion of the welfare and security of its peoples and territory.

The Governments of the Arab States hereby confirm at this stage the view that had been repeatedly declared by them on previous occasions, such as the London Conference and before the United Nations mainly, the only fair and just solution to the problem of Palestine is the creation of United State of Palestine based upon the democratic principles which will enable all its inhabitants to enjoy equality before the law, and which will guarantee to all minorities the safeguards provided for in all democratic constitutional States

affording at the same time full protection and free access to Holy Places. The Arab States emphatically and repeatedly declare that their intervention in Palestine has been prompted solely by the considerations and for the aims set out above and that they are not inspired by any other motive whatsoever. They are, therefore, confident that their action will receive the support of the United Nations as tending to further the aims and ideals of the United Nations as set out in its Charter."

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## CHAPTER VIII

### War, Armistice, And Efforts For Settlement

On May 15, 1948 the Egyptian Government cabled the U. N. Secretary-General to inform him that the Egyptian forces had entered Palestine "to establish security and order in place of chaos which prevailed there and which rendered the country at the mercy of the Zionist terroristic gangs who persisted in attacking peaceful Arabs". The King of Trans-Jordan also informed the Secretary-General that his forces had entered Palestine "to protect unarmed Arabs against massacres." A lengthy telegram received from the Secretary-General of the Arab League the same day detailed the reasons for intervention by Armed Forces of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan and Iraq and hoped the U. N. would support the action. The Arab intervention was occasioned to push back Jewish incursions into Syria and Lebanon and was in response to requests for assistance from local Arabs, the U. N. was informed.

Britain, it may be stated, had phased withdrawal of her forces and administration first from the Jewish areas and last of all from areas proposed to form an Arab State. Tel Aviv was among the first to be vacated giving the Zionists a port for free import of illegal arms and immigrants. Britain also failed to discharge her obligation to maintain law and order, or hand over control to a U. N. organ till the termination of the mandate. The Jewish Agency stepped in to take charge of administration upon British withdrawal. The Arabs were thus put at a great disadvantage as compared to the Jews and the Zionists according to their set policy of fixing a few massacres to rid their areas of Arabs who almost equalled them in number, indulged in brutal killings of Arab men, women and children, the worst example of which occurred at Deir Yassein, causing panic among Arabs who fled to neighbouring Arab countries. The Zionists later accused Arab countries of having encouraged migration. The lie was, however, nailed by Nathan Chofshi, Prof. Erich Fromm, Glubb-Pasha and Mr. Erskine Childers. Chofshi a contemporary immigrant in Ben Gurion's group said: "we turned them out", Fromm, a noted Jewish writer and thinker, declared 'it was deliberately planned'; Childers a noted British author and guest of Israeli Foreign office said: "not a shred of evidence was produced in support of Israeli charge"; and Glubb-Pasha observed very rightly



that "voluntary immigrants do not leave their homes in the clothes they stand in, nor are they in such a hurry as to lose members of their family".

The intervening Arab forces registered some initial gains occupying areas in south and east not yet occupied by Jews and tried to blockade Jerusalem. Transjordan obtained surrender of Jewish Quarter and control of old city on May 18. Egypt occupied Gaza on May 16 and Beersheba on May 20. The Jews, however, won control of a section of the main road to Jerusalem and beat off Arab attacks on their scattered settlements. The Arab forces, it may be said to their credit, never entered the area allotted to the Jewish State under the Nov. 29, 1947 resolution and kept within the area allotted to the Arab State only.

The Security Council by a resolution adopted on May 22, 1948, directed the parties 'to cease fire without prejudice to their rights, claims or positions.' By another resolution of May 29, it forbade the parties to "induct military personnel or import into or export war material to Palestine."

Count Folke Bernadotte who had been appointed U. N. Mediator in Palestine obtained a four-week cease-fire effective June 11, and on June 28, proposed a plan for settlement envisaging transfer of Arab State areas and Negeb to Jordan and West Galilee to Israel both of which should form a Union; the Union Government handling economic affairs, Foreign relations and Defence, which was rejected by both the parties.

Hostilities broke out again in July. Israelis had utilized the four-week interval for securing war materials from all over the world and reorganizing their forces for an all-out attack. According to John Kimche arms and ammunition were flown in from Prague to Aqir and Israel obtained flying fortresses from the U.S.A. and Beaufort fighters from Britain. Prime Minister Ben Gurion in his June 9, address on the acceptance of the cease-fire had pledged to utilize the interval for better reorganization. Thus equipped the Israelis obtained lightning successes in all the sectors and occupied Ramle and Lod, and captured Nazareth and West Galilee, allotted to Arab State under the U.N. resolution of Nov. 29, 1947, and advanced their positions in the south. A second cease-fire was accepted on July 18, but it was

never observed faithfully by Israelis who by early months of 1949 occupied all the Negeb upto Palestine-Egyptian frontier except a coastal strip in the south-west corner. Egyptian forces were also cut off from El Arish and pinned against the Mediterranean Sea.

Both the Security Council and the General Assembly addressed themselves to the problem of peace in Palestine during autumn and winter of the year. Count Bernadotte in a report submitted on Sept. 16, 1948, a day before his assassination by men wearing Israeli Army uniform who were never brought to book for the dastardly offence, recommended the supersession of truce by formal peace or at the minimum an armistice. Other recommendations made by him included fixation of frontiers, in the absence of agreement, by the U.N. with Negeb going to Arabs, W. Galilee to the Jews and the central Palestine divided according to Nov. 29, 1947 resolution (181) (11) of General Assembly ; declaration of Haifa port and Lydda airport as free for all ; effective U.N. control for Jerusalem ; affirmation of the right of refugees to return at the earliest ; and setting up of a Conciliation Commission to supervise the implementation of all this. He also stated that "on grounds of historical connection and common interest there would be compelling reasons to merge Arab territory of Palestine with the territory of Jordan".

Israel rejected the conclusions even as a basis for discussion at the 200th meeting of the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 15. Arabs did the same the next day. Britain and U.S. supported the conclusions but the latter suggested different terms of reference for the Conciliation Commission emphasizing principle of consent for territorial question with regard to mediator's specific conclusions as the basis for a settlement. Russia considered the proposals contrary to resolution of Nov. 29, 1947 and on Nov. 25, submitted a draft resolution recommending immediate removal from Palestine of all foreign troops and foreign personnel. Australia, earlier on Nov. 23, had also introduced a resolution urging that resolution of Nov. 29, 1947 should form the basis of plan for settlement of the Palestine question. Poland on Nov. 25, introduced a draft resolution affirming the Nov. 29, 1947 resolution as a basis for settlement. The same day the Acting Mediator appeared before the Committee and said that the General Assembly should reach unequivocal conclusion on the following points.

1. Affirmation of Israeli existence according to the General Assembly resolution of Nov. 29, 1947 and its right to a seat.
2. Appeal to parties to resolve differences by negotiations direct or indirect.
3. Establishment of a Conciliation Commission to assist them and undertake such other functions as advised.
4. Clear guidance to Commission on reasonable allocation of territory subject to agreed modifications.
5. Arabs' right to return and just compensation where their houses are destroyed.
6. Determination of future of Jerusalem under international supervision with maximum local autonomy for Jewish and Arab Communities.

Syria by a draft resolution proposed reference to International Court of Justice for advisory opinion 'on the power of the General Assembly under the Charter to partition Palestine for the creation of Jewish Sovereign State against the wishes of the majority of the Palestine population and on the international status of Palestine on the termination of the Mandate'. This resolution was defeated by 20-20 with 8 abstentions in voting on Dec. 1, 1948. El Salvador's amendment to Syrian resolution replacing against --- by 'without first obtaining the consent of the majority of Palestine population' was lost by 21-21 with 4 abstentions. Another draft Syrian resolution urging the Conciliation Commission to study and prepare proposals for the establishment of a single State in Palestine on a cantonal and federal basis was also lost. U.K. revised its resolution eliminating endorsement of Mediator's Conclusions which was finally adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 11, 1948 appointing a new Mediator and Conciliation Commission and affirming the refugees' right to return and just compensation.

Between Sept. 30, 1948 and Dec. 1948, Acting Mediator complained against the intransigent attitude of Israelis obstructing cease-fire. Ten men including Mediator had lost their lives at the hands of the Israelis. On Nov. 16, the Security Council resolved to establish Armistice to convert truce to permanent peace. Dr. Ralph Bunche succeeded in effecting separate Armistice Agreements between Israel

and Egypt (Feb. 24, 1948) ; Israel and Lebanon (March 22) ; Israel and Jordan (April 3) and Israel and Syria (July 20, 1949). No agreements were signed with Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The agreements were alike in general content. Maps delineating the armistice demarcation lines were appended to the Israel-Jordan and Israel-Syria agreements. The Israel-Jordan agreement provided for replacement by Jordanian forces of the Iraqi forces in the sector held by Iraq and the appointment of Jordan and Israeli representatives to a special committee entrusted with the duty of ensuring normal use of Holy places and cultural institutions and free movement of traffic on vital roads.

The Armistice Agreements were concluded without prejudice to the rights and positions of the parties. The armistice frontiers were not international borders. In fact they left Israel in possession of some 5,000 square miles of territory in excess of what was allotted to her under the resolution of Nov 29, 1947. Israel sought to use the Armistice Agreements as a leverage for free passage of her ships through the Suez canal. But Arabs pointed out rightly, as stated by Oppenheim, that 'truces and Armistices are not peace treaties and do not end the state of belligerency'. Israel also claimed and tried to assert sovereignty in the demilitarized zone contrary to injunctions of the Armistice Agreements as interpreted by the U.N. Mixed Armistice Committees comprising representatives of the two parties with a U. N. official as chairman, which were continuously obstructed in their functioning by Israeli intransigence.

Israel was admitted to U. N. on May 11, 1949. The General Assembly resolution on her admission was no formal resolution as in the case of admission of any other Member. It recalled the resolutions of Nov. 29, 1947 and Dec. 11, 1948 and Israeli assurances of willingness to comply therewith. But no sooner was the resolution adopted than the Israeli attitude underwent a radical transformation. Israel exhibited ever-increasing bellicosity towards Arabs and defiance of U. N. Assembly's decision on refugees' right to return and a just compensation. The Arab refugee property was expropriated and discriminatory laws such as the Nationality Law and Absentee Property Law were passed against the Arabs and Defence regulations applied against them restricting their movements.

**SC Resolution of May 22, 1948 On Cease-Fire**

*"The Security Council*

*Taking into consideration* that previous resolutions of the Security Council in respect to Palestine have not been complied with and that military operations are taking place in Palestine.

*Calls upon* all Governments and authorities, without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned, to abstain from any hostile military action in Palestine and to that end to issue a cease-fire order to their military and Para-military forces to become effective within thirtysix hours after midnight, New York standard time, 22 May, 1948 :

*Calls upon* the Truce Commission and upon all parties concerned to give the highest priority to the negotiation and maintenance of a truce in the city of Jerusalem;

*Directs* the Commission established by the Security Council by its resolution of 23 April 1948 to report to the Security Council on the compliance with the two preceding paragraphs of this resolution ;

*Calls upon* all parties concerned to facilitate by all means in their power the task of the United Nations Mediator appointed in execution of the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948' (Appointment of Count Bernadotte was announced to S.C. on May 2)

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**SC Resolution of May, 28, 1948 For Four-Week Truce**

*"The Security Council*

*Desiring* to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of either Arabs or Jews,

*Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to order a cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks,

*Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to undertake that they will not introduce fighting personnel into Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen during the cease-fire, and

*Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned, should men of military age be introduced into countries or territories under their control, to undertake not to mobilize or submit them to military training during the cease-fire ;

*Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to refrain from importing or exporting war materials into or to Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen during the cease-fire ;

*Urges* all Governments and authorities concerned to take every possible precaution for the protection of the Holy Places and of the city of Jerusalem, including access to all shrines, and sanctuaries for the purpose of worship by those who have an established right to visit and worship at them ;

*Instructs* the United Nations Mediator for Palestine in concert with the Truce Commission to supervise the observance of the above provisions, and decides that they shall be provided with a sufficient number of military observers ;

*Instructs* the United Nations Mediator to make contact with all parties as soon as the cease-fire is in force with a view to carrying out his functions as determined by the General Assembly ;

*Calls upon* all concerned to give the greatest possible assistance to the United Nations Mediator ;

*Instructs* the United Nations Mediator to make a weekly report to the Security Council during the cease-fire ;

*Invites* the States Members of the Arab League and the Jewish and Arab authorities in Palestine to communicate their acceptance of this resolution to the Security Council not later than 6.00 p.m. New York standard time on 1 June 1948.

*Decides* that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter ;

*Calls upon* all Governments to take all possible steps to assist

in the implementation of this resolution.

—o—

**SC Appeal For Extension of Truce of July 7, 1948**

*"The Security Council,*

*Taking into consideration the telegram from the United Nations Mediator dated 5 July 1948,*

*Addresses an urgent appeal to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator"*.

—o—

**SC Resolution of July 15, 1948 on Jerusalem**

*"The Security Council*

*Taking into consideration that the Provisional Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine; that the States Members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator, and of the Security Council in its resolution of 7 July 1948, for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine; and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine;*

*Determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter :*

*Orders the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further military action and to this end to issue cease fire orders to their military and para-military forces, to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator, but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution.*

*Declares that failure by any of the Governments or authorities concerned to comply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with a view to such further action under chapter VII of the Charter as may be decided upon by the Council.*

*Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to continue*

to co-operate with the Mediator with a view to the maintenance of peace in Palestine in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 29 May 1948.

*Orders* as a matter of special and urgent necessity an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the city of Jerusalem to take effect twentyfour hours from the time of the adoption of this resolution and instructs the Truce Commission to take any necessary steps to make this cease-fire effective.

*Instructs* the Mediator to continue his efforts to bring about the demilitarization of the city of Jerusalem without prejudice to the future political status of Jerusalem and to assure the protection of and access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine.

*Instructs* the Mediator to supervise the observance of the truce and to establish procedures for examining alleged breaches of the truce since 11 June 1948, authorizes him to deal with breaches so far as it is within his capacity to do so by appropriate local action, and requests him to keep the Security Council currently informed concerning the operation of the truce and when necessary to take appropriate action, decides that subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly the truce shall remain in force in accordance with the present resolution and with that of 29 May 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached.

*Reiterates* the appeal to the parties contained in the last paragraph of its resolution of 22 May and urges upon the parties that they continue conversations with the Mediator in a spirit of conciliation and mutual concession in order that all points under dispute may be settled peacefully.

*Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Mediator with the necessary staff and facilities to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to him under the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May and under this resolution, and

*Requests* that the Secretary-General make appropriate arrangements to provide necessary funds to meet the obligations arising from this resolution.



**Explanation of Parties Effective Responsibility**

**SC. Resolution of August 19, 1948**

*The Security Council,*

*Taking into account* communications from the Mediator concerning the situation in Jerusalem ;

*Directs* the attention of the Governments and authorities to the Resolution of the Security Council of 15 July 1948, and

*Decides* pursuant to its Resolution of 15 July 1948, and so informs the Governments and authorities concerned, that :

(a) Each Party is responsible for the actions of both regular and irregular forces operating under its authority or in territory under its control ;

(b) Each party has the obligation to use all means at its disposal to prevent action violating the Truce by individuals or groups who are in territory under its control ;

(c) Each party has the obligation to bring to speedy trial and in case of conviction, to punishment, any and all persons within their jurisdiction who are involved in a breach of the Truce ;

(d) No party is permitted to violate the Truce on the ground that it is undertaking reprisals or retaliations against the other party ;

(e) No party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of the Truce" ;

—o—

**SC. Resolution of 18-8-1948 On Count Bernadotte**

*"The Security Council*

Deeply shocked by the tragic death of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte, as the result of a cowardly act which appears to have been committed by a criminal group of terrorists in Jerusalem while the United Nations Representative was fulfilling his peace-seeking mission in the Holy Land,

*Resolves*

*First*, to request the Secretary-General to keep the flag of the United Nations at half-mast for a period of three days ;

*Second*, to authorize the Secretary-General to meet from the working capital fund all expenses connected with the death and burial of the United Nations Mediator ;

*Third*, to be represented at the interment by the President or a person whom he may appoint for the occasion."

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### Security Council Resolution of Oct. 19, 1948

#### *"The Security Council*

*Having in mind* the report of the Acting Mediator concerning the assassination on 17 September of the United Nations Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte and United Nations Observer Colonel Andre Serot (LS/1018) the report of the Acting Mediator concerning difficulties encountered in the supervision of the truce (S/1022) and the report of the Truce Commission for Palestine concerning the situation in Jerusalem (1023);

*Notes* with concern that the Provisional Government of Israel has to date submitted no report to the Security Council or to the Acting Mediator regarding the progress of the investigation into the assassinations ;

*Requests* that Government to submit to the Security Council at an early date an account of the progress made in the investigation and to indicate therein the measures taken with regard to negligence on the part of officials or other factors affecting the crime ;

*Reminds* the Governments and authorities concerned that all the obligations and responsibilities of the parties set forth in its resolutions of 15 July (S/903) and 19 August 1948 (S/983) are to be discharged fully and in good faith ;

*Reminds* the Mediator of the desirability of an equitable distribution of the United Nations observers for the purpose of observing the truce on the territories of both parties ;

*Determines*, pursuant to its resolutions of 15 July and 19 August 1948, that the Governments and authorities have the duty ;

(a) to allow duly accredited United Nations observers and other Truce Supervision personnel bearing proper credentials, on official notification, ready access to all places where their duties require them to go, including airfields, ports, truce lines and strategic points and areas ;

(b) to facilitate the freedom of movement of Truce Supervision personnel and transport by simplifying procedures on United Nations aircraft now in effect, and by assurance of safe conduct for all United Nations aircraft and other means of transport ;

(c) to co-operate fully with the Truce Supervision personnel in their conduct of investigations into incidents involving alleged breaches of the Truce ; including the making available of witnesses, testimony and other evidence on request ;

(d) to implement fully by appropriate and prompt instructions to the commanders in the field all agreements entered into through the good offices of the Mediator or his representatives ;

(e) to take all reasonable measures to ensure the safety and safe conduct of the Truce Supervision personnel and the representatives of the Mediator, their aircraft and vehicles, while in territory under their control ;

(f) to make every effort to apprehend and promptly punish any and all persons within their jurisdictions guilty of any assault upon or other aggressive act against the Truce Supervision personnel or the representatives of the Mediator."

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### **Resolution of 19-10--948 On Ending Fighting In Negeb**

*"The Present Situation* in the Negeb is complicated by fluid nature of military dispositions making the demarcation of truce lines difficult, the problem of the convoys to the Jewish settlements, as well as the problems of the dislocation of large numbers of Arabs and their inability to harvest their crops. In the circumstances, the

indispensable condition to a restoration of the situation is an immediate and effective cease-fire. After the cease-fire, the following conditions might well be considered as the basis for further negotiations looking toward insurance that similar outbreaks will not again occur and that the truce will be fully observed in this area ;

“(a) Withdrawal of both parties from any positions not occupied at the time of the outbreak ;

(b) Acceptance by both parties of the conditions set forth in the General Truce Supervision Board decision number 12 affecting convoys ;

(c) Agreement by both parties to undertake negotiations through United Nations intermediaries or directly as regards outstanding problems in the Negeb and the permanent stationing of the United Nations observers throughout the area”.

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### **Security Council Resolution of November 4, 1948 on Withdrawals in Negeb**

*“The Security Council*

*Having decided* on 15 July that, subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force in accordance with the resolution of that date and with that of the 29 May 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached ;

*Having decided* on 19 August that no party is permitted to violate the truce on the ground that it is undertaking reprisals or retaliations against the other party ; and that no party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of the truce ; and

*Having decided* on 29 May that, if the truce was subsequently repudiated or violated by either party or by both, situation in Palestine could be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter,

*Takes Note* of the request communicated to the Government of Egypt and the Provisional Government of Israel by the Acting Mediator on 26 October (S/1058) following upon the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 19 October, 1948 ; and

*Calls upon* the interested Governments, without prejudice to their rights, claims or position with regard to a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine or to the position which the Members of the United Nations may wish to take in the General Assembly on such peaceful adjustment;

(1) To withdraw those of their forces which have advanced beyond the position held on 14 October, the Acting Mediator being authorized to establish provisional lines beyond which no movement of troops shall take place ;

(2) To establish through negotiations conducted directly between the parties, or failing that, through intermediaries in the service of the United Nations, permanent truce lines and such neutral or demilitarized zones as may appear advantageous, in order to ensure henceforth the full observance of the truce in that area. Failing an agreement, the permanent lines and neutral zones shall be established by decision of the Acting Mediator, and

*"Appoints* a Commission of the Council, consisting of the five permanent members together with Belgium and Colombia, to give such advice as the Acting Mediator may require with regard to his responsibilities under this resolution and, in the event that either party or both should fail to comply with sub paragraph (1) and (2) of the preceding paragraph of this resolution within whatever time-limits the Acting Mediator may think it desirable to fix; to study as a matter of urgency and to report to the Council on further measures it would be appropriate to take under chapter VII of the Charter".

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**SC Resolution S/1080 of November 16, 1948**

*"The Security Council*

*Reaffirming* its previous resolutions concerning the establishment and implementation of the Truce in Palestine and, recalling particularly its resolution of 15 July 1948 which determined that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter ;

*Takes note* that the General Assembly is continuing its consideration of the future government of Palestine in response to the request of the Security Council of 1 April (1948 S/714) ;

*Without prejudice* to the actions of the Acting Mediator regarding the implementation of the Resolution of the Security Council of 4 November 1948 ;

*Decides* that, in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine ;

*Calls upon* the parties directly involved in the conflict in Palestine, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter, to seek agreement forthwith, by negotiations conducted either directly or through the Acting Mediator on Palestine, with a view to the immediate establishment of the armistice including ;

(a) the delineation of permanent armistice demarcation lines beyond which the armed forces of the respective parties shall not move ;

(b) Such withdrawal and reduction of armed forces as will ensure the maintenance of the armistice during the transition to permanent peace in Palestine”.

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### SC Resolution of 29. 12. 1948 on Cease-Fire in Palestine

#### *“The Security Council*

*Having considered* the report of the Acting Mediator (S/1125) on the hostilities which broke out in Southern Palestine on 22 December,

*Calls upon* the Governments concerned :

(i) to order an immediate cease-fire ;

(ii) to implement without further delay the resolution of 4 November and the instructions issued by the Acting Mediator in accordance with sub-paragraph (1) of the fifth paragraph of that resolution ;

(iii) to allow and facilitate the complete supervision of the truce by the United Nations observers,

*Instructs* the Committee of the Council appointed on 4 November to meet at Lake Success on 7 January to consider the situation in

Southern Palestine and to report to the Council on the extent to which the Governments concerned have by that date complied with the present resolution and with the resolutions of 4 and 16 November ;

*Invites* Cuba and Norway to replace as from 1 January the two retiring members of the Committee (Belgium and Colombia); Expresses the hope that the members of the Conciliation Commission appointed by the General Assembly on 11 December will nominate their representatives and establish the Commission with as little delay as possible”.

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### **SC Resolution of 11 August 1949 In Appreciation**

**of Dr. Bunche**

#### *“The Security Council*

*Having taken note* of the report of the Acting United Nations Mediator on Palestine, submitted upon the completion of his responsibilities ;

*Desires* to pay special tribute to the qualities of patience, perseverance and devotion to the ideal of international peace of the late Count Folk Bernadotte who stabilized the situation in Palestine and who, together with ten members of his staff, gave his life in the service of the United Nations ;

*Desires* to express its deep appreciation of the qualities of tact, understanding, perseverance and devotion to duty of Dr. Ralph Bunche, Acting United Nations Mediator on Palestine, who has brought to a successful conclusion the negotiation of armistice agreements between Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the one hand and Israel on the other ;

*Desires* also to associate in this expression of appreciation the members of the Staff of the United Nations Mission in Palestine, including both the members of the United Nations Secretariat and the Belgian, French, Swedish and United States officers who served on the staff and as military observers in Palestine”

**Egypt Israel Armistice Agreement, of Feb. 24, 1949****PREAMBLE**

"The Parties to the present Agreement, responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an Armistice, having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations Chairmanship concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions of 4 and 16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice agreement

The undersigned representatives, in the full authority entrusted to them by their respective governments, have agreed upon the following provisions:—

Art 1. With a view to promoting the return to permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles which shall be fully observed by both parties during the Armistice, are hereby affirmed :

1. The injunction of Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties.

2. No aggressive action by the armed forces land, sea, or air of either Party shall be undertaken, planned or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other ; it being understood that the use of the term 'planned' in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practised in military organizations.

3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected.

4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of these two parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the



liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.

Art. II—1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties-land, sea and air-is hereby established.

2. No element of the land, sea or air, military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in Article VI of this Agreement except as provided in Article III of this Agreement and elsewhere shall not violate the international frontier; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party; or through the waters within three miles of the coastline of the other Party.

Art. III—1. In pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of 4 November 1948, and with a view to the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, the Egyptian military force in the *Al Faluja* area shall be withdrawn.

2. This withdrawal shall begin on the day after that which follows the signing of this Agreement at 0500 hours GMT, and shall be beyond the Egypt-Palestine frontier.

3. The withdrawal shall be under the supervision of the United Nations and in accordance with the plan of withdrawal set forth in Annex 1 to this Agreement.

Art IV—With specific reference to the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed:

1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized.

2. It is also recognized that the basic purposes and spirit of the Armistice would not be served by the restoration of previously

held military positions, changes from those now held other than as specifically provided for in this Agreement, or by the advance of the military forces of either side beyond positions held at the time this Armistice Agreement is signed.

3. It is further recognized that rights, claims, or interests of a non-military character in the area of Palestine covered by this Agreement may be asserted by either Party, and that these, by mutual agreement being excluded from the Armistice negotiations, shall be, at the discretion of the Parties, the subject of later settlement. It is emphasized that it is not the purpose of this Agreement to establish, to recognize, to strengthen, or to weaken or nullify, in any way, territorial, custodial or other rights, claims or interests which may be asserted by either Party in the area of Palestine or any part or locality thereof covered by this Agreement, whether such asserted rights, claims or interests derive from Security Council resolutions, including the resolutions of 4 November 1948 and the Memorandum of 13 November 1948 for its implementation, or from any other source. The provisions of this Agreement are dictated exclusively by military considerations and are valid only for the period of the Armistice.

Art. V. 1. The line described in Art VI of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice Demarcation Line and is delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948.

2. The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question.

3. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move except as provided in Article III of this Agreement.

4. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armistice Demarcation line defined in Art VI.

Art. VI—1. In the Gaza-Rafah area the Armistice Demarcation line shall be as delineated in paragraph 2. B (i) of the Memorandum of 13 November 1948 on the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 4 November 1948, namely by a line from the coast at the mouth of the Wadi Hasi in an easterly direction through Deir Suneid and cross the Gazal-Al Majdal Highway to a point 3 kilometres east of the Highway, then in a southerly direction parallel to the Gazal-Al Majdal Highway, and continuing thus to the Egyptian frontier.

2. Within this line the Egyptian forces shall nowhere advance beyond their present positions, and this shall include Beit Hanun and its surrounding area from which Israeli forces shall be withdrawn to north of the Armistice Demarcation Line, and any other positions within the line delineated in paragraph 1, shall be evacuated by Israel forces as set forth in paragraph 3.

3. Israeli outposts, each limited to platoon strength, may be maintained in this area at the following points: Deir Suneid, on the north side of the Wadi (MR 10751090); 700 SW of Sa'ad (MR 10500982); Sulphur Quarries (MR 09870924); Tall Jamma (MR 09720887); and Kh Al Ma' in (MR 09320821); The Israeli outpost maintained at the cemetery (MR 08160723) shall be evacuated on the day after that which follows the signing of this Agreement. The Israeli outpost at Hill 79 (MR 10451017) shall be evacuated not later than four weeks following the day on which this Agreement is signed. Following the evacuation of the above outpost, new Israeli outpost may be established at MR 08360700, and a point due east of Hill 79 east to the Armistice Demarcation Line.

4. In the Bethlehem-Hebron area, wherever positions are held by Egyptian forces, the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the forces of both parties in each locality, except that the demarcation of the Armistice line and reciprocal arrangements for withdrawal and reduction of forces shall be undertaken in such manner as may be decided by the Parties, at such time as an Armistice Agreement may be concluded covering military forces in that area other than those of the Parties to this Agreement, or sooner at the will of the Parties.

Art. VII—1. It is recognized by the Parties to this Agreement that in certain sectors of the total area involved, the proximity of the forces of a third party not covered by this Agreement makes impractical the full application of all provisions of the Agreement to such sectors. For this reason alone, therefore, and pending the conclusion of an Armistice Agreement in place of the existing truce with that third party, the provisions of this Agreement relating to reciprocal reduction and withdrawal of forces shall apply only to the western front and not to the eastern front.

2. The areas comprising the western and eastern fronts shall be as defined by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization ; on the basis of the deployment of forces against each other and past military activity or the future possibility thereof in the area. This definition of the western and eastern fronts is set forth in Annex 11 of this Agreement.

3. In the area of western front under Egyptian control, Egyptian defensive forces only may be maintained. All other Egyptian forces shall be withdrawn from this area to a point or points no further east than El Arish-Abou Aoueigla.

4. In the area of the western front under Israeli control, Israeli defensive forces only, which shall be based on the settlements, may be maintained. All other Israeli forces shall be withdrawn from this area to a point or points north of the line delineated in paragraph 2-A of the Memorandum of 13 November 1948 on the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 4 November 1948.

5. The defensive forces referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall be as defined in Annex. III to this Agreement.

Art. VIII. 1. The area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity, as defined in paragraph 2. of this article, shall be demilitarized, and both Egyptian and Israeli armed forces shall be totally excluded therefrom. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X of this Agreement and United Nations observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this provision.

2. The area thus demilitarized shall be as follows : From a

point on the Egypt-Palestine frontier five (5) kilometres north-west of the inter-section of the Rafah-El Auja road and the frontier (MR08750468), south east to Khashm El Mamdud (MR09650414), thence south-east to Hill 405 (MR10780285), thence south-west to a point on the Egypt-Palestine Frontier five (5) kilometres south-east of the intersection of old railway tracks and the frontier (MR09950145, thence returning north-west along the Egypt-Palestine frontier to the point of origin.

3. On the Egyptian side of the frontier, facing the El Auja area, no Egyptian defensive positions shall be closer to El Auja than El Qouseima and Abou Aoueigila.

4. The road Taba-Qouseima-Auja shall not be employed by any military forces whatsoever for the purpose of entering Palestine.

5. The movement of armed forces of either Party to this Agreement into any part of the area defined in paragraph 2 of this Article for any purpose, or failure by either Party to respect or fulfil any of the other provisions of this Article, when confirmed by the United Nations representatives, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this Agreement.

Art. IX. All prisoners of war detained by either Party to this Agreement and belonging to the armed forces, regular or irregular, of the other Party Shall be exchanged as follows :

1. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be under United Nations supervision and control throughout. The exchange shall begin within ten days after the signing of this Agreement and shall be completed not later than twenty-one days following upon the signing of this Agreement, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in Art X of this Agreement, in consultation with the appropriate military authorities of the Parties, shall formulate a plan for the exchange of prisoners of war within the above period, defining the date and places of exchange and all other relevant details.

2. Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well as those sentenced for crime or other offence, shall be included in this exchange of prisoners of war.

3. All articles of personal use, valuables, letters, documents, identification marks, and other personal effects of whatever nature belonging to prisoners of war who are being exchanged, shall be returned to them, or if they have escaped or died, to the Party to whose armed forces they belonged.

4. All matters not specifically regulated in this Agreement shall be decided in accordance with the principles laid down in the International Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X of this Agreement shall assume responsibility for locating missing persons, whether military or civilian; within the areas controlled by each Party, to facilitate their expeditious exchange. Each Party undertakes to extend to the Commission full cooperation and assistance in the discharge of this function.

Art. X—1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of seven members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate three, and whose chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the Observer personnel of that Organization designated by him following consultations with both Parties to this Agreement.

2. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at El Auja, and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work.

3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement.

4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting. On questions of

principle, appeal shall lie to a Special Committee, composed of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and one member each of the Egyptian and Israeli Delegations to the Armistice Conference at Rhodes or some other senior officer, whose decisions on all such questions shall be final. If no appeal against a decision of the Commission is filed within one week of the date of said decision, that decision shall be taken as final. Appeals to the Special Committee shall be presented to the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, who shall convene the Committee at the earliest possible date.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only after due notice to members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members.

6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ observers, who may be from among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations Observers should be so employed they shall remain under the command of the U.N. Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations Observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.

7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail, subject to the right of appeal as provided in paragraph 4. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may

from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.

9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.

10. Members of the Commission and its Observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the areas covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations Observers only shall be employed.

11. The expenses of the Commission other than those relating to United Nations Observers, shall be apportioned in equal share between the two Parties to this Agreement.

Art. XI. No provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

Art XII. 1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed.

2. This Agreement having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article.

3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than Articles I and II, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement, and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement, other than Article I and II. Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties.



2. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine.

5. This Agreement supersedes the Egyptian-Israeli General Cease-Fire Agreement entered into by the Parties on 24 January 1949.

6. This Agreement is signed in quintuplicate, of which one copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the Acting Mediator on Palestine”.

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**General Assembly Resolusan 212 (III) of November 19, 1948  
On Relief To Refugees.**

*“Whereas the problem of the relief of Palestine refugees of all communities is one of immediate urgency and the United Nations Mediator on Palestine in his progress report of 18 September 1948, part III, states that ‘action must be taken to determine the necessary measures (of relief) and to provide for their implementation’ and that ‘the choice is between saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die’;*

*Whereas the Acting Mediator, in his supplemental report of 18 October 1948, declares that ‘the situation of the refugees is now critical and that ‘aid must not only be continued but very greatly increased if disaster is to be averted’;*

*Whereas the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees is one of the minimum conditions for the success of the efforts of the United Nations to bring peace to that land,*

*The General Assembly*

1. *Expresses its thanks to the Governments and organizations which, and the individual persons who, have given assistance directly or in response to the Mediator’s appeal;*

2. *Considers*, on the basis of the Acting Mediator's recommendations, that a sum of approximately 29, 500,000 dollars will be required to provide relief for 500,000 refugees for a period of nine months from 1 December 1948 to 31 August 1949, and that an additional amount of approximately 2,500 000 dollars will be required for administrative and local operational expenses;

3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance immediately a sum of up to 500,000 dollars from the Working Capital Fund of the United Nations, the said sum to be repaid before the end of the period specified in paragraph 2, from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under paragraph 4;

4. *Urges* all States Members of the United Nations to make as soon as possible voluntary contributions in kind or in funds sufficient to ensure that the amount of supplies and funds required is obtained and states, that, to this end, voluntary contributions of non-member States would also be accepted, contributions in funds may be made in currencies other than the United States dollar, in so far as the operations of the relief organizations can be carried out in such currencies;

5. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to establish a Special Fund into which contributions shall be paid, which will be administered as a separate account;

6. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to expend the funds received under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present resolution;

7. *Instructs* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to establish regulations for the administration and supervision of the Fund;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take all necessary steps to extend aid to Palestine refugees and to establish such administrative organization as may be required for this purpose, inviting the assistance of the appropriate agencies of the several Governments, the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the United Nations International children's Emergency Fund, the International Committee of

the Red Cross the League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary agencies, it being recognized that the participation of voluntary organizations in the relief plan would in no way derogate from the principle of impartiality on the basis of which the assistance of these organizations is being solicited ;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint a Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, to whom he may delegate such responsibility as he may consider appropriate for the over-all planning and implementation of the relief programme ;

10. *Agrees to* the convoking, at the discretion of an *ad hoc* advisory Committee of seven members to be selected by the President of the General Assembly to which the Secretary-General may submit any matter of principle or policy upon which he would like the benefit of the Committee's advice,

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue and extend the implementation of the present relief programme until the machinery provided for by the present resolution is set up ;

12. *Urges* the World Health Organization ; the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Refugee Organization, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and other appropriate organizations and agencies, acting within the framework of the relief programme herein established, promptly to contribute supplies, specialized personnel and other services permitted by their constitutions and their financial resources, to relieve the desperate plight of Palestine refugees of all communities ,

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at the next regular session, on the action taken as a result of this resolution

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### **General Assembly's Resolution No 194 (III) On Consiliation Commission And Refugees of December 11, 1948**

*The General Assembly.*

*Having Considered further* the situation in Palestine

1. *Expresses* its deep appreciation of the progress achieved

through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and

*Extends* its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine.

2. *Establishes* a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States Members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:

(a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;

(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council.

(c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council.

Upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated.

3. *Decides* that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission.

4. *Requests* the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the commission at the earliest possible time.

5. *Calls upon* the Governments, and authorities concerned to extend the scope of negotiations provided for in the Security Council Resolution of 16 November 1948 and to seek agreement by negotia-

tions conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them.

6. *Instructs* the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them.

7. *Resolves* that the Holy Places-including Nazareth, religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice, that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision, that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory, that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval.

8. *Resolves* that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis, the most southern Bethelam; the most western Ein Karim including also the built up area of Motsa: and most northern, Shu'fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations' Control;

*Requests* the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;

*Instructs* the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;

The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United

Nations Representative, who shall co-operate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area;

9. *Resolves* that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine ;

*Instructs* the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access ;

10. *Instructs* the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities ;

11. *Resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Government or authorities responsible;

*Instructs* the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation ; and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations ;

12. *Authorizes* the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution :

The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will

provide a limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission ;

13. *Instructs* the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the members of the United Nations ;

14. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to cooperate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution ;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution."

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**General Assembly Resolution 273 (III) on the  
The Admission of Israel To U. N. of 11.5.1949**

*'Having received* the report of the Security Council on the application of Israel for membership in the United Nations,

*Noting* that, in the judgement of the Security Council, Israel is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter,

*Noting* that the Security Council has recommended to the General Assembly that it admit Israel to membership in the United Nations,

*Noting* furthermore the declaration by the State of Israel that it unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a member of the United Nations,

*Recalling* its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and 11 December 1948 and taking note of the declarations and explanations made by the representative of the Government of Israel before the *ad hoc* political committee in respect of the implementation of the resolutions,

*The General Assembly*

*Acting in discharge of its functions under Article 4 of the*

Charter and Rule 125 of its rules of procedure,

1. *Decides* that Israel is a peace-loving State which accepts the obligations contained in the Charter and is able and willing to carry out those obligations;

2. *Decides* to admit Israel to membership the United Nations”.

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### **SC Resolution of August 11, 1949. Relieving Mediator**

#### ***“The Security Council***

*Having noted* with satisfaction the several Armistice Agreements concluded by means of negotiations between the parties involved in the conflict in Palestine in pursuance of its resolution of 16 November 1948 (S/1080),

*Expresses* the hope that the Governments and the authorities concerned, having undertaken by means of the negotiations now being conducted by the Palestine Conciliation Commission, to fulfil the request of the General Assembly in its resolution of 11 December 1948 to extend the scope of the armistice negotiations and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, will at an early date achieve agreement on the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

*Finds* that the Armistice Agreement constitutes an important step toward the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine and considers that these Agreements supersede the truce provided for in the resolutions of the Security Council of 29 May and 15 July 1948;

*Reaffirms*, pending the final peace settlement, the order contained in its resolution of 15 July 1948 to the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to observe an unconditional cease-fire and, bearing in mind that the several Armistice Agreements include firm pledges against any further acts of hostilities between the parties and also provide for their supervision by the parties themselves, relies upon the parties to ensure the continued application and observance of those agreements;



*Decides* that all functions assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine having been discharged, the Acting Mediator is relieved of any further responsibility under Security Council resolutions;

*Notes* that the Armistice Agreements provide that the execution of those Agreements shall be supervised by Mixed Armistice Commission whose chairman in each case shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organization designated by him following consultations with the parties to the Agreements;

*Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange for the continued service of such of the personnel of the present Truce Supervision Organization as may be required in observing and maintaining the cease-fire, and as may be necessary in assisting the parties to the Armistice Agreements in the supervision of the application and observance of the terms of those Agreements, with particular regard to the desires of the Parties as expressed in the relevant articles of the Agreements;

*Requests* the Chief of Staff mentioned above to report to the Security Council on the observance of the cease-fire in Palestine in accordance with the terms of this resolution, and to keep the Palestine Conciliation Commission informed of matters affecting the Commission's work under the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948".

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### **Establishment of UNRWA**

*Text of General Assembly Resolution 302 (iv) of Dec. 8, 1949*

#### *The General Assembly*

*Recalling* its resolution 212 (III) of 19 November 1948 and 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, affirming in particular the provisions of paragraph 11 of the latter resolution,

*Having examined* with appreciation the first interim report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East and the report of the Secretary-General on assistance to Palestine refugees,

1. *Expresses* its appreciation to the Governments which have generously responded to the appeal embodied in resolution 212 (111), and to the appeal of the Secretary-General, to contribute in kind or in funds to the alleviation of the conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees;

2. *Expresses* also its gratitude to the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the League of Red Cross Societies and to the American Friends Service Committee for the contribution they have made to this humanitarian cause by discharging in the face of great difficulties, the responsibility they voluntarily assumed for the distribution of Relief Supplies and the general care of the refugees, and welcomes the assurance they have given the Secretary-General that they will continue the co-operation with the United Nations until the end of March 1950, on a mutually acceptable basis;

3. *Commends* the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund for the important contribution which it has made towards the United Nations programme of assistance, and commends those specialized agencies which had rendered assistance in their respective fields, in particular the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International Refugee Organization;

4. *Expresses* its thanks to the numerous religious charitable and humanitarian organizations which have materially assisted in bringing relief to Palestine refugees;

5. *Recognizes* that without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (111) of 11 December 1948, continued assistance for the relief of the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them and to further conditions of peace and stability, and that constructive means should be undertaken at an early date with a view to the termination of international assistance for relief;

6. *Considers* that, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9D of the present resolution, the equivalent of approximately \$ 33,700,000 will be required for direct relief and works programmes, for the period 1 January to 31 December 1950 of which the equivalent of \$ 20,200,000 is required for direct relief and \$ 13,500,000

for works programmes, that the equivalent of approximately \$ 21,200,000 will be required for works programmes from 1 January to 30 June 1951, all inclusive of administrative expenses, and that direct relief should be terminated not later than 31 December 1950 unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly at its fifth regular session ;

7. *Establishes* the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East :

(a) To carry out in collaboration with local government the direct relief and works programme as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission,

(b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available ;

8. *Establishes* an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, with powers to add not more than three additional members from contributing Governments, to advise and assist the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in the execution of the programme, the Director and the Advisory Commission shall consult with each Near Eastern Government concerned in the selection, planning and execution of projects;

9. *Requests* the Secretary General to appoint the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in consultation with the Governments represented on the Advisory Commission;

(a) The Director shall be chief executive officer of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East responsible to the General Assembly for the operation of the programme;

(b) The Director shall select and appoint his staff in accordance with general arrangements made in agreement with the Secretary-General, including such of the staff rules and regulations

of the United Nations as the Director and the Secretary-General shall agree are applicable and to the extent possible utilize the facilities and assistance of the Secretary-General;

(c) The Director shall, in consultation with the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, establish financial regulations for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

(d) Subject to the financial regulations established pursuant to clause (e) of the present paragraph, the Director, in consultation with the Advisory Commission, shall apportion available funds between direct relief and works projects, in his discretion, in the event that the estimates in paragraph 6 require revision;

10. *Requests* the Director to convene the Advisory Commission at the earliest practicable date for the purpose of developing plans for the organization and the administration of the programme, and of adopting rules of procedure;

11. *Continues* the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees as established under General Assembly resolution 212 (III) until 1 April 1950, or until such date thereafter as the transfer referred to in paragraph 12 is effected, and requests the Secretary-General in consultation with the operating agencies to continue the endeavour to reduce the numbers of rations by progressive stages in the light of the findings and recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission;

12. *Instructs* the Secretary-General to transfer to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the assets and liabilities of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees by 1 April 1950, or at such date as may be agreed by him and the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the the Near East;

13. *Urges* all Members of the United Nations and non-members to make voluntary contributions in funds or in kind to ensure that the amount of supplies and funds required is obtained for each period of the programme as set out in paragraph 6, contributions in funds may be made in currencies other than the United States

dollar in so far as the programme can be carried out in such currencies;

14. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance funds deemed to be available for this purpose and not exceeding \$ 5,000,000 from the Working Capital Fund to finance operations pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than 31 December 1950, from the voluntary Government contributions requested under paragraph 13 above;

15. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to negotiate with the International Refugee Organization for an interest-free loan in an amount not to exceed the equivalent of \$2, 800,00 to finance the programme subject to mutually satisfactory conditions for repayment;

16. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to continue the Special Fund established under General Assembly resolution 212(111) and to make withdrawals therefrom for the operation of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and upon the request of the Director, for the operation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

17. *Calls Upon* the Governments concerned to accord to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities which have been granted to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, together with all other privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities necessary for the fulfilment of its functions;

18. *Urges* the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the International Refugee Organization, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and other appropriate agencies and private groups and organizations in consultation with the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to furnish assistance within the framework of the programme;

19. *Requests* the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East :

(a) To appoint a representative to attend the meeting of the Technical Assistance Board as an observer so that the technical assistance activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East may be co-ordinated with the technical assistance programme of the United Nations and specialized agencies referred to in Economic and Social Council resolution 222 (IX) A of 15 August 1949,

(b) To place at the disposal of the Technical Assistance Board full information concerning any technical assistance works which may be done by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, in order that it may be included in the reports submitted by the Technical Assistance Board to the Technical Assistance Committee of the Economic and Social Council :

20. *Directs* the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to consult with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interests of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (II) of 11 December 1948;

21. *Requests* the Director to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations an annual report on the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, including an audit of funds, and invites him to submit to the Secretary-General such other reports as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East may wish to bring to the attention of the Members of the United Nations or its appropriate organs;

22. *Instructs* the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to transmit the final report of the Economic Survey Mission with such comments as it may wish to make, to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations and to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East”.

**General Assembly Resolution on Jerusalem of  
December 9, 1949**

*"The General Assembly*

*Having regard* to its resolution 181 (11) of 29 November 1947 and 194 (111) of 11 December 1948,

*Having studied* the reports of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine set up under the latter resolution,

*Decides*

In relation to Jerusalem,

*Believing* that the principles underlying its previous resolutions concerning this matter, and in particular its resolution of 29 November 1947, represent a just and equitable settlement of the question,

1. To restate, therefore, its intention that Jerusalem should be placed under a permanent international regime, which should envisage appropriate guarantees for the protection of the Holy Places, both within and outside Jerusalem, and to confirm specifically the following provisions of General-Assembly's resolution 181 (11),

(1) The city of Jerusalem shall be established as a *Corpus separatum* under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations ; (2) the Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering authority...and (3) the city of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis, the most Southern Bethleem ; the most Western Ein Karim (including also the built up area of Motsa) , and the most Northern, Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map ;

2. To request for this purpose that the Trusteeship Council at its next session , whether special or regular, complete the preparation of the Statute of Jerusalem, omitting the now inapplicable provisions, such as articles 32 and 39, and, without prejudice to the fundamental principles of the international regime for Jerusalem set forth in General Assembly's resolution 181 (11) introducing therein amendment in the direction of its greater democratization , approve

the Statute, and proceed immediately with its implementation. The Trusteeship Council shall not allow any action taken by an interested Government or Governments to divert it from adopting and implementing the Statute of Jerusalem;

11. *Calls upon* the States concerned to make formal undertakings, at an early date and in the light of their obligations as Members of the United Nations, that they will approach these matters with goodwill and be guided by the terms of the present resolution."

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### **Anglo-French Declaration of 25 May 1950**

"The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab States and of Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to these States have resolved to make the following statements;

1. The three Governments recognize that the Arab States and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defence and to permit them to play their part in the defence of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connection the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives in the Security Council on August 4, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab States and Israel.

2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the States in question, to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries that the purchasing State does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other State. Similar assurances will be requested from any other State in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.

3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in, and their desire to promote the establishment



and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the States in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these States was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as Members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation”.

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### **Arab League Council's Statement of June 21, 1950**

“The Governments of the Arab States, severally and jointly have studied the joint declaration issued by the United Kingdom, France and the United States on 25 May 1950. The exchange of views on this declaration was one of the most important reasons that prompted the Arab States to expedite the meeting of the Arab League Council on 12 June 1950 and was one of the most important items on the agenda of the meeting.

The Arab States have agreed to issue the following statement :

1. No one is more anxious than the Arab States about the preservation of peace and stability in the Middle East. The Arab lands stand by nature at the head of the peace-loving countries. Successive events have proved the degree of their respect for the United Nations Charter.

2. If the Arab States have shown, and continue to show an interest in meeting their military needs, this has been due to their deep sense of responsibility for safeguarding the internal Security of their countries, insuring the legitimate defence of their neutrality and fulfilling the obligation of safeguarding international Security in this region. This is primarily the obligation of Arab States and of the Arab League as a regional organization under Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.

3. Even before the three powers ever thought of issuing their declaration, the Arab Governments on their own initiative, had decided to express the peaceful intentions of the Arabs and to refute the allegations that Israel has persisted in circulating to the effect that the Arab States are requesting arms for aggressive purposes. The Arab States hereby reiterate their peaceful intentions and declare

that the arms that have been, or may be ordered from the three Powers or from others will be used solely for defensive purposes.

4. It goes without saying that the level of armed forces maintained by every State for defence purposes and for participation in the maintenance of international Security is a matter that can only be estimated by the State concerned. It is also subject to various factors, chiefly the size of the population, the area of the country, and the length and diversity of its frontiers;

5. The Arab States take note of the assurances that they have received to the effect that the three Powers did not intend by their declaration to favour Israel, or to exert pressure on the Arab States to enter into negotiations with Israel, or to affect the final settlement of the Palestine problem or to preserve the *status quo*; but that they did intend to express their opposition to the use of force or to the violation of the armistice lines.

6. The Arab States declare that the most preferable and reliable measures for maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East would consist in solving its problems on the basis of right and justice, re-establishing the conditions of understanding and harmony that once prevailed and hastening the execution of the United Nations resolution on the return of the Palestine refugees to their homes and on compensation for their material losses.

7. The Arab States also take note of assurances given to them that the three Power declaration, both in its manner of presentation and in its provision for prior guarantees from the States purchasing arms, neither signifies the division of this region into zones of influence nor in any way infringes on the independence and sovereignty of the Arab States.

8. It is self-evident that the doubts, which the assurances mentioned in the preceding paragraph were designed to dispel, were raised by paragraph 3 of the three Power declaration, which laid down that, if the three Powers should find that any State of this region was preparing to violate the frontiers or the armistice lines of another State, they would immediately take action, within or outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.

There is no doubt that action alone will dispel these doubts, if it demonstrates that the three Powers are in fact concerned with maintaining peace in the Middle East impartially and on the basis of right and justice and respect for the sovereignty of the States and without subjecting them to domination or influence.

9. In conclusion the Arab States can only affirm once again that, despite their anxiety for peace, they cannot approve any action that would harm their sovereignty and their independence."

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### **Israeli PM's Comment In Kneset on May 31, 1950**

"The publication a week ago of the declaration by the three great Powers—the United States, Britain and France—on arms and security in the Arab States and Israel did not escape notice in our country, although the exaggerated sensitivity towards political declarations by foreign Powers, so natural when our land was under foreign rule, is now a matter of history. The young State that emerged from a defensive war when Israel fought alone against six Arab States that invaded the country in violation of the United Nations Charter, views its existence, security and future as dependent primarily on its own efforts to conquer the desert, absorb immigrants, and mobilize the spiritual and material resources of the nation. But it does not ignore for one moment the inescapable fact that the world in which we live is based upon mutual co-operation between the large nations and the small, and that even a great Power cannot any longer live in isolated security, to say nothing of such a small and weak State as that of Israel. We ardently desire friendly relations with all nations, near and far, and the strengthening of security and peace in the world.

The Kneset has surely noted that the three-Power declaration is a unilateral instrument, issued to define the policy of above Powers toward the State of Israel and the Arab States on the question of arms and security. It is not necessary to stress here that the policy of the State of Israel is formulated only by the Government of Israel in accordance with the sovereign will of the people and the consent of the Kneset: The declaration was transmitted to the Government of Israel by the Ambassadors of the three Powers for information only.

The Kingdom of Egypt.

The Motawakilite Kingdom of Yemen.

In view of the desire of the above mentioned Governments to consolidate relations between the States of the Arab League ; to maintain their independence and their mutual heritage ; in accordance with the desire of their people, to co-operate for the realization of mutual defence and the maintenance of Security and peace according to the principles of both the Arab League Pact and the United Nations Charter, together with the aims of the said Pacts, ; and to consolidate stability and security and provide means of welfare and development in the countries.

The following government delegates of ....., having been dully accredited and fully authorized by their respective Governments, approve, the following :

Art. 1. The contracting States, in an effort to maintain and stabilize peace and security, hereby confirm their desire to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, whether such disputes concern relations among themselves or with other Powers.

Art. 2. The contracting States consider any act of armed aggression made against anyone or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all. Therefore in accordance with the right of self-defence, individually and collectively, they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States against which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take individually and collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed forces to repel the aggression and restore security and peace. In conformity with Art. 6 of the Arab League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab League Council and U.N. Security Council shall be notified of such act of aggression and the means and procedures taken to check it.

Art. 3. At the invitation of any of the signatories of this Treaty the contracting States shall hold consultation whenever there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the territorial integrity, independence or security of anyone of the parties is threatened. In the event of the threat of war or the existence of an international emergency, the contracting States shall immediately proceed to unify their plans and defensive measures as the situation may demand.

Art. 4. The contracting States, desiring to implement fully the above obligations and effectively carry them out, shall co-operate in consolidating and co-ordinating their armed forces and shall participate according to their resources and needs in preparing individual and collective means of defence to repulse the said armed aggression.

Art. 5. The Permanent Military Commission composed of representatives of the General Staffs of the armies of the contracting States shall be formed to draw up plans of joint defence and their implementation. The duties of the Permanent Military Commission which are set forth in an Annex attached to this Treaty, include the drafting of necessary reports on the method of co-operation and participation mentioned in Article 4. The Permanent Military Commission shall submit to the Joint Defence Council, provided hereunder in Article 6, reports dealing with questions within its province.

Art. 6. A Joint Defence Council under the supervision of the Arab League Council shall be formed to deal with all matters concerning the implementation of the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Treaty. It shall be assisted in the performance of its task by the Permanent Military Commission referred to in Article 5. The Joint Defence Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers and the Defence Ministers of the contracting States or their representatives. Decisions taken by a two-thirds majority shall be binding on all the contracting States.

Art. 7. The contracting States, in order to fulfil the aims of this Treaty, and to bring about security and prosperity in the Arab countries, and in an effort to raise the standard of living in them, undertake to co-operate in the development of their economies and the exploitation of their natural resources; to facilitate the exchange of their respective agricultural and industrial products; and generally to organize and co-ordinate their economic activities and to conclude the necessary inter-Arab agreements to realize such aims.

Art. 8. An Economic Council consisting of the Ministers-in-charge of economic affairs, or their representatives if necessary, shall be formed by the contracting States to submit recommendations for the realization of all such aims as are set forth in the previous

article. The Council may, in the performance of its duties, seek the co-operation of the Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs referred to in Art. 4 of the Arab League Pact.

Art. 9. The Annex to this Treaty shall be considered an integral and indivisible part of it.

Art. 10. The contracting States undertake to conclude no international agreements which may be contradictory to the provisions of this Treaty, nor to act, in their international relations, in a way which may be contrary to the aims of this Treaty.

Art. 11. No provision of this Treaty shall in any way affect, or is intended to affect, any of the rights or obligations devolving upon the contracting States from the United Nations Charter or the responsibilities borne by the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Art. 12. After a lapse of 10 years from the date of the ratification of this Treaty, anyone of the contracting States may withdraw from it; providing 12 months' notice is previously given to the Secretariat-General of the Arab League. The Secretariat-General of the League shall inform the other contracting States of such notice.

Art. 13. This Treaty shall be ratified by each contracting State according to the constitutional procedure of its own Government. The Treaty shall come into force for the ratifying State 15 days after the receipt by the Secretariat-General of the Instruments of ratification from at least four States. The Treaty is drafted in Arabic in Cairo on April 13, 1950. One signed copy shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General of the Arab League, equally authentic copies shall be transmitted to each of the contracting States:

### **Military Annex**

1. The Permanent Military Commission provided for in Art. 5 of the Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty between the States of the Arab League shall undertake the following:

(a) In co-operation with the Joint Defence Council, to prepare plans to deal with all anticipated dangers or armed aggression that

may be launched against one or more of the contracting States or their armed forces, such plans to be based on the principles determined by the Joint Defence Council;

(b) To submit proposals for the organization of the forces of the contracting States, stipulating the minimum force for each in accordance with military exigencies and the potentialities of each State,

(c) To submit proposals for increasing the effectiveness of the forces of the contracting States in so far as their equipment, organization and training are concerned; so that they may keep pace with modern military methods and development, and for the unification and co-ordination of all such forces;

(d) To submit proposals for the exploitation of natural, agricultural, industrial, and other resources of all contracting States in favour of the inter-Arab military effort and joint defence.

(e) To organize the exchange of training missions between contracting States for the preparation of plans, participation in military exercises and manoeuvres and the study of their results, recommendations for the improvement of methods to ensure close co-operation in the field, and for the general improvement of the forces of all the contracting States;

(f) To prepare the necessary data on the resources and military potentialities of each of the contracting States and the part to be played by forces of each in the joint military effort;

(g) To discuss the facilities and various contributions which each of the contracting States, in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty, might be asked to provide, during a state of war, on behalf of the armies of such other contracting States as might be operating on its territories.

2. The Permanent Military Commission may form temporary or permanent sub-committees from among its own members to deal with any of the matters falling within its jurisdiction. It may also seek the advice of any experts whose views on certain questions are deemed necessary.

3. The Permanent Military Commission shall submit detailed

reports on the result of its activities and studies to the Joint Defence Council provided for in Article 4 of this Treaty, as well as an annual report giving full particulars of its work and studies during the year.

4. The Permanent Military Commission shall establish its Headquarters in Cairo but may hold meetings in any other place the Commission may specify. The Commission shall elect its chairman for two years, he may be re-elected. Candidates for the chairmanship shall hold at least the rank of a high commanding officer. Each member of the Commission must have as his original nationality that of the contracting State he represents.

5. In the event of war, the supreme command of the joint forces shall be entrusted to the contracting State possessing the largest military force taking actual part in field operations, unless by unanimous agreement, the Commander-in-Chief is selected otherwise. The Commander-in-Chief shall be assisted in directing military operations by a joint staff".

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### **Security Council Resolution of 17 Nov. 1950**

#### *"The Security Council*

*Recalling* its resolution of 11 August 1949 wherein it noted with satisfaction the several armistice agreements concluded by means of negotiations between the parties involved in the conflict in Palestine, expressed the hope that the governments and authorities concerned would at an early date achieve agreement on final settlement of all questions outstanding between them, noted that the various armistice agreements provided that the execution of the agreements would be supervised by Mixed Armistice Commission whose chairman in each case would be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or his designated representative, and bearing in mind that the several armistice agreements include firm pledges against any further act of hostility between the parties and also provide for their supervision by the parties themselves, relied upon the parties to ensure the continued application and observance of these agreements.



*Taking* into consideration the views expressed and the date given by the representatives of Egypt, Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization on the complaints submitted to the Council : (S/1790; S/1824),

*Notes* that with regard to the implementation of Article 8 of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement, the Special Committee has been formed and has convened and hopes that it will proceed expeditiously to carry out the functions contemplated in paragraph 2 and 3 of that article;

*Calls Upon* the parties to the present complaints to consent to the handling of complaints according to the procedures established in the Armistice Agreements for the handling of complaints and the settlement of points at issue;

*Requests* the Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission to give urgent attention to the Egyptian complaint of expulsion of thousands of Arabs; and

*Calls upon* both parties to give effect to any finding of the Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission regarding the repatriation of any such Arabs who in the Commission's opinion are entitled to return;

*Authorizes* the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization with regard to the movement of nomadic Arabs to recommend to Israel, Egypt, and to such other Arab States as he may consider necessary, to control the movement of such nomadic Arabs across international frontiers or armistice lines by mutual agreement; and

*Calls upon* the Governments concerned to take in the future no action involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers or armistice lines without prior consultation through the Mixed Armistice Commission;

*Taken note* of the statement of the Government of Israel that Israeli armed forces will evacuate Bir Qatter pursuant to the 20th March 1950 decision of the Special Committee, provided for in Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement and that the Israeli Armed forces will withdraw to positions authorized by the Armistice Agreement;

*Reminds* Egypt and Israel as Member Nations of the United Nations of their obligation under Charter to settle their outstanding differences and further reminds Egypt, Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan that the armistice agreements to which they are parties contemplate the return of permanent peace in Palestine, and therefore, urges them and the other States in the area to take all such steps as will lead to the settlement of the issues between them;

*Requests* the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to report to the Security Council at the end of 90 days, or before, "if he deems necessary, on the compliance given to this resolution and upon the status of the operations of the various Mixed Armistice Commissions and further requests that he submit periodically to the Security Council reports of all decisions made by the various Mixed Armistice Commissions and the Special Committee provided for in Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement".

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### **General Assembly Resolution on Relief in Palestine**

**of 2-12-1950.**

*The General Assembly at its 315th plenary meeting on 2 December 1950 adopted the draft resolution recommended by the Ad Hoc Political Committee (A/1566) without debate, by 46 votes to none, with 9 abstentions. The resolution (393 (v)) reads as follows :*

*"The General Assembly,*

*Recalling its resolution 302 (iv) of 8 December 1949,*

*Having examined the report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and the report of the Secretary-General concerning United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees,*

1. *Notes* that contributions sufficient to carry out the programme authorized in paragraph 6 of resolution 302 (iv) have not been made, and urges governments which have not yet done so to make every

effort to make voluntary contributions in response to paragraph 13 of that resolution:

2. *Recognizes* that direct relief cannot be terminated as provided in paragraph 6 of Resolution 302 (iv);

3. *Authorizes* the Agency to continue to furnish direct relief to refugees in need, and considers that, for the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952, the equivalent of approximately \$ 20,000,000 will be required for direct relief to refugees who are not yet reintegrated into the economy of the Near East;

4. *Considers* that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement, is essential in preparation for the time when international assistance is no longer available, and for the realization of conditions of peace and stability in the area.

5. *Instructs* the Agency to establish a reintegration fund which shall be utilized for projects requested by any government in the Near East and approved by the Agency for the permanent re-establishment of refugees and their removal from relief.

6. *Considers* that, for the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952, not less than the equivalent of \$ 30,000,000 should be contributed to the Agency for the purposes set forth in paragraph 5 above;

7. *Authorizes* the Agency, as circumstances permit, to transfer funds available for the current relief and works programmes, and for the relief programme provided in paragraph 3 above, to reintegration projects provided for in paragraph 5.

8. (a) *Requests* the President of the General Assembly to appoint a Negotiating Committee composed of seven or more members for the purpose of consulting, as soon as possible during the current session of the General Assembly, with Members and non-member States as to the amounts which governments may be willing to contribute on a voluntary basis towards:

(i) The current programme for relief and work for the period ending 30 June 1951, bearing in mind the need for securing contributions from Member States which have not yet contributed;

(ii) The programme of relief and reintegration projects as provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 above for the year ending 30 June 1952;

(b) *Authorizes* the Negotiating Committee to adopt procedures best suited to the accomplishment of its task, bearing in mind

(i) The need for securing the maximum contribution in cash ;

(ii) The desirability of ensuring that any contribution in kind is of a nature which meets the requirements of the contemplated programmes;

(iii) The importance of enabling the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to plan its programmes in advance and to carry them out with funds regularly contributed;

(iv) The degree of assistance which can continue to be rendered by specialized agencies, non-member States and other contributors;

(c) *Requests* that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has ascertained the extent to which Member States are willing to make contributions, all delegations be notified accordingly by the Secretary-General in order that they consult with their Governments;

(d) *Decides* that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has completed its work, the Secretary-General shall at the Committee's request arrange, during the current session of the General Assembly, an appropriate meeting of Member and non-Member States at which Members may commit themselves to their national contributions and the contributions of non-Members may be made known;

9. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance funds, deemed to be available for this purpose and not exceeding \$ 5,000,000 from the Working Capital Fund to finance operations pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than 31 December 1951;

10. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies to utilize to the fullest extent the Agency's facilities as a

point of reference and co-ordination for technical assistance programmes in the countries in which the Agency is operating.

11. *Expresses* its appreciation to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Refugee Organization, the International Labour Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization for the assistance which they have rendered, and urges them to continue to furnish all possible assistance to the Agency;

12. *Commends* the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and the American Friends Service Committee for their invaluable services and whole-hearted co-operation in the distribution of relief supplies until those functions were taken over by the Agency;

13. *Expresses* its thanks to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations whose programmes have brought much needed supplementary assistance to the Palestine refugees, and urges them to continue and expand, to the extent possible, the work which they have undertaken on behalf of the refugees;

14. *Extends* its appreciation and thanks to the Director and staff of the Agency and the members of the Advisory Committee for their effective and devoted work".

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### **General Assembly on Refugees**

*The text of the resolution, 394 (V), adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, 1950.*

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

*Having examined* with appreciation the general progress report dated 2 September 1950, of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine,

*Noting with Concern:*

(a) That agreement has not been reached between the parties on the final settlement of the questions outstanding between them,

(b) That the repatriation, resettlement, economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation have not been effected,

*Recognizing* that, in the interest of the peace and stability of the Near East, the refugee question should be dealt with as a matter of urgency,

1. *Urges* the governments and the authorities concerned to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

2. *Directs* the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to establish an office which, under the direction of the Commission, shall

(a) Make such arrangements as it may consider necessary for the assessment and payment of compensation in pursuance of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) ;

(b) Work out such arrangements as may be practicable for the implementation of the other objectives of paragraph 11 of the said Resolution ;

(c) Continue consultations with the parties concerned regarding, measures for the protection of the rights, property and interests of the refugees ;

3. *Calls upon* the government concerned to undertake measures to ensure that refugees, whether repatriated or resettled will be treated without any discrimination either in law or in fact".

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### **Call For Cease-fire in Demilitarized Zone**

*Security Council Resolution (S 2130) of May 8, 1951*

"The Security Council,

1. *Recalling* its resolutions of 15 July 1948 (S/902) 11 August 1949 (S/1376), 17 November 1950 (S/1907 & corr 1),

2. *Noting* with concern that fighting has broken out in and

around the demilitarized zone established by the Syrian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949 and that fighting is continuing despite the cease-fire order of the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization issued on 4 May 1951,

2. *Calls upon* the parties or persons in the area concerned to cease fighting and brings to the attention of the parties their obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and the Security Council's resolution of 15 July 1948 and their commitment, under the General Armistice Agreement, and accordingly calls upon them to comply with these obligations and commitments".

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### Admonition To Israel

(Security Council Resolution S/2157 of 18 May 1951)

*"The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its past resolutions of 15 July 1948 (S/902), 11 August 1949 (S/1376), 17 November 1950 (S/1907 & corr. 1), and 8 May 1951 (S/2130) relating to the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States and to the provisions contained therein concerning methods for maintaining the armistice and resolving disputes through the Mixed Armistice Commissions participated in by the parties to the General Armistice Agreements ;

*Noting* the complaints of Syria and Israel to the Security Council, statements in the Council of the representatives of Syria and Israel, the reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Chief of Staff and the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine, and statements before the Council by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine ;

*Noting* that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in a memorandum of 7 March 1951 (S/2049, Section IV paragraph 3), and the Chairman of the Syria-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission on a number of occasions have requested the Israeli delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission to ensure that the

Palestine Land Development Company, Limited, is instructed to cease all operations in the demilitarized zone until such time as an agreement is arranged through the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for continuing this project ;

*Noting* further that Article 5 of the General Armistice Agreement gives to the Chairman the responsibility for a general supervision of the demilitarized zone ;

*Endorses* the requests of the Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission on this matter and calls upon the Government of Israel to comply with them ;

*Declares* that in order to promote the return of permanent peace in Palestine, it is essential that the Governments of Israel and Syria observe faithfully the General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949 ;

*Notes* that under Article VII, paragraph 8, of the Armistice Agreement, where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of the agreement, other than the preamble and Articles I & II, is at issue, the Mixed Armistice Commission's interpretation shall prevail ;

*Calls upon* the Governments of Israel and Syria to bring before the Mixed Armistice Commission or its Chairman, whichever has the pertinent responsibility under the Armistice Agreement, their complaints and to abide by the decisions resulting therefrom ;

*Considers* that it is inconsistent with the objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreements to refuse to participate in meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission or to fail to accept requests of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his obligations under Article 5, and calls upon the parties to be represented at all meetings called by the Chairman of the Commission and to respect such requests ;

*Calls upon* the parties to give effect to the following excerpt cited by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization at the 542nd meeting of the Security Council on 25 April 1951, as being from the summary record of the Syria-Israel Armistice Conference of 3 July 1949, which was agreed to by the parties as an authoritative comment on Article 5 of the Syria-Israel Armistice Agreement ;



"The question of Civil Administration in villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone is provided for, within the framework of an Armistice Agreement in sub-paragraph 5 (b) and 5 (c) of the draft article. Such civil administration, including policing, will be on a local basis, without raising general questions of administration, jurisdiction, citizenship and sovereignty.

"Where Israel civilians return to or remain in an Israel village or settlement, the civil administration and policing of the village will be by Israelis. Similarly where Arab civilians return to or remain in an Arab village, a local administration and police unit will be authorized.

"As civilian life is gradually restored, administration will take shape on a local basis under the general supervision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

"The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, in consultation and co-operation with the local communities, will be in a position to authorize all necessary arrangements for the restoration and protection of civilian life. He will not assume responsibility for direct administration of the zone".

*Recalls* to the Governments of Syria and Israel their obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and their commitments under the Armistice Agreement not to resort to military force and finds that :

(a) Aerial action taken by the forces of the Government of Israel on 5 April 1951, and

(b) Any aggressive military action by either of the parties in or around the demilitarized zone, which further investigation by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization into the reports and complaints recently submitted to the Council may establish,

Constitute a violation of the cease-fire provision provided in the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and are inconsistent with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations assumed under the Charter;

*Noting* the complaint with regard to the evacuation of Arab residents from the demilitarized zone;

(a) Decides that Arab civilians who have been removed from the demilitarized zone by the Government of Israel should be permitted to return forthwith to their homes and that the Mixed Armistice Commission should supervise their return and rehabilitation in a manner to be determined by the Commission; and

(b) Holds that no action involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers, armistice lines, or within the demilitarized zone should be undertaken without prior decision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission;

*Noting* with concern the refusal on a number of occasions to permit observers and officials of the Truce Supervision Organization to enter localities and areas which were subject of complaints in order to perform their legitimate functions, considers that the parties should permit such entry at all times whenever this is required, to enable the Truce Supervision Organization to fulfil its functions, and should render every facility which may be requested by Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for this purpose;

*Reminds* the parties of the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security are not endangered, and expresses its concern at the failure of the Governments of Israel and Syria to achieve progress pursuant to their commitments under the Armistice Agreement to promote the return to permanent peace in Palestine;

*Directs* the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to take the necessary steps to give effect to this resolution for the purpose of restoring peace in the area, and authorizes him to take such measures to restore peace in the area and to make such representations to the Governments of Israel and Syria as he may deem necessary;

*Calls upon* the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to report to the Security Council on compliance given to the present resolution;

*Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish such additional personnel and assistance as the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization may request in carrying out the present resolution and the Council's resolutions of 8 May 1951 and 17 November 1950.

## On Free Passage Through Suez Canal

*Security Council Resolution (S/2322) of September 1, 1951*

### *"The Security Council"*

Recalling that in its resolutions of 11 August 1949, (S/1376) relating to the conclusion of Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States it drew attention to the pledges in these Agreements against any further acts of hostility between the Parties;

2. Recalling further that in its resolution of 17 November 1950 (S/1907) it reminded the States concerned that the Armistice Agreements to which they were parties contemplate 'the return of permanent peace in Palestine' and therefore urged them and the other States in the area to take all such steps as would lead to the settlement of the issues between them.

3. Noting the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Security Council of 12 June 1951 (S/2194).

4. Further noting that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization recalled the statement of the Senior Egyptian delegate in Rhodes on 13 January 1949, to the effect that his delegation was inspired with every spirit of co-operation, conciliation, and a sincere desire to restore peace in Palestine, and that the Egyptian Government has not complied with the earnest plea of the Chief of Staff made to the Egyptian delegate on 12 June 1951, that it desist from the present practice of interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel,

5. Considering that since the Armistice regime, which has been in existence for nearly two and a half years, is of permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search, and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence,

6. Finds that the maintenance of the practice mentioned in paragraph 4 above is inconsistent with the objectives of a peaceful settlement between the parties and the establishment of a permanent peace in Palestine set forth in the Armistice Agreement.

7. *Finds* further that such practice is an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure;

8. *Further finds* that the practice cannot in the prevailing circumstances be justified on the ground that it is necessary for self-defence.

9. *And further noting* that the restrictions on the passage of goods through the Suez canal to Israel ports are denying to nations at no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable supplies required for their economic reconstruction, and that these restrictions, together with sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel ports represent unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another including the Arab States and Israel;

10. *Calls upon* Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods [through the Suez canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential for the safety of shipping in the canal itself and to the observance of international conventions in force”.

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### **Call To Consult Conciliation Commission**

*General Assembly Resolution (512 (VI) of 26-1-1952*

*“The General Assembly*

*Recalling* all the resolutions adopted at previous sessions of the General Assembly on the Palestine problem,

*Having examined* the progress report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.

1. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Conciliation Commission for Palestine for its efforts to assist the parties to reach agreement on their outstanding differences;

2. *Notes with regret* that, as stated in paragraph 87 of the report, the Commission has been unable to fulfil its mandate under the resolutions of the General Assembly;

3. *Considers* that the governments concerned have the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine;

4. *Urges* the governments concerned to seek agreement with a view to an early settlement of their outstanding differences in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine and for this purpose to make full use of the United Nations facilities;

5. *Considers* that the Conciliation Commission for Palestine should continue its efforts to secure the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine and accordingly should be available to the parties to assist them in reaching agreement on outstanding questions ;

6. *Requests* the Conciliation Commission for Palestine to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations ;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities for carrying out the terms of the present resolution”.

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**Assembly Resolution 513 (VI) of 26.1.1952 on Refugees**

*“The General Assembly*

*Recalling its* resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, as amended by resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950,

*Having examined* the report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the special joint report of the Director and the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency ;

1. *Commends* the United Nations Relief and and Works Agency for the development of a constructive programme which will contribute effectively to the welfare of the refugees ;

2. *Endorses* without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 or to the provisions

of paragraph 4 of resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 relative to reintegration either by repatriation or resettlement, the programme recommended by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the relief and reintegration of Palestine refugees, which envisages the expenditure of \$ 84.550 million for relief and \$. 200 million for reintegration over and above such contributions as may be made by local governments, to be carried out over a period of approximately three years starting as of 1 July 1951 ;

*Recognizing* the concern of the United Nations in the problem of the Palestine refugees ,

3. *Urges* the governments of the countries in the area to assist, with due regard to their constitutional processes, in the carrying out of this programme and to extend to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, a subsidiary organ established by the General Assembly, their co-operation in the elaboration of specific projects and in the general performance of its functions ;

4. *Invites* the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to explore with the Governments concerned arrangements looking towards their assuming administration of reintegration projects at the earliest possible date ,

5. *Requests* the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to explore with the governments concerned the desirability and practicability of transferring the administration of relief to those governments at the earliest possible date, and considers that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency should continue to carry the cost of the supply programme, subject to paragraph 2 and 6, and to provide assistance for the health, welfare and education programme along with the duty of making such inspection and such verification of accounts as may be necessary ;

6. *Considers* that relief expenditures should be reduced in suitable proportion to reintegration expenditures ;

7. *Decides* that the amount of \$ 20 million provided for direct relief in resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 should be increased to \$ 27 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1952 ;

8. *Decides* that consequent upon paragraph 2 above, the amount of \$ 30 million provided in resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 for reintegration should be increased to not less than \$ 50 million ; and credited to the reintegration Fund provided for in that resolution for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1952 ;

9. *Approves* the budget recommended by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the fiscal year 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953, of the equivalent of \$ 118 million of which \$ 100 million shall be available for reintegration and \$ 18 million for relief ;

10. *Authorizes* the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to transfer funds allocated for relief to reintegration ;

11. *Urges* the governments of Member States to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to termination the programme set forth in paragraph 2 above ;

12. *Requests* that negotiation regarding contributions for the proposed three years programme be carried out with Member and non-Member States by the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds established by resolution 571 B (VI) adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 1951 ;

13. *Expresses its appreciation* of the assistance afforded to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency by the specialized Agencies and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and urges them to render all services possible to strengthen the programme of refugee relief and reintegration, and to co-operate with the Secretary-General and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in ensuring that the total assistance of the United Nations to Palestine refugees is rendered with the maximum of co-ordination and efficiency ;

14. *Expresses its appreciation* to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations whose programmes have afforded valuable supplementary assistance to Palestine refugees, and again requests them to continue and expand to the extent possible the work which they have undertaken on behalf of the refugees".

**General Assembly Resolution 614 (VII) of Nov. 6, 1952**

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Recalling its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952,*

*"Having examined the report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the special joint report of the Director and the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency,*

*"Noting that negotiations have taken place between the Agency and governments of Near Eastern countries under the programme approved in resolution 513 (VI),*

*"Having in mind the goals for the reduction of relief expenditure envisaged in the three-years US \$ 250 million relief and reintegration programme, approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 513 (VI) without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) or to the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 393 (V) relative to reintegration either by repatriation or resettlement,*

*"Recognizing that immediate realization of these goals has not proved possible and that increased relief expenditures are therefore required, with a resultant reduction in the reintegration funds,*

*"Authorizes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to increase the budget for relief to \$ 23 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1953 and to make such further adjustments as it may deem necessary to maintain adequate standards; and to adopt a budget for relief of \$ 18 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1954 which shall be subject to review at the eighth session of the General Assembly;*

*"2. Authorizes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to allocate funds remaining for reintegration according to time schedules deemed appropriate up to 30 June 1954;*

*"3. Requests that negotiations regarding contributions for the*



programme be carried out with Member and non-Member States by the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds”.

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**Call To Suspend Works in Demilitarized Zone**

*SC Resolution (S/3128) of 27 October 1953*

*“The Security Council,*

*Having taken note* of the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization dated 23 October 1953 (S/3122),

*Desirous* of facilitating the consideration of the question without however prejudicing the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned,

*Deems* it desirable to that end that the works started in the Demilitarized Zone on 2 September 1953 should be suspended during the urgent examination of the question by the Security Council;

*Notes* with satisfaction the statement made by the Israel representative at the 631st meeting regarding the undertaking given by his Government to suspend the works in question during that examination;

*Requests* the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to inform it regarding the fulfilment of that undertaking.”

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**General Assembly Resolution (720 VIII) of 27 November 1953**

*“The General Assembly*

*“Recalling* its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 and 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952,

*“Having examined* the report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the Special report of the Director and the Advisory Commission of that Agency,

*“Noting* that programme agreements envisaging the commitment

of approximately, \$ 120 million have been signed by UNRWA with the governments of several Near Eastern countries, pursuant to the plan endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 513 (VI), but that expectations as regards the execution of the projects programme have not been realized,

*"Noting also that the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of grave concern,*

*"1. Decides, without prejudice to the provision of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), or to the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 393 (V), that the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East shall be extended until June 1955, and that its programme shall be again subject to review at the ninth session of the General Assembly;*

*"2. Authorizes the Agency to adopt a budget for relief amounting to \$ 24.8 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1954, subject to such adjustments as may be attributable to refugee employment on projects, or as may be necessary to maintain adequate standards, and to adopt a provisional budget for relief of \$ 18 million for fiscal year ending 30 June 1955,*

*"3. Considers that the projects fund previously authorized by the General Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) should be maintained at \$ 200 million until 30 June 1955, and urges UNRWA and the governments of the Near Eastern countries concerned to continue to seek acceptable projects to enable the fund to be utilized for the purposes for which it is intended;*

*"4. Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds to seek the funds required to meet the current needs of the relief programmes and to invite governments to take into account the need for the additional pledges which will be required to meet the total programme now established at \$ 292.8 million.*

B

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Having noted that the present membership of the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for*

Palestine Refugees in the Near East, established pursuant to paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, is composed of representatives of Egypt, France, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

*"Noting further that it is in the general interest that other contributing countries join the Advisory Commission,*

*"Authorizes the Advisory Commission to increase its membership by not more than two additional members"*.

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**SC. Resolution (S/313 9/ Rev. 2) of 29 November 1953**

*Appeal To Israel & Jordan*

*"The Security Council,*

*"Recalling its previous resolutions on the Palestine Question, particularly those of 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949 and 18 May 1951 concerning methods for maintaining the armistice and resolving disputes through the Mixed Armistice Commissions ,*

*Noting the reports of 27 October 1953 and 9 November 1953 to the Security Council by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the statements to the Security Council by the representatives of Jordan and Israel ,*

**A**

*Finds that the retaliatory action at Qibya taken by armed forces of Israel on 14-15 October 1953 and all such actions constitute a violation of the cease-fire provisions of the Security Council resolution 15 July 1948, and are inconsistent with the parties' obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and the Charter;*

*Expresses the strongest censure of that action which can only prejudice the chances of that peaceful settlement which both parties in accordance with the Charter are bound to seek, and calls upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent all such actions in the future ;*

## B

*Takes note* of the fact that there is substantial evidence of crossing of the demarcation line by unauthorized persons often resulting in acts of violence and requests the Government of Jordan to continue and strengthen the measures which they are already taking to prevent such crossings ;

*Recalls* to the Governments of Israel and Jordan that their obligations under Security Council resolutions and the General Armistice Agreement to prevent all acts of violence on either side of the demarcation line ;

*Calls upon* the Governments of Israel and Jordan to ensure the effective co-operation of local security forces ;

## C

*Reaffirms* that it is essential in order to achieve progress by peaceful means toward a lasting settlement of the issues outstanding between them that the parties abide by their obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and the resolutions of the Security Council;

*Emphasizes* the obligation of the Governments of Israel and Jordan to co-operate fully with the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization ;

*Requests* the Secretary-General to consider with the Chief of Staff the best ways of strengthening the Truce Supervision Organization and to furnish such additional personnel and assistance as the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization may require for the performance of his duties ;

*Requests* the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to report within three months to the Security Council with such recommendations as he may consider appropriate on compliance with and enforcement of the General Armistice Agreement with particular reference to the provisions of this resolution ; and taking into account any agreement reached in pursuance of the request by the Government of Israel for the convocation of a conference under

article XII of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan."

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### **Extension upto 1960 of UNRWA**

*General Assembly Resolution 818 (IX) of 4-12-1954*

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952 and 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953,*

*"Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the special report of the Director and the Advisory Commission of UNRWA,*

*"Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected and that the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of grave concern ,*

*"1. Decides, without prejudice to the rights of the refugees to repatriation and compensation, to extend the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for five years ending 30 June 1960 ;*

*"2. Requests the Agency to continue its consultation with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);*

*"3. Requests the Governments of the area to continue to co-operate with the Director of the Agency in seeking and carrying out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees;*

*"4. Decides to maintain the rehabilitation Fund of \$ 200 million, subject to reduction for expenditures already made ;*

*"5. Approves a relief budget of \$ 25, 100,000 and a rehabilitation budget of \$ 36,200,000 for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1955 ;*

"6. *Requests* the Director, in consultation with the Advisory Commission of UNRWA to study and report upon the problem of assistance which should be given to other claimants for relief, particularly children and needy inhabitants of villages along the demarcation lines;

"7. *Authorizes* the Director to prepare, in consultation with the Advisory Commission, the budgets for relief and rehabilitation in advance of each fiscal year, which budgets he shall transmit to the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, without prejudice to review each year by the General Assembly ;

"8. *Requests* the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, after receipt of such budgets from the Director of UNRWA, to seek such funds as may be required by the Agency ;

"9. *Appeals* to the Governments of Member and non-Member States to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to fulfilment the Agency's programmes and thanks the numerous religious charitable and humanitarian organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees ;

"10. *Requests* the Director to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of resolution 302 (IV), as well as the annual budgets."

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### **Condemnation of Israeli Action**

*SC Resolution (S/3378) of 29.3.1955 unanimously adopted*

*"The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolution of 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949, 17 November 1950, 18 May 1951 and 25 November 1953,

*Having heard* the report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and statements by the representatives of Egypt and Israel;

*Noting* that the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission on 6 March 1955 determined that a 'pre-arranged and planned attack ordered by Israeli authorities' was 'committed by Israel regular army forces against the Egyptian regular army force' in the Gaza strip on February 28, 1955,

*Condemns* this attack as a violation of the cease-fire provisions of the Security Council resolutions of 15 July 1948 and as inconsistent with the obligations of the parties under the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel and under the Charter;

*Calls upon* again Israel to take all necessary measures to prevent such actions;

*Expresses its* conviction that the maintenance of the General Armistice Agreement is threatened by any deliberate violation of that Agreement by one of the parties to it, and that no progress towards the return of permanent peace in Palestine can be made unless the parties comply strictly with their obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of July 15, 1948".

*SC Resolution S/3379 of March 30, 1955*

*"The Security Council*

*"Taking note* of those sections of the report by the Chief of the UNTSO which deal with the general conditions on the Armistice Demarcation Line between Egypt and Israel and the causes of the present tension,

*Anxious* that all possible steps shall be taken to preserve security in this area, within the framework of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel,

*Requests* the Chief of Staff to continue his consultations with the Governments of Egypt and Israel with a view to the introduction of practical measures to that end;

*Notes* that the Chief of Staff has already made certain concrete proposals to this effect;

*Calls upon* the Governments of Egypt and Israel to co-operate with the Chief of Staff with regard to his proposals bearing in mind that, in the opinion of the Chief of Staff, infiltration can be reduced to an occasional nuisance if an agreement were effected between the parties on the lines he has proposed, Requests the Chief of Staff to keep the Council informed of the progress of his discussions.

**Dulles Proposals For Settlement**

*(Announced in a speech before Council on Foreign Relations, New York, on August 26, 1955)*

"What are the principal remaining problems? They are those which were unresolved by the Armistice of 1949 which ended the fighting between Israelis and Arabs. Before taking up these problems specifically, I would first pay high tribute to what the United Nations has done to preserve tranquillity and serve humanity in the area. Despite these indispensable efforts, three problems remain that conspicuously require to be solved.

The first is the tragic plight of the 900,000 refugees who formerly lived in the territory that is now occupied by Israel.

The second is the pall of fear that hangs over the Arab and Israeli people alike. The Arab countries fear that Israel will seek by violent means to expand at their expense. The Israelis fear that the Arabs will gradually marshal superior forces to be used to drive them into the sea, and they suffer from the economic measures now taken against them.

The third is the lack of fixed permanent boundaries between Israel and Arab neighbours.

There are other important problems. But if these three principal problems could be dealt with, then the way would be paved for the solution of others.

Border clashes take an almost weekly toll of human lives and inflame an already dangerous mood of hatred. The sufferings of the Arab Refugees are drawn out almost beyond the point of endurance. The fears which are at work on each side, lead to a heavy burden of armament, which constitutes a serious drag on economic and social progress. Responsible leaders are finding it hard to turn their full attention and energies to the positive task of creating conditions of healthy growth.

Serious as the present situation is, there is a danger that, unless it improves, it will get worse. One ill leads to another, and cause and effect are hard to sort out. The atmosphere, if it worsens, could becloud clear judgments, making appear attractive what would in fact be reckless.



Both sides suffer greatly from the present situation, and both are anxious for what they would regard as a just and equitable solution. But neither has been able to find that way.

This may be a situation where mutual friends could serve the common good. This is particularly true since the area may not itself possess all of the ingredients needed for the full and early building of a condition of security and well-being.

The United States, as a friend of both Israelis and Arabs, has given the situation deep and anxious thought and has come to certain conclusions, the expression of which may help men of goodwill within the area to fresh constructive efforts. I speak in this matter with the authority of President Eisenhower.

#### *Loan Proposed To Israel*

To end the plight of 900,000 refugees requires that these uprooted people should, through resettlement and to such an extent as may be feasible—reparation, be enabled to resume a life of dignity and self-respect. To this end, there is need to create more arable land where refugees can find permanent homes and gain their own livelihood through their own work. Fortunately, there are practical projects for water development which can make this possible. All this requires money.

Compensation is due from Israel to the refugees. However, it may be that Israel can not unaided, now make adequate compensation. If so, there might be an international loan to enable Israel to pay the compensation which is due and which would enable many of the refugees to find for themselves a better way of life.

President Eisenhower would recommend substantial participation by the United States in such a loan for such a purpose. Also he would recommend that the United States contribute to the realization of water development and irrigation projects which would directly or indirectly, facilitate the resettlement of the refugees.

These projects would, of course, do much more than aid in the resettlement of refugees. They would enable the people throughout the area to enjoy a better life. Furthermore, a solution to the refugee problem would help in eliminating the problem of recurrent

incidents which have plagued and embittered the settlements on both sides of the borders.

### *Collective Security Measures*

The second principal problem which I mentioned is that of fear. The nature of this fear is such that it is hardly within the capacity of the countries of the area, acting alone, to replace the fear with a sense of security. There, as in many other areas, security can be assured only by collective measures which commit decisive power to the deterring of aggression.

President Eisenhower has authorized me to say that, given a solution of the other related problems, he would recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbours. I hope that other countries would be willing to join in such a security guarantee, and that it would be sponsored by the United Nations.

By such collective security measures the area could be relieved of the acute fears which both sides now profess. The families located near the boundaries could relax from the strain of feeling that violent death may suddenly strike them; the peoples of the area whose standards of living are already too low would no longer have to carry the burden of what threatens to become an armament race if indeed it does not become a war; the political leadership of the area could devote itself to constructive tasks.

### *Problem of Boundaries*

If there is to be a guarantee of borders, it would be normal that there should be prior agreement upon what the borders are. That is the third major problem. The existing lines separating Israel and the Arab States were fixed by the Armistice Agreements of 1949. They were not designed to be permanent frontiers in every respect, in part, at least, they reflected the status of the fighting at the moment.

The task of drawing permanent boundaries is admittedly one of difficulty. There is no single or sure guide, for each of two conflicting claims may seem to have merit. The difficulty is increased by the fact, that even territory which is barren has acquired a sentimental significance. Surely the overall advantages of the measures here

outlined would outweigh vastly any net disadvantage of the adjustments needed to convert armistice lines of danger into boundary lines of safety. In spite of conflicting claims and sentiments, I believe it is possible to find a way of reconciling the vital interests of all the parties. The United States would be willing to help in the search for a solution if the parties to the dispute should so desire.

If agreement can be reached on these basic problems of refugees, fear, and boundaries, it should prove possible to find solutions for other questions, largely economic, which presently fan the flames of hostility and resentment.

### *Status of Jerusalem*

It should also be possible to reach agreement on the status of Jerusalem. The United States would give its support to a United Nations review of this problem.

I have not attempted to enumerate all the issues on which it would be desirable to have a settlement, nor have I tried to outline in detail the form which a settlement of any of the elements might take. I have tried to show that possibilities exist for an immeasurable improvement and that the possibilities do not require any nation-taking action which would be against its interests, whether those interests be measured in terms of material strength or in terms of national prestige and honour. I have also, I trust, made clear that the Government of the United States is disposed to enlarge those possibilities by contributions of its own, if this be desired by those concerned.

Both sides in this strife have a noble past, a heritage of rich contributions to civilization. Both have fostered progress in science and the arts. Each side is predominantly representative of one of the world's great religions. Both sides desire to achieve a good life for their people and to share, and contribute to, the advancements of this century.

At a time when a great effort is being made to cease the tension which has long prevailed between the Soviet and Western world, can we not hope that a similar spirit should prevail in the Middle East. That is our plea. The spirit of conciliation and of the good neighbour brings rich rewards to the people and to the nations. If doing that involves some burdens they are burdens which the United States would share, just as we would share the satisfaction which would

result to all peoples if happiness, contentment and goodwill could drive hatred and misery away from peoples whom we hold in high respect and honour.\*

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### **Security Council Concern on outbreak of Violence**

*Text of Resolution (S/3432) of September 8, 1955*

*"The Security Council*

*Recalling its resolution of 30 March 1955. (S/3379),*

*Having received the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization (S/3430),*

*Noting with grave concern the discontinuance of the talks initiated by the Chief of Staff in accordance with the above mentioned resolution,*

*Deploring the recent outbreak of violence in the area along the Armistice Demarcation Line established between Egypt and Israel on 24 February 1949,*

*1. Notes with approval the acceptance by both parties of the appeal of the Chief of Staff for an unconditional cease-fire;*

*2. Calls upon both parties forthwith to take all steps necessary to bring about order and tranquillity in the area, and in particular to desist from further acts of violence and to continue the cease-fire in full force and effect;*

*Endorses the view of the Chief of Staff that the armed forces of both parties should be clearly and effectively separated by measures such as those which he has proposed;*

*4. Declares that freedom of movement must be afforded to United Nations Observers in the area to enable them to fulfil their functions;*

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*\*The proposals were endorsed by British Foreign office Statement on August 27, (See New York Times 28-8-55) reaffirming the United Kingdom's offer of 4 April 1955 'to guarantee by treaty, or treaties with the parties concerned any territorial settlement so agreed'.*

5. *Calls upon* both parties to appoint representatives to meet with the Chief of Staff and to co-operate fully with him to these ends,

6. *Requests* the Chief of Staff to report to the Security Council on the action taken to carry out this resolution”.

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### **British PM's Offer Of Mediation**

*Made by Sir Anthony Eden in his Guild Hall Speech of November 9, 1955*

“And here, My Lord Mayor, I have to discuss a grave situation with you. Between Israel and Egypt lies an area of dangerous tension. During the past seven years we have been trying to bring about some kind of settlement—successive governments in this country, and our allies in that part of the world—and to prevent competition in armaments there. We have not been entirely unsuccessful. Despite frontier incidents from time to time, some more serious than others—there has been no war since 1948. The level of arms has been kept comparatively low, and this applies especially to more modern weapons. There has been some kind of a balance, though naturally each side cries loudly that it is less favoured than the other.

### *British Aims*

Now, My Lord Mayor, what is our immediate task. It is to prevent the outbreak of war. General Burns, UN Chief of Staff in Palestine and a distinguished Canadian soldier, has been tireless in his efforts to keep the forces of the two sides apart. He and his staff have shown patience and courage in hazardous work, and we should all be most grateful to them. At this moment, General Burns is urging both sides to withdraw their forces from the El Auja demilitarized zone. We are giving him full diplomatic support for his present proposal in the Capitals concerned. But let there be no mistake: Were any country to reject counsels of moderation, it would forfeit the sympathy of this, and I believe every other, peace-loving nation; and once lost that sympathy might be hard to regain.

I have never known a situation where it was clearer that neither party had anything whatever to hope for in the long term from any military conflict. It is in the interests of both to put the demilitarized zone between them. I saw General Burn when he was in London three days ago, and he knows that if there is any further help we can give him we shall be glad to do so. It will be a great gain if the risk of frontier incidents can be reduced. It will be a greater gain if the

tragic problem of the refugees can be dealt with. I much regret that the hard work which Mr. Johnston of the United States has devoted to preparing irrigation schemes has not yet been accepted by those concerned. It should be, for it is in the interests of all, Israeli and Arab alike, and we are ready to help here also, as we have done with the Arab refugees. But beneath the volcanic crust of these smouldering dangers lies a deeper peril, the hostility between Israel and her Arab neighbours is unreconciled. Here time has proved no healer. There is no progress to report to you since the armistice agreement six years ago. If it were not for these hard and enduring sentiments, the countries of the Middle East could give all their effort to their economic and social plans. They could concentrate on building up happy and prosperous societies in their lands. As I have said, we have tried for a long time past to find common ground for a some kind of settlement. I think that the time has come now when the acute dangers of the situation command us to try again. We must somehow attempt to deal with the root cause of the trouble, and our country has a special responsibility in all this, for we have a long tradition of friendship with the Middle East. I believe that it should be possible to find common ground between the two positions. There is after all, one interest which both parties ought to share. Neither Israel nor her Arab neighbours can want to see their differences turned to the advantage of anyone else: and there is some body else quite ready to receive the advantage.

Now Sir, from that starting point, can we not all look once again at the proposals which the United States Government and we ourselves have advocated? We have only one desire in this. If our Arab and Israeli friends would only believe us—to help to find a means of living which will enable the peoples concerned to dwell side by side in peace.

### *Frontier Problems*

Let us give one instance. If there could be accepted arrangements between them about their boundaries, we, Her Majesty's Government, and, I believe, the United States Government and perhaps other Powers also, would be prepared to give a formal guarantee to both sides, and that might bring real confidence and security at last. Our countries would also offer substantial help, financial and other, over this tragic problem of the refugees.

All this we will do. But can we not now move even a little further than this? And I think Guildhall is the right place to make this suggestion. The position today is that the Arabs on the one side take their stand on the 1947 and other United Nations resolutions. That is where they are. They have said that they would be willing to open discussions with Israel from that basis. The Israelis on the other side, found themselves on the later Armistice Agreement of 1949, and on the present territories which they occupy. Now, My Lord Mayor, between those two positions there is, of course, a wide gap. But is it so wide that no negotiation is possible to bridge it? It is not right, I agree, that United Nations resolutions should be ignored, but equally can it be maintained that the United Nations resolutions on Palestine can now be put into operation just as they stand? The stark truth is that if these nations want to win a peace, which is in both their interests and to which we want to help them, they must make some compromise between these two positions.

#### *Offer Of Services*

My Lord Mayor, I have finished. I am convinced that it is possible to work this out. And if we could do so it would bring relief and happiness to millions, and the sooner the better. If we fail to do so, none can tell what the consequences will be, I want to say tonight, My Lord Mayor, that Her Majesty's Government, and I personally, are available to render any service in this cause. If there is anything, we can do to help, we would gladly do it for the sake of peace".

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#### **General Assembly Resolution 916 (X) of 3 December 1955**

##### *"The General Assembly*

*Recalling* its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953 and 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954,

*Noting* the Annual report and the special report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the special report of the Advisory Commissions of the Agency,

*Having received* the budgets for relief and rehabilitation prepared by the Director of the Agency,

*Noting* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme for reintegration of refugees endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) and that the situation of the refugees therefore continues to be a matter of grave concern,

1. *Directs* the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to pursue its programme for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the limitations imposed upon it by the extent of the contributions for the fiscal year;

2. *Requests* the Agency to continue its consultation with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of their respective tasks with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);

3. *Requests* the Governments of the area, without prejudice to paragraph II of resolution 194 (III) to make a determined effort, in co-operation with the Director of the Agency, to seek and carry-out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees;

4. *Notes with gratification* that the Government of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Agency have made substantial progress towards resolving the difficulties which impede the granting of rations to all qualified refugee children in Jordan;

5. *Notes* the serious need of the other claimants for relief as described in the special report prepared by the Director pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 818 (IX), namely, the frontier villagers in Jordan, the non-refugees in Egypt and certain of the Bedouin;

6. *Appeals* to private organizations to give them increased assistance to the extent that local government can not do so;

7. *Urges* all Governments and individuals to support these private organizations with food, goods and services;

8. *Requests* the Negotiating Committee for Extra Budgetary Funds, after the receipt of the budget from the Director of the Agency, to seek such funds as may be required by the Agency;



9. *Appeals* to the Governments of Member and non-Member States to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to fulfilment the Agency's programmes, and thanks the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;

10. *Expresses its thanks* to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out their mandate, and requests the Governments of the area to continue to facilitate the work of the Agency and to ensure the protection of its personnel and property;

11. *Requests* the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of resolution 302 (IV) as well as the annual budgets".

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### **Security Council Warning to Israel**

*Resolution, S/3538, as proposed by France, United Kingdom and United States, S/3530, Rev. 3, adopted unanimously by Security Council on 19 January 1956, at meeting 715.*

#### ***"The Security Council***

*Recalling* its resolutions of 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949, 18 May 1951, 24 November 1953, and 29 March 1955,

*Taking into consideration* the statements of the Representatives of Syria and Israel and the reports of the Chief of Staff of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization on the Syrian complaint that an attack was committed by Israel regular army forces against Syrian regular army forces on Syrian territory on 11 December 1955,

*Noting* the report of the Chief of Staff that this Israel action was a deliberate violation of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, including those relating to the demilitarized zone, which was crossed by the Israel forces which entered Syria,

*"Noting also,* without prejudice to the ultimate rights, claims and positions of the parties, that according to the reports of the Chief of Staff there has been interference by the Syrian authorities

with Israel activities on Lake Tiberias, in contravention of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria,

1. *Holds* that this interference in no way justifies the Israel action;

2. *Reminds* the Government of Israel that the Council has already condemned military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreements, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation, and has called upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent such action ;

3. *Condemns* the attack of 11 December 1955 as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of 15 July 1948, of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and of Israel's obligations under the Charter ;

4. *Expresses* its grave concern at the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with its obligations ;

5. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to do so in the future, in default of which the Council will have to consider what further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace ;

6. *Calls upon* the parties to comply with their obligations under article V of the General Armistice Agreement to respect the armistice demarcation line and the demilitarized zone :

7. *Requests* the Chief of Staff to pursue his suggestions for improving the situation in the area of Lake Tiberias without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of the parties and to report to the Council as appropriate on the success of his efforts ;

8. *Calls upon* the parties to arrange with the Chief of Staff for an immediate exchange of all military prisoners ;

9. *Calls upon* both parties to co-operate with the Chief of Staff in this and all other respects, to carry out the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement in good faith, and in particular to make full use of the Mixed Armistice Commission's machinery in the interpretation and application of its provisions".

### Call For Enforcement of Armistice Agreements

*Resolution (S/3575), as proposed by United States, (S/3562 and corr. 1) adopted unanimously by Security Council on 4 April 1956, at meeting 722).*

*"The Security Council,*

*"Recalling its resolution of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956,*

*"Recalling that in each of these resolutions the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the parties to the General Armistice Agreements concerned were requested by the Council to undertake certain specific steps for the purpose of ensuring that the tensions along the armistice demarcation lines should be reduced ,*

*"Noting with grave concern that despite the efforts of the Chief of Staff the proposed steps have not been carried out ,*

*"1. Considers that the situation now prevailing between the parties concerning the enforcement of the armistice agreements and the compliance given to the above-mentioned resolutions of the Council is such that its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security ;*

*"2. Requests the Secretary-General to undertake, as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the various aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and the Council's resolutions under reference ;*

*"3. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures which, after discussion with the parties and with the Chief of Staff, he considers would reduce existing tensions along the armistice demarcation lines, including the following points :*

*"(a) Withdrawal of their forces from the armistice demarcation lines ;*

*"(b) Full freedom of movement for observers along the armistice demarcation lines, in the demilitarized zones and in the defensive areas ;*

“(c) Establishment of local arrangements for the prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of any violations of the Armistice Agreements ;

“4. *Calls upon* the parties to the General Armistice Agreements to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution ;

“5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council in his discretion but not later than one month from this date on the implementation given to this resolution in order to assist the Council in considering what further action may be required.”

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### Directions To Secretary-General

*Resolution (S/3605), as submitted by United Kingdom, (S/3600/-Rev. 2) as amended, adopted unanimously by Security Council On 4 June 1956, at meeting 728*

“*The Security Council,*

“*Recalling its resolutions of 4 April 1956 (S/3575) and 11 August 1949.*

*Having received the report of the Secretary-General on his recent mission on behalf of the Security Council (S/3596),*

“*Noting those passages of the report (Section III and annex-4 which refer to the assurances given to the Secretary-General by all the parties to the General Armistice Agreements unconditionally to observe the cease-fire,*

“*Noting also that progress has been made towards the adoption of the specific measures set out in operative paragraph 3 of the Security Council's resolution of 4 April 1956,*

“*Noting however that full compliance with the General Armistice Agreements and with the Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955 and 19 January 1956 is not yet effected, and that the measures called for in operative paragraph 3 of its resolution of 4 April 1956 have been neither completely agreed upon nor put fully into effect*

"*Believing* that further progress should now be made in consolidating the gains resulting from the Secretary-General's mission and towards full implementation by the parties of the Armistice Agreements,

"1. *Commends* the Secretary-General and the parties on the progress already achieved ;

"2. *Declares* that the parties to the Armistice Agreements should speedily carry out the measures already agreed upon with the Secretary-General, and should co-operate with the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to put into effect their further practical proposals, pursuant to the resolution of 4 April 1956, with a view to full implementation of that resolution and full compliance with the Armistice Agreements;

"3. *Declares* that full freedom of movement of United Nations Observers must be respected along the armistice demarcation lines, in the demilitarized zones and in the defensive areas, as defined in the Armistice agreements, to enable them to fulfil their functions;

"4. *Endorses* the Secretary-General's view that the re-establishment of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements represents a stage which has to be passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues between the parties;

"5. *Requests* the Chief of Staff to continue to carry out his observation of the cease-fire pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of 11 August 1949 and to report to the Council whenever any action undertaken by the party to an Armistice Agreement constitutes a serious violation of that Agreement or of the cease-fire, which in his opinion requires immediate consideration by the Council;

"6. *Calls upon* the parties to the Armistice Agreements to take the steps necessary to carry out this resolution, thereby increasing confidence and demonstrating their wish for peaceful conditions;

"7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties, with a view to full implementation of the Council's resolution of 4 April 1956 and full compliance with the Armistice Agreements, and to report to the Security Council as appropriate".

**Principles For Accord on Suez**

*Security Council Resolution S/3671 of October 13 1956*

*"The Security Council,*

*Noting the declarations made before it and the accounts of the development of the exploratory conversations on the Suez Question given by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, France and the United Kingdom,*

*Agrees that any settlement of the Suez question should meet the following requirements :*

(1) there should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert, this covers both political and technical aspects,

(2) the Sovereignty of Egypt should be respected,

(3) the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country,

(4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users,

(5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development,

(6) in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due".

## CHAPTER IX

### THE WAR OVER SUEZ AND AFTER

In collusion with Britain and France, Israel on October 29, 1956 penetrated deep into Egyptian territory using action against *Fedayeen* as a cover in justification of the aggression. On October 30, Britain and France gave a 12-hour notice to both Israel and Egypt to withdraw their forces 10 miles away from the Suez Canal zone or else their forces would intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance. Egypt was also requested to permit Anglo-French forces to be stationed temporarily into key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. Securing free passage through the Canal was their cover for the action. The real object, however, was to topple the progressive Government of President Gamal Abd-Al Nasser and establish international control over the operation of Suez Canal. The operation, however, in the end proved a dismal failure in so far as the realization of these objectives was concerned and instead foreigners for the first time in the history of Egypt ceased to have any special position.

The failure of Eric Johnston to secure agreement on the utilization of the Waters of Jordan and Yarmuk for the benefit of Jordan, Israel and Syria; U. S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles' announcement on July 18, 1956 of cancellation of U. S. offer of aid for the Aswan Dam in retaliation against Egypt's growing friendship with the Communist bloc; and Egyptian Law 285 of July 26, 1956 nationalizing the Suez Canal provided the background for the aggressive military action of Britain, France and Israel against Egypt. Intrinsic evidence of collusion between Britain and Israel was provided by the British Government's warning to Israel that any attack on Jordan not Egypt would involve Britain in action against her. Some French Ministers stated later that Israel was acting in collusion with Britain and France. The British Foreign Secretary's objection to Israel being stigmatized as an aggressor in the Security Council also serves as a significant pointer in the direction.

That Egypt was perfectly within her rights to nationalize and operate the 101-mile long Suez Canal which was first opened to mari-

time shiping on November 17, 1869-ten years after Ferdinand Marie Vicomte de Lesseps turned the first spadeful of sand at the site which now is called Port Said, on April 25, 1859-no student of international law could seriously question Britain which became the largest single shareholder in the Suez Canal Company in 1875 by acquiring the Khedive's 176, 602 shares at a cost of \$ 4,080,000 and France where Compaigne Universelle due Canal Maritime de Suez had its head quarters, however tried to becloud the issue by stating that the 1888 Constantinople Convention and the Suez Canal Company were inextricably interlinked. Egyptian delegate, however, had little difficulty in exposing the hollowness of the contention in the Security Council. The Suez Company was awarded \$ 28,000,000 by way of compensation, the last instalment of which was paid in 1963. Britain and France, however, refused to pay toll to Egyptian authorities and along with U. S. blocked both the Canal and Egyptian accounts.

In retrospect the Anglo-French and Israeli aggression against Suez looks all the more indefensible and condemnable. France Britain and U. S. A. had agreed in talks in London between July 29, and August 2, 1956 that "the Suez nationalization threatened the freedom and security of the Canal guaranteed by the 1888 Constantinople Convention." The U.K. then issued invitations to the original signatories to the Convention and other users to a conference in London from August 16 to 24, 1956 at which 18 out of 22 nations proposed the setting up of a Suez Canal Board to operate, maintain and develop the Canal, which proposal was rejected by Egypt on September 3. At the second London Conference (September 19-21) the British Prime Minister announced the setting up of a Suez Canal Users' Association with a Council to exercise their rights with due regards for the rights of Egypt. Egypt had refused to attend the London Conference and proposed instead a conference of 45 users of the Canal to reconsider the 1888 Constantinople Convention and to confirm and guarantee the freedom of navigation through the Canal. In a memorandum of September 10, 1956 Egypt stated that "the essence of the 18-Power proposal was to establish international in place of Egyptian control over the Canal and stipulate sanctions". She proposed instead the setting up of a negotiating body representative of the different user views to seek solutions to questions regarding freedom of navigation, equitable tolls and development of the Canal. This



proposal was however described by the Second London Conference as to imprecise to "afford a useful basis for discussion". At the London conference India had proposed the via media of a "consultative body to advise Egypt in accordance with the users interests and to maintain contact with the U.N." which drew the support of Ceylon, Indonesia and Russia but did not find favour with the majority. The Security Council considered the question at seven open and three closed meetings between September 26, and October 13, 1956 at which Egypt made it clear that what she objected to was dictation and not negotiation, and accepted the six basic principles outlined in the resolution adopted. Between October 13 and 19, Secretary-General of the U.N. held negotiations with the Egyptian Foreign Minister and secured his agreement on arrangements for meeting the six requirements except for the right of complaining party to certain steps in self-protection. That is where the matters had stood, providing hope for early resolution of the Suez issue, when Britain and France engineered Israeli attack against Egypt to pave the way for their intervention. Russia, it may be noted here, had already warned the Security Council in a statement on September 15, 1956 of Anglo-French military preparations conducted with the support of the U.S. to exert pressuse on Egypt on the Suez issue.

The Security Council convened on October 30, 1956 at the request of the United States to consider 'the Palestine question: steps for the immediate cessation of the military action of Israel in Egypt'. Britain and France vetoed both the Russian and U.S. resolutions calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the General Armistice lines. The U. S. resolution had further "called upon all Members to refrain from the threat or use of force in the area, co-operate with the U. N. in maintaining armistice lines and to refrain from giving any military, economic or financial assistance to Israel so long as it had not complied with that resolution" and requested the Secretary-General 'to keep the Council informed on compliance with the resolution and make recommendations for the maintenance of international peace and security in the area'. Before the meeting adjourned, Yugoslavia suggested the possibility of calling an emergency session of the General Assembly under "Uniting for Peace" Assembly resolution 377 (v) and submitted a draft resolution to that effect at the

Council's next meeting on October 31, which was adopted by the Council the same day overruling the technical objections raised by France and Britain. Reports were also read out at the Security Council meeting on October 31, that Anglo-French planes had started bombing military targets in Egypt. British and French representatives told the Council that the action was 'temporary, designed to safeguard Suez Canal and restore peace in the Middle East'. The effect was, however, quite the opposite—the Suez became blocked to shipping and fighting became stepped up.

The General Assembly convened in emergency session on November 1, 1956 in pursuance of the Security Council decision of October 31 and held 7 plenary meetings between November 1 and 10, to discuss the question. On November 2, the Assembly adopted a U.S. draft resolution with 6 in favour, 5 against, and 6 abstaining calling for immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of Israeli forces behind armistice lines, halt to further military action and clearing of the Suez Canal. Britain and France, however, in flagrant violation of this resolution landed their armed forces in Port Said and also occupied Port Fuad. By then Israeli armed forces had also occupied Egyptian positions at the entrance of Gulf of Aqaba; they had occupied the whole of Sinai by Nov. 2, Gaza having been taken on Nov. 1. Britain and France notified the Secretary-General on Nov. 6, 1956, that they would stop further military operations only when Egypt and Israel unconditionally accepted the ceasefire under Nov. 2, resolution of the Assembly and he confirmed that the U.N. Emergency Force would be competent to secure the objectives of the resolution. Pending confirmation their forces would cease-fire at midnight of November 6 and 7, 1956. The Secretary-General gave the requisite assurances the next day when he also drew attention to the Israeli Prime Minister's statement that the Armistice Lines between Israel and Egypt had no validity and it would not permit U.N. Emergency Force to be stationed on its side of the lines.

The Assembly decided to create the Emergency Force on Nov. 5, 1956 by adopting a resolution moved by Canada, Colombia and Norway. A 4500 strong UNEF finally came into being and was stationed on the Egyptian side of the Armistice Demarcation line. It was more than an observers group but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it was stationed. The Soviet

delegate, however questioned the competence of the General Assembly to create the force. He contended Security Council alone could do that.

Afro-Asian nations thereafter took the lead in compelling Israel, Britain and France to pull out of the occupied areas where they had stayed put till November 23, 1956. British and French withdrawals were completed by December 22, 1956. Israel, however, invented one excuse after another to impede implementation of the resolution. On Jan 24, 1956 the U.N. Secretary-General reported that Israel had not complied with the resolution. It wanted Gaza strip to be administered by Israeli Police since it was used by the Fedayeen as a springboard for action against Israel and stipulated that withdrawals in Sharm el Sheikh area should be combined with ensuring free navigation in the straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba which it contended had the character of international waterways. It also wanted the UNEF to be stationed there.

The Secretary-General, however, firmly rejected Israeli arguments. He said that the U.N. could not condone a change in *status Juris* resulting from military action contrary to the Charter, nor could it assist in creation of situation contrary to Armistice Agreements. Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba were clearly Egyptian territories. Egypt, however on, its own allowed UNEF to be stationed in the area.

It took concerted Afro-Asian pressure and further U.N. resolutions to force the Israelis to withdraw to pre-war lines by March 8, 1957. The Israeli Foreign Minister, however, qualified his withdrawal from the Sharm el Sheikh area, with the confidence that there would be continued freedom of navigation for international and Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. The U.S. President Eisenhower, in his statement of Feb 20, 1957, had also strongly urged Israelis to withdraw and impliedly threatened to apply sanctions against Israel if she continued to defy UN. resolution.

The 1956 Israeli action made more acute the position and plight of refugees. Israel, became even more belligerent in defiance of the U.N. resolutions on the question which stipulated their rehabilitation in their original homes and compensation to those who had lost their property.

## Convention on The Free Navigation of the Suez Canal

*The European Powers and the Ottoman Empire*

October 29, 1888

(Signed by Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Spain, Britain and France on Oct. 29, 1888. The Convention became fully operative only after the conclusion of Anglo-French understanding of April 4, 1904—Ed.)

Art. 1. The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.

Consequently the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace.

The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade.

Art. II. The High Contracting Parties recognizing that the Fresh-Water Canal is indispensable to the Maritime Canal, take note of the engagements of His Highness the Khedive towards the Universal Suez Canal Company as regards the Fresh-Water Canal; which engagements are stipulated in a convention bearing date the 18th March 1863, containing an *expose* and four Articles.

They undertake not to interfere in any way with the security of that Canal and its branches, the working of which shall not be opposed to any attempt at obstruction.

Art. III. The High Contracting Parties likewise undertake to respect the plant, establishments, buildings, and works of the Maritime Canal and of the Fresh-Water Canal.

Art. IV. The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of Article 1 of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers.

Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in stores in the Canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly necessary. The transit of the aforesaid vessels through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible delay; in accordance with the Regulations in force, and without any other intermission than that resulting from the necessities of the service.

Their stay at Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez shall not exceed twentyfour hours, except in case of distress. In such case they shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of twentyfour hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent ship from one of the ports of access and the departure of a ship belonging to the hostile Power.

Art. V. In time of war belligerent Powers shall not disembark nor embark within the Canal and its ports of access either troops, munitions, or materials of war. But in case of an accidental hindrance in the Canal, men may be embarked or disembarked at the ports of access by detachments not exceeding 1,000 men, with a corresponding amount of war material.

Art. VI. Prizes shall be subjected, in all respects, to the same rule as the vessels of war of belligerents.

Art. VII. The Powers shall not keep any vessel of war in the waters of the Canal (including Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes),

Nevertheless, they may station vessels of war in the ports of access of Port Said and Suez, the number of which shall not exceed two for each power.

This right shall not be exercised by belligerents.

Art. VIII. The Agents in Egypt of the Signatory Powers of the present Treaty shall be charged to watch over its execution. In case of any event threatening the security or the free passage of the Canal, they shall meet on the summons of three of their number under the presidency of their Doyen, in order to proceed to the necessary verifications. They shall inform the Khedivial Government of the danger which they may have perceived, in order that Government may take proper steps to insure the protection and free use of the Canal. Under any circumstances, they shall meet once a year to take note of the due execution of the Treaty.

*'Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent Members at the 749th and 750th meetings of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security ;*

*Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly as provided in the General Assembly resolution 377 (V) in order to make appropriate recommendations.'*

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### **Call For Cease-fire To France And U K.**

*Resolution 997 (ES-I), as proposed by United States, (A/3256), adopted by Assembly on 4 November 1956.*

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Noting the disregard on many occasions by parties to the Israel-Arab Armistice Agreements of 1949 of the terms of such agreements, and that the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949,*

*"Noting that armed forces of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are conducting military operations against Egyptian territory,*

*"Noting that traffic through Suez Canal is now interrupted to the serious prejudice of many nations,*

*"Expressing its grave concern over these developments,*

*"1. Urges as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into area;*

*"2. Urges the parties to the Armistice Agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of Armistice Agreements;*

*"3. Recommends that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution;*

"4. *Urges* that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation;

"5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on the compliance with the present resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as they may deem appropriate in accordance with the Charter;

"6. *Decides* to remain in emergency session pending compliance with the present resolution."

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### **Directoins To Secretary-General**

Resolution 999 (ES-I), as submitted by 19 Powers, A/3275, adopted by Assembly on 4 November 1956;

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Noting* with regret that not all the parties concerned have yet agreed to comply with the provisions of its resolution 997 (ES-I) of November 1956,

*"Noting* the special priority given in that resolution to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, to the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area,

*"Noting* further that the resolution urged the parties to the Armistice Agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and observe scrupulously the provisions of the Armistice Agreements,

*"Reaffirms* its resolution 997 (ES-I), and once again calls upon the parties immediately to comply with the provisions of the said resolution;

"2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area, and requests him to report compliance forthwith and, in any case, not later than twelve hours from the time of adoption of the present resolution ;

"3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Chief of Staff and the members of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, to obtain compliance of the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines ;

"4. *Decides* to meet again immediately on receipt of the Secretary-General's report referred to in paragraph 2 of the present resolution".

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### **Call For Emergency Force Plan**

Resolution 998 (ES-I), as submitted by Canada, (A/3276) adopted by General Assembly on 4 November 1956.

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Bearing in mind* the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956,

*"Requests* as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the above-mentioned resolution."

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### **Establishment of U.N. Emergency Force**

*Resolution 1000 (ES-I) adopted by U.N. General Assembly on 5 November, 1956.*

*"The General Assembly*

*Having requested* the Secretary-General in its resolution 998(ES-I) of 4 November 1956, to submit to it a plan for an emergency international United Nations Force, for the purposes stated,

*Noting with satisfaction* the first report of the Secretary-General on the plan, and having in mind particularly paragraph 4 of that report,

1. *Establishes* a United Nations Command for an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostili-



ties in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956;

2. *Appoints*, on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Major General E. L. M. Burns, as Chief of the Command;

3. *Authorizes* the Chief of the Command immediately to recruit from the Observers Corps of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, a limited number of officers who shall be nationals of countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council, and further authorizes him in consultation with the Secretary-General to undertake the recruitment directly, from various Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council, of the additional number of officials needed;

4. *Invites* the Secretary-General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution."

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### Advisory Committee For Emergency Force

Resolution 1001 (ES-I), adopted by General Assembly on 7 November 1956;

"The General Assembly,

"*Recalling its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956 concerning the cease-fire, withdrawal of troops and other matters related to the military operations in Egyptian territory, as well as its resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956 concerning the request to the Secretary-General to submit a plan for an emergency international United Nations Force,*

"*Having established by its resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, a United Nations command for an emergency international Force, having appointed the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization as Chief of the Command with authorization to him to begin the recruitment of officers for the Command, and having invited the Secretary-General to take administrative measures necessary for the prompt execution of that resolution,*

"Noting with appreciation the second and final report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force as requested in General Assembly resolution 998 (ES-I), and having examined that plan,

"1. *Expresses its approval* of the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of the emergency international United Nations Force as expounded in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the Secretary-General's report ;

"2. *Concurs* in the definition of the functions of the Force as stated in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report ;

"3. *Invites* the Secretary-General to continue discussions with Governments of Member States concerning offers of participation in the force, toward the objective of its balanced composition ;

"4. *Requests* the Chief of the Command, in consultation with the Secretary-General as regards size and composition, to proceed forthwith with the full organization of the force ;

"5. *Approves provisionally* the basic rule concerning the financing of the Force laid down in paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's report ;

"6. *Establishes* an Advisory Committee composed of one representative from each of the following countries : Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway, and Pakistan, and requests this Committee, whose Chairman shall be the Secretary-General to undertake the development of those aspects of the planning for the Force and its operation not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which do not fall within the areas of the direct responsibility of the Chief of the Command ;

"7. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to issue all regulation and instructions which may be essential to the effective functioning of the Force, following consultation with the Committee aforementioned, and to take all other necessary administrative and execution action ;

"8. *Determines* that, following the fulfilment of the immediate responsibilities defined for it in operative paragraphs 6 and 7 above,

the Advisory Committee shall continue to assist the Secretary-General in the responsibilities falling to him under the present and other relevant resolutions,

"9. *Decides* that the Advisory Committee, in the performance of its duties, shall be empowered to request, through the usual procedures, the convening of the General Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters arise which, in its opinion, are of such urgency and importance as to require consideration by the General Assembly itself,

"10. *Requests* all Member States to afford assistance as necessary to the United Nations Command in the performance of its functions, including arrangements for passage to and from the area involved".

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### **Call For troops Withdrawal**

(Resolution 1002 (ES-I), as submitted by 19 Powers, A 3309, adopted by General Assembly on 7 November 1956)

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Recalling* its resolutions 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-I) and 999 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956 and 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, adopted by overwhelming majorities,

*"Noting in particular* that the General Assembly, by its resolution 1000 (ES-I), established a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of its resolution 997 (ES-I),

1. *Reaffirms* the above-mentioned resolutions;
2. *Calls once again upon* Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949;
3. *Calls once again upon* the United Kingdom and France immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory, consistently with the above-mentioned resolutions;
- "4. Urges the Secretary-General to communicate the present resolution to the parties concerned, and requests

him promptly to report to the General-Assembly on the compliance with this resolution”.

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### **Reference To Regular Session**

(Resolution 1003 (ES-I) as submitted by United States, A/3329, and as amended by sponsor, adopted by General Assembly on 10 November 1956).

*“The General Assembly,*

“1. *Decides* to place on the provisional agenda of its eleventh regular session, as a matter of priority, the question on the agenda of its first emergency special session;

“2. *Refers* to its eleventh regular session, for consideration, the records of the meetings and the documents of its first emergency special session;

“3. *Decides* that, notwithstanding paragraph 1 above, the first emergency special session may continue to consider the question, if necessary, prior to the eleventh regular session of the Assembly.”

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### **Regret on Troops Non-Withdrawal**

Resolution 1120 (XI), as submitted by 20 powers, (A/3385 Rev. 1) adopted by the General Assembly on 24 November 1956,

*“The General Assembly,*

“*Having received* the report of the Secretary-General on compliance with General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) and 1002 (ES-I) of 2 and 7 November 1956.

“*Recalling* that its resolution 1002 (ES-I) called upon Israel immediately to withdraw its forces behind the demarcation line established by the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949,

“*Recalling further* that the above-mentioned resolution also called upon France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland immediately to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory, in conformity with previous resolutions,

"1. *Notes with regret* that, according to the communications received by the Secretary-General, two-thirds of the French forces remain, all the United Kingdom forces remain although it has been announced that arrangements are being made for the withdrawal of one battalion, and no Israel forces have been withdrawn behind the armistice line although a considerable time has elapsed since the adoption of the relevant General Assembly resolutions;

"2. *Reiterates* its call to France, Israel and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to comply forthwith with resolutions 997 (ES-I) and 1002 (ES-I) of 2 and 7 November 1956 ;

"3. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to communicate the present resolution to the parties concerned, and to report without delay to the General Assembly on the implementation thereof."

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### Authority For Secretary-General

(Resolution 1121 (XI), as submitted by 6 powers, A/3386, adopted by Assembly on 24 November 1956)

"*The General Assembly,*

"*Having received* the report of the Secretary-General on basic points for the presence and functioning in Egypt of the United Nations Emergency Force ,

"*Having received also* the report of the Secretary-General on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal,

"1. *Notes with approval* the contents of the *aide memoire* on the basis for the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, as annexed to the report of the Secretary-General ;

"2. *Notes with approval* the progress so far made by the Secretary-General in connexion with arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal, as set forth in his report ;

"3. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to proceed with the exploration of practical arrangements and negotiation of agreements so that the clearing operations may be speedily and effectively undertaken."

### Approval of Secretary's Report

(Resolution 1126 (XI), as submitted by 10 powers, A/3542, adopted, by Assembly on 22 February 1957)

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Bearing in mind its resolutions 1000 (ES-I) and 1001 (ES-I) of 5 and 7 November 1956 concerning the United Nations Emergency Force ;*

*"Having received the report of the Secretary-General of 8 February 1957 on arrangements concerning the status of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt ;*

*"Notes with approval this report."*

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### Special Fund For Emergency Force

(Resolution 1122 (XI), as submitted by Secretary-General, A/3383 (Annex.) Rev. 1 adopted by Assembly on 26 November 1956).

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Having decided, in resolutions 1000 (ES-I) and 1001 (ES-I) of 5 and 7 November 1956, to establish an Emergency International United Nations Force (hereafter to be known as the United Nations Emergency Force) under a Chief of Command (hereafter to be known as the Command),*

*"Having considered and provisionally approved the recommendations made by the Secretary-General concerning the financing of the Force in paragraph 15 of his report of 6 November 1956 ;*

*"1. Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish a United Nations Emergency Force Special Account to which funds received by the United Nations, outside the regular budget, for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the Force shall be credited, and from which payment for this purpose shall be made ;*

*"2. Decides that the Special Account shall be established in an initial amount of \$ 10 million ;*

*"3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, pending the receipt of funds for the Special Account, to advance from the Working Capital*

Fund, such sums as the Special Account may require to meet any expenses chargeable to it ;

"4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish such rules and procedures for the Special Account and make such administrative arrangements as he may consider necessary to ensure effective financial administration and control of that Account ;

"5. *Requests* the Fifth Committee and, as appropriate, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to consider and, as soon as possible, to report on further arrangements that need to be adopted regarding the cost of maintaining the Force."

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### Decision About Finances

(Resolution 1089 (XI), as recommended by Fifth Committee, A/3560, adopted by Assembly on 21 December 1956)

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Recalling* its resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956 and 1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956 ,

*"Emphasizing* the fact that expenses incurred by the Secretary-General under the resolutions of the General Assembly are without prejudice to any subsequent determinations as to responsibilities for situations leading to the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force and to ultimate determination as to claims established as a result of expenses arising in connexion therewith ;

*"Considering* that the Secretary-General, in his report of 4 November 1956, particularly in paragraph 15, has stated that the question of how the Force should be financed required further study,

*"Considering* that the Secretary-General, in his reports dated 21 November and 3 December 1956, has recommended that the expenses relating to the Force should be apportioned in the same manner as the expenses of the Organization,

*"Considering further* that several divergent views, not yet reconciled, have been held by various Member States on

contributions or on the method suggested by the Secretary-General for obtaining such contributions,

*"Considering* that the Secretary-General has already been authorized to enter into commitments for the expenses of the Force up to an amount of \$ 10 million necessitates further study in all its aspects,

*Decides* that the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force, other than for such pay, equipment, supplies and services as may be furnished without charge by Governments of Member States, shall be borne by the United Nations and shall be apportioned among the Member States, to the extent of \$ 10 million, in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the General Assembly for contributions to the annual budget of the Organization for the financial year 1957;

*"2 Decides further* that this decision shall be without prejudice to the subsequent apportionment of any expenses in excess of \$ 10 million which may be incurred in connexion with the Force;

*"3. Decides* to establish a Committee composed of Canada, Ceylon, Chile, El Salvador, India, Liberia, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to examine the question of the apportionment of the expenses of the Force in excess of \$ 10 million, this Committee shall take into consideration, among other things, the discussions on this matter at the General Assembly, and shall study the question in all its aspects including the possibility of voluntary contributions, the fixing of maximum amounts for the expenses of the Emergency Force that, with prior approval by the General Assembly, could be established on each occasion, and the principle or the formulation of scales of contributions different from the scale of contributions by Member States to the ordinary budget for 1957. The committee will present its report as soon as possible".

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#### **Request For contributions**

(Resolution 1090 (xi), as recommended by Fifth Committee,



A/3560/Add.1, adopted by General Assembly on 27 February 1957)

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Recalling its resolution 1122 (xi) of 26 November 1956 authorizing the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force Special Account in an initial amount of \$ 10 million and its resolution 1019 (xi) of 21 December 1956 apportioning its initial \$ 10 million among the Member States in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the General Assembly for contributions to the annual budget of the Organization for 1957,*

*"Noting that the expenses of the Force already approved for 1957 represent a sizable increase in assessments placed on Member States, causing a grave unanticipated financial burden for many Governments,*

*"Acknowledging that certain Governments have borne without charge certain of the expenses of the Force, such as pay, equipment supplies and services,*

*"Noting nevertheless that the Secretary-General estimates that the expenses of the Force for 1957 will exceed the \$ 10 million previously assessed,*

*"Noting the request of the Secretary-General for authority to enter into commitments for the Force upto a total of \$ 16.5 million,*

*"Authorizes the Secretary-General to incur expenses for the United Nations Emergency Force upto of \$ 16.5 million in respect of the period up to 31 December 1957;*

*"Invites Member States to make voluntary contributions to meet the sum of \$ 16.5 million so as to ease the financial burden for 1957 on the membership as a whole;*

*"3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, pending receipt of contributions to the United Nations Emergency Force Special Account:*

*(a) To advance from the Working Capital Fund such sums as the Special Account may require to meet any expenses chargeable to it,*

(b) Where necessary, to arrange for loans to the Special Account from appropriate sources, including other funds under the control of the Secretary-General, provided that the repayment of any such advances of loans to the Special Account shall constitute a first charge against contributions as they are received, and further provided that such loans shall not affect current operational programmes

"4 *Decides* that the General Assembly, at its twelfth session shall consider the basis for financing any costs of the Force in excess of \$ 10 million not covered by voluntary Contributions."

### **Regret On Israeli Non-compliance**

Resolution 1123 (xi) as submitted by 25 Powers, A/350/Rev.1 adopted by General Assembly on 19 January 1957,

*The General Assembly,*

"*Recalling* its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-I) and 999 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956, 1002 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956 and 1120 (xi) of 24 November 1956,

"*Noting* the report of the Secretary-General of 10 January 1957.

"1 *Noies with regret and concern* the failure of Israel to comply with the terms of the above-mentioned resolutions,

"2 *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his efforts for securing the complete withdrawal of Israel in pursuance of the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report on such completion to the General Assembly, within five days,

### **Further call to Israel**

Resolution 1124 (xi), as submitted by seven Powers, A/3517, adopted by the General Assembly on 2 February 1957,

*"The General Assembly,*

"*Recalling* its resolutions 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, 998, (ES-I) and 999 to (ES-I) of 4 November 1956, 1002 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956, 1120 (xi) of 24 November 1956 and 1123 (xi) of 19 January 1957,

"1. *Deplores* the non-compliance of Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line despite the repeated requests of the General Assembly;

"2. *Calls upon* Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the Armistice demarcation line without further delay,

### **Call To Observe Armistice**

(Resolution 1125 (xi), as submitted by seven Powers, A/3518, adopted by General Assembly, on 2 February 1957)

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Having received* the report of the Secretary-General of 24 January 1957,

*"Recognizing* that withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions,

"1 *Notes with appreciation* the Secretary-General's report and the measure therein to be carried out upon Israel's complete withdrawal;

"2. *Calls upon* the Governments of Egypt and Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949;

"3. *Considers* that after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza areas, the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures proposed in the Secretary General's report with due regard to the considerations set out therein with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area;

*"Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties concerned, to take steps to carry out these measures and to report, as appropriate to the General Assembly,

### **Adjournment Of Session**

Resolution 1119 (xi), as submitted by seven Powers, A/3570, adopted by General Assembly on 8 March 1957,

*"The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* resolution 1109 (xi) of 15 February, 1957 concerning progress of the work of the eleventh session on the closing date of the session,

*"Having completed* consideration of all the items of its agenda with the exception of items 66 and 67,

*"Decides*, in accordance with rule 6 of the rules of procedure to adjourn its eleventh session temporarily and to authorize the President of the General Assembly, in consultation with the Secretary General and with the Member States the representatives of which are serving the General Committee during the session, to reconvene the General Assembly as necessary in order to consider further items 66 or 67."

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### SC Call Peace In Demilitarized Zone

Resolution, S/ 3942, as proposed by United Kingdom and United States, unanimously adopted by Security Council on 22 January 1958.

*"The Security Council,*

*"Recalling* its consideration on 6 September 1957, of the complaint of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan concerning activities conducted by Israel in the zone between the armistice demarcation lines in the area of Government House at Jerusalem,

*"Having considered* the report relating to the zone dated 23 September 1957, submitted in response to the Council's request by Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization,

*"Noting* that the status of the zone is affected by the provisions of General Armistice Agreement and that neither Israel nor Jordan enjoys sovereignty over any part of the zone (the zone being beyond the respective demarcation lines),

*"Motivated* by a desire to reduce tensions and avoid the creation of new incidents.

*"1. Directs* the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to regulate activities within the zone subject to such arrangements as may be made pursuant to the provisions

of the General Armistice Agreement and pursuant to paragraph 3 below, bearing in mind ownership of property there, it being understood that unless otherwise mutually agreed, Israelis should not be allowed to use Arab owned properties and Arabs should not be allowed to use Israeli-owned properties ;

"2. *Directs* the Chief of Staff to conduct a survey of property records with a view to determining property ownership in the zone ,

"3. *Endorses* the recommendations of the Acting Chief of Staff to the end that :

"(a) The parties should discuss through the Mixed Armistice Commission civilian activities in the zone ,

"(b) In order to create an atmosphere which would be more conducive to fruitful discussion, activities in the zone, such as those initiated by Israelis on 21 July 1957, should be suspended until such time as survey will have been completed and provisions made for the regulation of activities in the zone :

"(c) *Such* discussions should be completed within a period of two months, and

"(d) *The* Security Council should be advised of the result of the discussions ;

"4. *Calls upon* the parties to the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement to co-operate with the Chief of Staff and in the Mixed Armistice Commission in carrying out these recommendations pursuant to this resolution ;

"5. *Calls upon* the parties to the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement to observe article 3 of the Agreement and prevent all forces referred to in article 3 of the Agreement from passing over the armistice demarcation lines and to remove or destroy all their respective military facilities and installations in the zone,

"6. *Calls upon* the parties to use the machinery provided for in the General Armistice Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of that Agreement, and

"7. *Requests* the Chief of Staff to report on the implementation of this resolution.

## COST OF EMERGENCY FORCE

Resolution 1151 adopted by General Assembly on 22 November 1957,

*"The General Assmehly,*

*"Recalling its resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956, 1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956, 1125 (XI) 2 February 1957 and 1090 (XI) of 27 February 1957 concerning the establishment, organization, functioning and financing of the United Nations Emergency Force,*

*"Noting with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General on the Force dated 9 October 1957, and the effective assistance rendered by the Advisory Committee on the United Nations Emergency Force.*

*"Mindfull of the contribution of the Force to the maintenance of quiet in the area,*

*"1. Expresses its appreciations of the assistance rendered to the United Nations Emergency Force by Memembers of the United Nations which have contributed troops, and other support and facilities, and expresses the hope that such assistance will be continued as necessary ;*

*"2. Approves the principles and proposals for the allocation of costs between the organization and Members contributing troops as set forth in paragraphs 86, 88 and 91 of the report of the Secretary General, and authorizes the Secretary-General in connexion therewith to enter into such agreements as may be necessary for the reimbursement of appropriate extra and extraordinary costs to Members contributing troops ;*

*"Authorizes the Secretary-General to expend an additional amount for the Force, for the period ending 31 December 1957 up to a maximum of \$ 13.5 million and as necessary, an amount for the continuing operation of the Force beyond that date up to a maximum of \$ 25 million, subject to any decisions taken on the basis of the review provided for in paragraph 5 below.*

*"4. Decides that the expenses authorized in paragraph 3 above shall be borne by the Members of the United Nations in accordance with the scales of assessments adopted by the General Assembly for*

the financial year 1957 and 1958 respectively, such other resources as may have become available for the purpose in question being applied to reduce the expenses before the apportionment for the period ending 31 December 1957,

"5 Requests the Fifth Committee to examine, with the assistance of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and in the light of the present resolution, the cost estimates for maintaining the United Nations Emergency Force contained in the report of the Secretary-General, and to make such recommendations as it considers appropriate concerning the expenditure authorized under paragraph 3 above."

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**Appeal For Funds For UNRWA**

(Resolution 1315 (XIII), adopted by General Assembly on 12 December 1958)

*"The General Assembly,*

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957 and 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957,

"Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and in particular the observations relating to the expiration of the Agency's mandate on 30 June 1960, and noting the report of the advisory Commission of the Agency,

"Noting with regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), has not been effected and that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees and that, therefore, the situation of refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

*"Having reviewed the budget prepared by the Director and having noted the endorsement thereof by the Advisory Commission of the Agency,*

*"Noting with grave concern that contributions to the budget are not yet sufficient and that the financial situation of the Agency remains serious,*

*"Recalling that the Agency is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations,*

*"1. Draws the attention of Governments to the precarious financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges them to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions in order that the Agency may carry out relief and rehabilitation programmes for the welfare of the refugees ;*

*"2 Requests the Secretary-General, in view of the serious financial position of the Agency, to contribute, as a matter of urgent concern, his special efforts to secure the additional financial assistance needed to meet the Agency's budget and to provide adequate working capital ;*

*"3. Directs the Agency to pursue its programme for refugees bearing in mind the response to paragraph 1 and 2 above ;*

*"4. Requests the Director of the Agency, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), to plan and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees and, in particular, programmes relating to education and vocational training,*

*"5. Requests the host Governments to co-operate fully with the Agency and with its personnel and to extend to the Agency every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions ;*

*"6. Requests the Agency to continue its consultations with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interests of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III),*

*"7. Expresses its thanks to Mr. Henry R. Labouisse, Director of the Agency, for the devoted attention he has given to the affairs*



of the Agency and to the welfare of the refugees for the four years of his incumbency, to the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out its mandate, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;

"8. Requests the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV), as modified by paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 1018 (XI)."

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### Further Extension for UNRWA

*(Resolution 1456 (XIV), as submitted by Special Political Committee, A/4342, adopted by Assembly on 9 December 1959, meeting 851, by 80 votes to 0, with 1 abstention)*

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957 and 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958,

"Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, in particular the expiration of the Agency's mandate on 30 June 1960,

"Noting the recommendations of the Secretary-General and the Director of the Agency for the continuation of the Agency,

"Noting with regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, and that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

*"Having reviewed the Agency's budget and noting with concern that contributions from Member States are not sufficient ,*

*"Recalling that the Agency, as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys the benefits of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations ,*

*"1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a period of three years with a review at the end of the two years ;*

*"2. Requests the Governments concerned to co-operate with the Agency in efforts to rectify the situation described in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Director's report ;*

*"3. Requests the Director of the Agency to arrange with the host Governments the best means of giving effect to the proposals contained in paragraph 47 of his report ;*

*"4. Requests the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) ;*

*"5. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the Agency and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency can carry out its programmes ;*

*"6. Directs the Agency to continue its programme of relief for the refugees and, in so far as is financially possible, expand its programme of self-support and vocational training ;*

*"7. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees."*

### **Meeting Cost of UNEF**

*Resolution 1441 (XIV), as submitted by Fifth Committee A/43355, adopted by Assembly on 5 December 1959.*

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Recalling its resolutions 1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956, 1151*

(XII) of 22 November 1957 and 1337 (XIII), of 13 December 1958,

*"Having considered the observations made by Member States concerning the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force,*

*"Having examined the budget estimates for the Force submitted by the Secretary-General for the year 1960 and the observations and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions thereon in its eleventh and twenty-eighth reports to the General Assembly at its fourteenth session,*

*"Having noted with satisfaction that special financial assistance in the amount of about \$3,475,000 has been pledged voluntarily towards the expenditures for the Force in 1960,*

*Considering that it is desirable to apply voluntary contributions of special financial assistance in such a manner as to reduce the financial burden on those Governments which have the least capacity, as indicated by the regular scale of assessments, to contribute towards the expenditures for maintaining the Force,*

*"1. Authorizes the Secretary-General to expend up to a maximum of 20 million for the continuing operation of the United Nations Emergency Force during 1960 ;*

*"2. Decides to assess the amount of \$20 million against all Members of the United Nations on the basis of the regular scale of assessments, subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 and 4 below ;*

*"3. Decides that voluntary contributions pledged prior to 31 December 1959 towards expenditures for the Force in 1960 shall be applied as a credit to reduce by 50 percent the contributions of as many Governments of Member States as possible, commencing with those Governments assessed at the next highest percentages until the total of voluntary contributions has been fully applied ;*

*"4. Decides that, if Governments of Member States do not avail themselves of credits provided for in paragraph 3 above 1, then the amounts involved shall be credited to section 9 of the 1960 budget for the Force."*

### Assessment For UNEF

(Resolution 1575 (XV), adopted by Assembly on 20 December 1960)

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Recalling its resolutions 1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956, 1151 (XII) of 22 November 1957, 1337 (XIII) of 13 December 1968 and 1441 (XIV) of 5 December 1959,*

*"Having considered the observations made by Member States on the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force,*

*"Having examined the budget estimates for the Force submitted by the Secretary-General for the year 1961 and the observations and recommendations thereon of the Advisory Committee of Administrative and Budgetary Questions,*

*"Having noted with satisfaction that special financial assistance has been pledged voluntarily towards the expenditures for the Force in 1961,*

*"Considerin that it is desirable to apply voluntary contributions of special financial assistance in such a manner as to reduce the financial burden on those Governments which have the least capacity to contribute towards the expenditures for maintaining the Force,*

*"1. Authorizes the Secretary-General to expend up to a maximum of \$19 million for the continuing operation of the United Nations Emergency Force during 1961 ;*

*"2. Decides to assess the amount of \$19 million against all States Members of the United Nations on the basis of the regular scale of assessments, subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 and 4 below.*

*"Decides further that the voluntary contributions pledged prior to 31 December 1960, including those already announced and referred to in the fourth preambular paragraph above, shall be applied, at the requests of the Member States concerned made prior to 31 March 1961, to reduce by upto 50 per cent*

*" (a) The assessment that the Member States which were admitted during the fifteenth session of the General Assembly are*

required to pay for the financial year 1961 in accordance with Assembly resolution 1552 (XV) of 18 December 1960;

"(b) *The assessment of all other Member States receiving assistance during 1960 under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, commencing with those States assessed at the minimum of 0.04 per cent and then including, in order, those States assessed at the next highest percentages until the total amount of the voluntary contributions has been fully applied;*

"4 *Decides that, if Member States do not avail themselves of credits provided for in paragraph 3 above, the amounts involved shall be credited to Section 9 of the 1961 budget for the Force;*

"5. *Approves the recommendations set forth in paragraphs 67 to 70 of the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations Emergency Force concerning reimbursement of Governments in respect of supplies, material and equipment furnished to their contingents "*

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### **Call to Israel to Desist from Military Parade in Jerusalem**

*Resolution (S/4788) adopted by the Security Council on 11 April, 1961.*

#### *"The Security Council*

*Having considered the complaint submitted on 1 April 1961 by the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (document /S/4777),*

*Noting the decision of the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission of March 20, 1961 (document S/4776),*

1. *Endorses the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission of 20 March 1961,*

2. *Urges Israel to comply with this decision,*

*Requests the members of the Mixed Armistice Commission to co-operate so as to ensure that the General Armistice Agreement will be complied with."*

**Call to Conciliation Commission**

*Resolution 1604 (xv), adopted by General Assembly On 21 April 1961.*

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958 and 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959,*

*"Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 1959—30 June 1960,*

*"Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,*

*"1. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has not yet been able to report progress on carrying out the task entrusted to it in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV), and again requests the Commission to make efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and report thereon not later than 15 October 1961:*

*"2. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency can carry out its programmes:*

*"3. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate*

of the Agency, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees."

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**Reiteration of Principles of Repatriation and Compensation**

*(Resolution 1725 (XVI) adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1961).*

*"The General Assembly,*

*Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959 and 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961,*

*Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1960—30 June 1961,*

*Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,*

1. *Takes Note* of the efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, pursuant to the request contained in General Assembly resolutions 1456 (XIV) and 1604 (XV), to secure the implementation of Paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III) and:

(a) *Requests* the Commission to intensify its efforts for the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) and urges the Arab host Governments and Israel to co-operate with the Commission in this regard;

(b) Further requests the Commission to intensify its work on the identification and evaluation of Arab refugee immovable properties in Palestine as on 15 May 1948, and to make every effort to complete that work by 1 September 1962;

(c) Requests the Secretary-General to make available to the Commission such additional staff and administrative facilities as may be required;

*Directs attention* to the precarious financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges non-contributing Governments to contribute, and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions, so that the Agency can carry out its essential programmes;

*Expresses its thanks* to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees."

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### Further Denunciation of Israel

*Resolution S/5111 moved by U. K. & U. S. and adopted by the Security Council on April 9, 1962.*

*"The Security Council*

*Recalling* its resolution of 15 July 1948 and 18 May 1951,

*Having considered* the report of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization on the military activities in the Lake Tiberias area and the demilitarized Zone,

*Having heard* the statements of the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel,

*Being deeply concerned* over developments in the area which have taken place in violation of the Charter and of the Armistice Agreement,

*Recalling* in particular the provisions of Article 2, paragraph



4 of the Charter, and Article 1 of the Syrian-Israel General Armistice Agreement;

*Noting with satisfaction* that a cease-fire has been achieved,

1. *Deplores* the hostile exchanges between the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel starting on 8 March 1962 and calls upon the two Governments concerned to comply with their obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter by refraining from the threat as well as the use of force ;

2. *Reaffirms* the Security Council resolution of 19 January 1956 which condemned Israeli military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreement, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation ;

3. *Determines* that the Israeli attack of 16-17 March 1962 constitutes a flagrant violation of that resolution and calls upon Israel scrupulously to refrain from such action in the future ;

4. *Endorses* the measures recommended by the Chief of Staff for the strengthening of the Truce Supervision Organization in its tasks of maintaining and restoring the peace and of detecting and deterring future incidents and calls upon the Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist the Chief of Staff in their early implementation ;

5. *Calls upon* both parties to abide scrupulously by the cease-fire arranged by the Chief of Staff on 17 March 1962 ;

6. *Calls for* strict observance of article 5 of the General Armistice Agreement which provides for the exclusion of armed forces from the demilitarized zone and Annex 4 of that Agreement which sets limits on forces in the Defensive Area, and calls upon the Governments of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to co-operate with the Chief of Staff in eliminating any violations thereof ;

7. *Calls upon* the Governments of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to co-operate with the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in carrying out his responsibilities under the General Armistice Agreement and the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council and urges that all steps necessary for reactivating the Mixed Armistice Commission and for making full use of the Mixed Armistice machinery be promptly taken ;

for the re-integration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

1. *Expresses its sincere appreciation* to Dr. John H. Daves, on the occasion of his resignation as Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. In the Near East, for his efficient administration of the Agency during past five years and for his dedicated service to the welfare of the refugees;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized Agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees,

3. *Requests* the Secretary General to provide the staff and facilities that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine may require in carrying out its work;

4. *Calls upon* the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to continue its efforts for the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III),

5. *Again directs attention* to the precarious financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges non-contributing Governments to contribute, and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions, so that the Agency can carry out its essential programmes'.

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### Further Extension for UNRWA

*Resolution 2002 (XIX) as proposed by Assembly Presided by adopted on 10 February 1965 with no objection.*

*"The General Assembly*

Recalling its resolution 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, by which it extended the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East until 30 June 1965,

*Having noted the statement of the Secretary-General at the 1327th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 8 February 1965,*

*Decides to extend the mandate of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a further year upto 30 June 1966, without prejudice to the interested parties"*

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### **Directions for Rectification of Refugee Rolls**

*Resolution 2052 (XX) as submitted by Nigeria and adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1965.*

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 December 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963 and 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965,*

*Noting the annual reports of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1964 to 30 June 1965,*

1. *Notes with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the re-integration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;*

2. *Expresses its thanks to the Commissioner-General and the Staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to*

provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Directs attention* to the critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

4. *Notes with regret* that contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East have not thus far been sufficient to enable the Agency to cover its essential budget requirements;

5. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report;

6. *Directs* the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to take such measures including rectification of the relief rolls—a problem which has been and continues to be of major concern to the General Assembly—as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need;

*Calls upon* the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to intensify its efforts for the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) and to report thereon as appropriate and not later than 1 October 1966;

8. *Decides* to extend until 30 June 1969, without prejudice to the provisions of Paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East."

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**Call to Implement Resolution on Refugee's Repatriation**

*General Assembly Resolution A/Res/2154, adopted on November 17, 1966.*

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912 (XIII) of 3 December 1963, 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965 and 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965.

*Noting* the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966,

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration or resettlement and that, therefore the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern ;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialised agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Directs attention* to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report ;

4. *Notes with concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General in collecting additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds to cover essential budget requirements ;

## CHAPTER X

### The 1967 Aggression And Its Aftermath

The eleven-year disturbed peace on Arab-Israel borders burst into open war on June 5, 1967 when Israel launched a massive, unprovoked surprise air and military attack on UAR, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. Highly sophisticated weapons were utilized by Israel to destroy air-strips first to prevent fighters taking to the air. The war lasted just six days but brought untold havoc and misery in the areas affected with the Israelis unscrupulously employing out-lawed weapons of war such as the napalm bombs on civilian targets and indulging in brutalities forcing another 400,000 Arabs to become refugees.

The Israeli aggression bore out the charge made by Syria in a letter to the Security Council on Jan. 10, that Israel was 'provoking incidents to make subsequent large-scale aggression look like the outcome of these actions.' The letter was written after serious armed clashes in the Galilee border. The fighting flared up again in April. Cultivation in the demilitarized zone by Israelis provided the provocation for the incidents.

On May 9, the Defence and Policy Committee of Israeli Parliament-Knesset-granted the Government powers to undertake military operations against Syria. Massive concentration of Israeli forces on the Syrian border followed, forcing mobilization of Syrian forces and steps by UAR to meet its obligations under its Joint Defence Treaty with Syria. The Soviet Union, in a statement issued on May 23, also charged Israel with "aggravating tensions with direct and indirect encouragement from imperialist circles to bring back colonial oppression to Arab soils.' That Israel had planned to launch a massive attack on Syria on the pretext of following in pursuit the Arab Fedayeens operating in that country was confirmed by Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin in talks with the UAR War Minister, Shams-ed-din Badran, in Moscow between May 26 and 28, 1967. Request for withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Force from Gaza and Sinai was made by UAR to be in a position to

meet its obligations under the Joint Defence treaty with Syria. The UN Secretary-General acceded to the request on May 19, and ordered the UNEF to cease operations in preparation for a final pullout. Israel which had opposed the stationing of U.N. troops on its side of the border strongly protested against Secretary-General's action. But

U. Thant rightly stated that the UAR was perfectly within its rights to demand withdrawal of the UNEF and they could not stay there without its consent. The UNEF, he stressed, was 'a peace-keeping-not an enforcement operation.' Israel ordered its tanks to move to Sinai on May 20 and called up 12,30,000 reserves. The same day the U.N. Secretary-General announced his visit to Cairo on May 22, in a bid to ease the situation. He subsequently held talks with the UAR leaders in Cairo on May 23 to 25 and reported about it to the Security Council on May 27, 1967.

The UAR President, Mr. Gamal Abd-al Nasser, in a speech at an air base in Sinai on May 22, 1967, declared that 'our sovereignty, over the Gulf of Aqaba is not negotiable' and that UAR would bar Israeli shipping in the Straits of Tiran and halt other ships to ensure against strategic supplies for Israel. Israel reacted the following day that it would treat the blockade as an act of aggression. The U.S. President Johnson also in a statement issued on May 23, 1967 expressed 'dismay' at the withdrawal of the UNEF and said that the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba were international waterways and their blockade would be illegal. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, backed the UAR's right to block the straits as they constituted its territorial waters. The UAR Foreign Minister, Mr. Riad, told the U.S. Ambassador Mr. Nolte the same day 'We shall consider you as partners if Israel carries out aggression against any Arab country,' while rejecting a 5-point plan suggested by President Johnson for peace in the region which inter alia provided for U.N. administration of Gaza, UNEF return to Sinai, free passage of all shipping in the straits and pull out of the troops from the borders. On May 22, U.S. advised its nationals not to visit Israel, Syria and Jordan and on May 25, asked its nationals to leave the countries concerned and dependents of diplomats to leave in view of the growing crisis. Build-up of Israeli and Arab troops meanwhile continued in the region.

The Israeli aggression made all the Arab States declare war on Israel. The U.S.A, Britain and France, in separate statements pledged to remain neutral in the conflict. The USSR denounced Israeli aggression and backed the Arabs. The UAR closed Suez canal to Britain and U.S. and later sinking of ships in the canal blocked its use to all. Syria, Sudan and Iraq also broke off relations with Britain and the U.S. A on June 6.

A call for immediate cease-fire presented by its President, Hans Tabor of Denmark was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on June 6. The Council continued in session till June 12, and three more resolutions were adopted by it to bring the fighting to an end in three stages, with Jordan accepting the cease-fire on June 7, UAR on June 8 and Syria on June 9-10, 1967. In the Security Council meeting USSR demanded denunciation of Israel as an aggressor and steps to compel it to withdraw its troops from the Arab territories. The Tass in a statement on June 7, said that the U.S. was delaying action by Security Council to enable Israel to capture whole of Gaza strip. The Anglo-U.S. opposition to the condemnation of Israel as an aggressor further increased Arab suspicions of their collusion with Israel. Izvestia charged that President Johnson and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson had jointly worked out the strategy of Israeli aggression. The U. S. Delegate Goldberg, however, denied the charge and offered to have investigation by the U. N. anytime.

With whole of Sinai, Gaza, West Bank of Jordan, and part of Syria under its control Israel adopted a haughty and defiant attitude in the United Nations. Its Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, declared in the Security Council on June 6, 1967 that the fighting had destroyed the status quo and there would be no return to Armistice Agreement of 1949. 'Israel would demand formal recognition and face to face negotiations of political differences leading to hostilities, would not tolerate blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and would accept no dwarfish status with face on the Mediterranean only.' The Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol in a statement on June 12, formally renounced the 1949 border and declared : "Be under no illusion that Israel is prepared to return to situation that reigned upto a week ago."

The USSR broke off its relations with Israel on June 10, in view of continued Israeli aggression against Arab States and gross violation



of Security Council decision. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia followed suit. Leaders of these six Communist nations and GDR had in a joint statement in Moscow on June 9, denounced the Israeli aggression which, in their, view was the "result of collusion of certain imperialist Powers and first of all the United States" and lent full support to the Arab cause. Cuba, China Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in official statements denounced the Israeli expansionism and lent full support to the Arabs.

The USSR summoned an emergency session of the General Assembly on June 14 which continued in session till July 21, and adopted resolutions urging Israel not to alter the status of Jerusalem.

The Foreign Ministers of 13 Arab States met in Kuwait on June 17 and 18 to map out their strategy for meeting the situation by Israeli aggression. The Kuwait Foreign Minister, Sheikh Sabah Al Jabar, opening the conference said that the Israeli strategy was to 'use aggression as a means for bargaining a solution that guarantees the aggressor permanent settlement in our homeland.' King Hussein of Jordan said "it was a turning point for the better in Arab history" and suggested an Arab summit in Khartoum which proposal was accepted by the conference. Algerian Foreign Minister, Abdul Aziz Bouteflika, disclosed that "the USSR had given a firm commitment to Algerian President Houari Boumedienne to give every assistance to the Arabs in wiping out the traces of Israeli aggression."

The Khartoum summit conference of Heads of Arab States and their representatives was held from August 29 to Sept 1, 1967. The conference adopted resolutions pledging continued non-military struggle against Israel, creating at 140 million Arab Fund to assist the war-ravaged economies of the UAR and Jordan, lifting the Arab oil boycott of the West, and on the UAR-Saudi Arabia agreement to end civil war in Yemen.

The resolution adopted on Israeli aggression said that "the conference agreed to unified efforts at international and diplomatic levels to eliminate the consequences of aggression and to assure the withdrawal of aggressor forces of Israel from Arab lands, but within the limits to which the Arab States are committed": No peace with Israel

no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel and maintenance of the right of Palestine people in their nation.' The ruling Syrian Baath Party in its manifesto adopted in a conference in Damascus between September 4 and 6, 1967 declared that 'armed struggle remained the only means for the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression and the liberation of Palestine.'

Two five-point plans for peace-settlement in the Middle East were presented by the U.S. President, Lyndon B. Johnson, and the Yugoslav President, Marshal Tito on June 19 and August 10, 1967 respectively. President Johnson in an address to National Foreign Policy Conference For Educationists in Washington proposed (1) recognition of national life; (2) progress in solving refugee problem; (3) freedom of navigation; (4) limit on arms, and (5) respect for political independence and territorial integrity of States in the region.

Marshal Tito, who visited UAR, Syria, and Iraq from August 10-17, 1967 proposed (1) Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories; (2) opening of Suez to all ships with Israeli ships navigating under the flag of a third nation or under the U.N. flag; (3) retention of Gulf of Aqaba by the UAR with free passage for Israel ships; (4) full indemnification for Palestine refugees and (5) an end to Arab state of belligerency. The plan was rejected by Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, on Sept. 1, 1967 as "one-sided and unauthorized." Arabs were prepared to discuss the plan, but considered it unfruitful in view of its outright rejection by Israel.

It took months for the Security Council finally to adopt a resolution on November 22, 1967 calling for withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied lands; free navigation in international waterways; and end of belligerency. Arabs readily accepted the resolution but Israel went no further than making an ambiguous positive response to the proposal. In practice instead of creating conditions for implementation of the resolution, it took measures such as colonization of the occupied territories, maltreatment and repression of Arab inhabitants to force them to flee the land, changing on Feb 8, 1968 the status of Jerusalem, and title of Arab territories from 'enemy territories' to 'military occupied territories.' It also provoked clashes on the borders and conducted in May a military parade in Jerusalem in utter disregard of Security Council's resolution forbidding that

and open daylong military raids into Jordan as on March 21, 1968 on the pretext of fighting out the Fedayeen in violation of the U.N. Charter for which it was condemned by resolutions of the Security Council in 1968. Suez clearance operations had also to be cancelled on June 30, 1968, because of Israeli gunfire.

An important statement on the Arab attitude on the Middle East settlement was made by King Hussein of Jordan in an appearance on the Columbia TV System in New York on November 5, 1967. He said that "from the U.N. standpoint there was only one legal Israel and that is the one created by the partition of Palestine in 1947. There would be peace if developments led to dezionization of Israel. There would always be a place for Jews in the Arab world."

The King said that, 'a strong, dominant military expansionist element had controlled Israel's politics since its creation,' and drew attention to the "fact that far from being a small, religious State, Israel has proved to be a powerful military one with ambitions far beyond its borders. If it wanted peace it should communicate on the level of culture and civility and not war planes and tanks." Withdrawals must precede any talks and Israel must propose a solution to the refugee problem and return occupied territories if it wanted to become a respectable neighbour. King Hussein further observed that "Israel is a present fact of life, we may not like it and may choose not to recognize it. But we recognize the right of all to live in peace and security." He also said that 'if right conditions were reached in general solution of the Middle East impasse, the UAR President would be prepared to grant Israeli ships navigational rights in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.' Israel he stressed must become more Eastern than Western if it wanted to live in peace. The Jordan King claimed that he spoke for all Arabs. The UAR Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammed Hussein El Zayyat in a Press interview in Cairo on November 8, 1967 drew attention to Article 1 of Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement stating that right of each Party to security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be respected, in support of King Hussein's observation that Israel was a present fact of life. Syrian Government in a statement on November 10, however, challenged the King's claim to speak for all Arabs. It said Syria stood by the statement in Baath Party's Manifesto of September 6, 1967 on the question.

Ambassador Gunnar. V. Jarring of Sweden was designated on November 23, 1967 Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General to promote a settlement of the question in the Middle East. He began his mission in December 1967 with Headquarters in Cyprus which were shifted to New York in May 1968. The progress of his mission was obstructed by Israel's insistence on direct talks and Arabs' refusal on the ground, as aptly put by the UAR's Mr. El Zayyat, that 'Israel was the creation of force and a U.N. resolution, not direct talks and hence any peace negotiations must be through the U.N.' The Jarring Mission was also obstructed by Israeli stand reflected in Premier Eshkol's declaration of June 22, 1968 that Jordan River must form the Security border'. Israeli attacks on Jordan and clashes with UAR troops on the Suez Canal further aggravated matters.

On September 25, 1968, the U.S. State Department disclosed a Soviet Plan for peace in the Middle East proposing (1) Israeli withdrawals from the occupied territories; (2) U.N. presence in the area evacuated by Israel; (3) end to the state of belligerency by countries in the region; and (4) guarantee of further peace in the Middle East by the USSR, the USA, Britain and France. The plan was rejected by Israel the following day. Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, on October 8, 1968 in a speech before the General Assembly outlined a nine-point plan which the Arabs rejected as a 'deceitful manoeuvre for the surrender of Arab nations, presenting nothing new and in fact trying to take the refugee issue out of the U.N.'

The Jarring Mission virtually came to an end on November 6, 1968 with the withdrawal of the UAR and Jordanian Foreign Ministers from talks in New York, which had gone on for six weeks, in search for a settlement. The deadlock was caused by Israeli failure to answer two simple questions put to it through Dr Jarring by the UAR Foreign Minister, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, whether Israel was prepared to implement the U.N. resolution of November 22, 1967, and whether Israel was prepared to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories. The Israeli Foreign Minister Mr. Eban said Israel would reveal its intentions only in direct talks. That left little doubt in the Arabs' mind that Israel was not willing to implement the

resolution and wanted to continue enjoying the gains of aggression. Israeli Premier, Levi Eshkol, further lent strength to the view by stating in the Israeli Parliament, Knesset, on November 5, 1968 that 'no foreign troops would be allowed to cross the West Bank of Jordan territory, whatever peace treaty might be signed in the future.'

In an interview in New York the UAR Foreign Minister said that there were 'no signs that Israel was willing to implement the Nov. 22, 1967 resolution—all resolution not parts of it.' He had wanted to know if Israel accepted the principle of withdrawal and had not proposed any time-limit. The UAR in fact had advised Jarring on May 9, that it would agree to a timetable for its implementation, if arranged by him.

Mr Riad said that UAR's borders with Palestine from where Israelis set out to occupy the Sinai peninsula were not negotiable. 'The UAR had no objection to demilitarized zones on its borders with Israel provided that they were on both sides, it could not accept any part of Sinai to be demilitarized if Israel refused to accept that the same measures would be put into force in Israel, he added. The UAR had also no objection to stationing of UNEF on its side as part of the a peace plan.

The French Foreign Minister, Mr. Debre, addressing the National Assembly said that the Jarring Mission had failed to make progress while the Israeli Government still seems to cling to the desire for a direct dialogue. He added: "The Big Powers must reach an understanding to guarantee a reasonable solution and impose its observation. We are prepared to commit ourselves to a system of guarantees arising out of an agreement to apply the correct principles of international law in this part of the world." This was in line with French President De Gaulle's statement of June 21, 1967 in which he had denounced Israel for the aggression and proposed Big Powers' guarantee for peace.

Concern over Israeli occupation of Arab territories was expressed by the Shahinshah of Iran in the Majlis during 1967. He said Iran was opposed to destruction of any Member State of the U.N. but the world must not permit any one to enjoy the fruits of aggression.

In his report on the 20th anniversary celebration of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pyongyang on Sept. 7, 1968, the DPRK Premier Marshal Kim Il Sung lent full support

to the liberation struggle of Palestinian people.

Prime Minister Kim Il Sung said: 'The Korean people give resolute support to the people of the United Arab Republic, Syria and other Arab countries in their struggle against the armed aggression of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, Israeli expansionists, for defending national independence and building a new life. Our people give full support to the Palestinian people in their struggle against the imperialists led by the U.S. imperialists and the Israeli expansionists for the liberation and independence of their fatherland.'

No progress could either be made with regard to the implementation of Security Council's resolution of September 27, 1968 urging the dispatch of a Special Representative to Arab territories under Israel because of Israel's insistence that like the Gussing Mission of 1967 it should cover the Jewish minorities in Arab lands too. U. Thant, however, told the Permanent Representative of Israel in a letter on October 7, that operative paragraph 1, of the resolution referred exclusively to the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel "and that it is not within the discretion of the Secretary-General to modify the requirements of a Security Council resolution or to concur in a course of action less than or different from what is called for in that resolution."

The Secretary-General, accordingly, informed the Security Council on October 14, 1968, that Israeli Permanent Representative's letter of October 4, 1968 afforded him no basis for the dispatch of Special representative in accordance with the clear intention of Security Council resolution 259.

Suggestions for Gunnar Jarring making his own proposals to break the deadlock created by Israeli attitude, withdrawal of US and Russian fleets from the Mediterranean and application of sanctions against Israel and if necessary military measures to enforce November 22, 1967 resolution were made on the observance of its anniversary in Arab, Spanish-Italian and Russian quarters respectively. Gunnar Jarring returned to Cyprus on November 28, 1968 to make another bid to break the Arab-Israeli deadlock but there appeared little prospect of success for his mission.

### **Council's Call For Cease-fire**

*Resolution 233 Adopted by the Security Council at its 1348th meeting on 6 June 1967.*

*"The Security Council,*

*Noting the oral report of the Secretary-General in this situation,*

*Having heard the statements made in the Council,*

*Concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with the menacing situation in the Near East,*

*1. Calls Upon the Governments concerned as a first step to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area ;*

*2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation."*

—o—

### **Deadline for Cease-fire**

*Resolution 234 Adopted by the Security Council at its 1350th meeting on 7 June 1967.*

*"The Security Council,*

*Noting that in spite of its appeal to the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the Near East (resolution 233 (1967)), military activities in the area are continuing,*

*Concerned that the continuation of military activities may create an even more menacing situation in the area,*

*1. Demands that the Governments concerned should as a first step ceasefire and discontinue all military activities at 20.00 hours GMT on 7 June 1967;*

*2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation."*

**Demand For Immediate Halt To Fighting**

*Resolution 235 Adopted by the Security Council at the 1352nd meeting on 9 June 1967.*

*"The Security Council,*

*Recalling its resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967),*

*Noting that the Governments of Israel and Syria have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,*

*Noting the statements made by the representatives of Syria and Israel,*

*1. Confirms its previous resolutions about immediate cease-fire and cessation of military action ;*

*2. Demands that hostilities should cease forthwith ;*

*3. Requests the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report to the Security Council not later than two hours from now. ;*

—o—

**Denunciation of Cease-fire Violations**

*Resolution Adopted by the Security Council at its 1357th meeting on 12 June 1967*

*"The Security Council,*

*Taking note of the oral reports of the Secretary-General on the situation between Israel and Syria made at the 1354th, 1355th, 1356th and 1357th meetings and the supplemental information supplied in documents S/7930 and Add, 1-3,*

*1. Condemns any and all violations of the cease-fire;*

*2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his investigations and to report to the Council as soon as possible ;*

*3. Affirms that its demand for a cease-fire and discontinuance of all military activities includes a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent to the cease-fire;*



4. Calls for the prompt return to the cease-fire positions of any troops which may have moved forward subsequent to 16.30 GMT on 10 June 1967 ;

5. *Calls for full co-operation with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine and the observers in implementing the cease-fire, including freedom of movement and adequate communications facilities*".

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### **Observance Of Geneva Convention**

*Resolution 237 Adopted by the Security Council at its 1351st meeting on 14 June 1967.*

*"The Security Council,*

*Considering the urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the Middle East from additional sufferings,*

*Considering that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,*

*Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of war should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict,*

1. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

2. *Recommends* to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civil persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council."

—o—

### Concern At Israeli Action In Jerusalem

*Resolution 2253 (ESV) adopted by 5th emergency Special Session on July 4, 1967.*

*"The General Assembly,*

*Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city ;*

*1. Considers that these measures are invalid,*

*2. Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem ;*

*3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the situation and the implementation of present resolution not later than one week from its adoption".*

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### Assembly's Call To Israel Not To Alter Status of Jerusalem

*Text of the Resolution 2254 (ESV) by General Assembly on July 14, 1967*

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Recalling its resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,*

*"Having received the report submitted by the Secretary-General (A/6753 and S/8052),*

*"Taking note with the deepest regret and concern of the non-compliance by Israel of resolution 2253 (ES-V),*

*"1. Deplores the failure of Israel to implement resolution 2253 (ES-V);*

*"2. Reiterates its call to Israel in that resolution to rescind all the measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;*

“3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security-Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution.”

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**Request To Regular Session**

*The following is the text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 21 July 1967*

*“The General Assembly,*

*“Having considered the grave situation in the Middle East,*

*“Considering that the Security Council continues to be seized of the problem.*

*“Bearing in mind the resolutions adopted and the proposals considered during its fifth emergency special session.*

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to forward the records of the fifth emergency special session to the Security Council in order to facilitate the resumption by the Council, as a matter of urgency, of its consideration of the tense situation in the Middle East.”

—o—

**Further Condemnation of Middle East Cease-fire Violations**

*Text of Resolution adopted by the Security Council on October 25, 1967*

*“The Security Council,*

*“Gravely concerned over recent military activities in the Middle East carried out in spite of the Security Council resolutions ordering a cease-fire,*

*“Having heard and considered the statements made by the parties concerned,*

*“Taking into consideration the information on the said activities provided by the Secretary-General in documents S/7930/Add. 43, Add. 44, Add. 45, Add. 46, Add. 47, Add. 48 and Add. 49.*

“1. *Condemns* the violations of the cease-fire.

"2. *Regrets* the casualties and loss of property resulting from the violations;

"3. *Reaffirms* the necessity of the strict observance of the cease-fire resolutions:

"4. *Demands* of the Member States concerned to cease immediately all prohibited military activities in the area, and to cooperate fully and promptly with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)."

—O—

### **SC Call for Withdrawal By Israelis And for End of Belligerency By Arabs**

*Text Of British Resolution 242 Adopted By The Security Council On November 22, 1967*

*"The Security Council,*

(1) *Expressing* its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

(2) *Emphasizing* the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

3. *Emphasizing* further that all Member-States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

4. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency, and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

(B) *Affirms* further the necessity

(i) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area,

(ii) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem,

(iii) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones ;

(C) Requests the Secretary-General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

(D) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the effort of the special representative as soon as possible."

—o—

### **General Assembly Resolution on Aid To Refugees**

*Text of Resolution No A/Res/2341/ (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly at its plenary meeting on Dec. 19, 1967*

*"The General Assembly*

*Recalling* its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950 512 (VI) and 513 (VI), of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963, 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965, 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965 and 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966,

*Noting* the Annual Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period from 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967,

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation and compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern ;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner General and the Staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Directs* the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need;

4. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means to achieve progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof;

5. *Directs* attention to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report.

6. *Notes with concern* that despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements ;

7. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report and therefore, urges non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contribution;

B

*The General Assembly*

Recalling its resolution 2252 (ES-V), of 4 July 1967,

*Taking Note* of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 15 September 1967,

*Taking Note* also of the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967,

*Concerned* about the continued human suffering as a result of the recent hostilities in the Middle East,

1. Reaffirms its resolution 2252, (ES-V),

2. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of that resolution, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of recent hostilities,

3. *Appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and to individuals to make special contributions for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned".

—o—

**Warning To Israel To Desist From Acts of Aggression**

Text of Resolution 248 (1968) Adopted by the Security Council at its 1407th meeting on 24 March 1968.

"The Security Council,

*Having heard* the statements of the representatives of Jordan

and Israel,

*Having noted* the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representatives of Jordan and Israel in documents S/8470, S/8478, S/8483, S/8484 and S/8486,

*Having noted further* the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO as contained in documents S/7930/Add. 64 and Add. 65,

*Recalling* resolution 236 (1967) by which the Security Council condemned any and all violations of the cease-fire,

*Observing* that the military action by the armed forces of Israel on the territory of Jordan was of a large-scale and carefully planned nature,

*Considering* that all violent incidents and other violations of the cease-fire should be prevented and not overlooking past incidents of this nature,

*Recalling further* resolution 237 (1967) which called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place,

1. *Deplores* the loss of life and heavy damage to property ;
2. *Condemns* the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions ;
3. *Deplores* all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire and declares that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts ;

—o—

### **Call Against Parade In Jerusalem**

*Text of Security Council, resolution (No 250) adopted at its 147th meeting on 27 April 1968.*



*"The Security Council,*

*Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel,*

*Having considered the Secretary-General's note (S/8561) particularly his note to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations,*

*Considering that the holding of a military parade in Jerusalem will aggravate tensions in the area and will have an adverse effect on a peaceful settlement of the problem in the area,*

1. *Calls Upon* Israel to refrain from holding the military parade in Jerusalem which is contemplated for 2 May 1968,

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution."

—o—

### **Regret on Israeli Violation of Resolution**

*(Text of resolution No 251 adopted by the Security Council at its 1420th meeting on May 2, 1968).*

*"The Security Council,*

*Noting the Secretary-General's reports of 26 April (S/8561) and 2 May 1968 (S/8567),*

*Recalling* resolution 250 (1968) of 27 April 1968,

*Deeply deplores* the holding by Israel of the military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968 in disregard of the unanimous decision adopted by the Council on 27 April 1968,

—o—

### **Condemnation of Israel And Call for Rescinding Measures in Jerusalem**

*Text of Resolution 252 (1968) Adopted by the Security Council at its 1426th meeting on 21 May 1968*

*"The Security Council,*

*Recalling* General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967.

*Having considered the letter (S/8560) of the Permanent*

Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem and the report of the Secretary-General (S/8146),

*Having heard* the statements made before the Council,

*Noting* that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions, Israel has taken further measures and actions in contravention of those resolutions,

*Bearing in mind* the need to work for a just and lasting peace,

*Reaffirming* that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

1. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to comply with the General Assembly resolutions mentioned above ;

2. *Considers* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status ;

3. *Urgently Calls upon* Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem ;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution."

### **Condemnation Of Israeli Violation Of UN Charter**

*Text of Security Council resolution (256) adopted at its 1440th meeting on 16 August 1968.*

*The Security Council,*

*Having heard* the statements of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel,

*Having noted* the contents of the letters of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel in documents S/8616, 8617, S/8721 and S/8724,

*Recalling its* previous resolutions 248 (1968) condemning the

military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and cease-fire resolutions and deploring all violent incidents and violations of the cease-fire,

*Considering* that all violations of the cease-fire should be prevented,

*Observing* that both massive air-attacks by Israel on Jordan territory were of a large-scale and carefully planned nature in violation of resolution 248 (1968),

*Gravely concerned* about the deteriorating situation resulting therefrom,

1. Reaffirms its resolution 248 (1968), which *inter alia*, declares that "grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts ;"

2. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property;

3. Considers that premeditated and repeated military attacks endanger the maintenance of the peace ;

4. Condemns the further military attacks launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and resolution 248 (1968) and warns that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would duly take note of the failure to comply with the present resolution.

—o—

### **Call To Observe Cease fire**

Text of Resolution 258 (1968) Adopted by the Security Council at its 1452nd Meeting on 18 September 1968.

*"The Security Council,*

*Recalling* the declaration of the President of the Security Council of 9 September 1968, as made at the 1448th meeting of the Council,

*Gravely concerned* with the deteriorating situation in the Middle East,

*Convinced* that all Members of the United Nations should co-operate towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East,

1. *Insists* that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in its resolutions must be rigorously respected ;

2. *Reaffirms* its resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, and urges all the parties to extend their fullest co-operation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the speedy fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to him under that resolution."

— o —

### **Concern About Security Of Arabs Under Israel**

Text of resolution (252) adopted by the Security Council at its 1454th meeting held on 27 September 1968,

*"The Security Council,*

*Concerned* with the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 6 June 1967,

*Recalling* its resolution 237 of 14 June 1967,

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General, contained in document S/869, and appreciating his efforts in this connexion,

*Deploing* the delay in the implementation of resolution 237, (1967) because of the conditions still being set by Israel for receiving a special Representative of the Secretary-General,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch a special representative to the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967, and to report on the implementation of resolution 237 (1967),

2. *Requests* the Government of Israel to receive the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to co-operate with him and facilitate his work ;

3. *Recommends* that the Secretary-General be afforded all co-operation in his efforts to bring about the implementation of the present resolution and resolution 237 (1967),

### **Israeli Nine-Point Plan**

(Outlined by Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, in his speech before the General Assembly on October 8, 1968),

1. A full cease-fire followed by a peace "duly negotiated and contractually expressed".
2. Replacement of cease-fire lines by permanent boundaries;
3. Guarantees of the security of all parties;
4. Open frontiers with freedom of movement;
5. Freedom of navigation;
6. A joint conference on refugees to be called in advance of peace negotiations;
7. The placing of Muslim and Christian Holy Places in Jerusalem under the responsibility of those who hold them in reverence;
8. Contractual engagements among the area's nations, by name, recognizing the right to nationhood of each;
9. Regional co-operation looking toward a Middle East community of Sovereign States.

—o—

### **International Conference On Human Rights Resolution On Refugees**

*Text of Resolution no XIII adopted by the Conference at Teheran on May 12, 1968.*

#### *'International Conference On Human Rights'*

*Being guided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,*

*Having heard the statements made in the Conference with regard to the question of "Respect for and implementation of Human Rights in Occupied Territories", and noting the Note submitted by the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (Document A/CONF. 23/22),*

*Bearing in mind* the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 regarding the protection of civilian persons in time of war,

*Recalling* Security Council resolution 257 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2352 (ES-V) in which the Council and the Assembly considered that essential and inalienable rights should be respected even in times of war,

*Mindful* of the principle embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights regarding the right of everyone to return to his own country,

*Further recalling*

(a) Resolution 6 (XXIV) of the Commission on Human Rights affirming the rights of the inhabitants who have left since the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East to return, and that the Government concerned should take the necessary measures in order to facilitate the return of those inhabitants to their own country without delay,

(b) The telegram dispatched by the Commission on Human Rights on 9 March 1968, calling upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of Arab civilian population inhabiting areas occupied by Israel,

1. *Expresses* its grave concern for the violation of Human Rights in Arab territories occupied as a result of the 1967 hostilities;

2. *Draws the attention* of the Government of Israel to the grave consequences resulting from disregard of fundamental freedoms and Human Rights in occupied territories;

3. *Calls on* the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of Arab civilian population inhabiting areas occupied by Israel, and to respect and implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 in occupied territories;

4. *Affirms* the inalienable rights of all inhabitants who have left their homes as a result of the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle

East to return, resume normal life, recover their property and homes, and rejoin their families, according to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ;

5. *Requests* the General Assembly to appoint a special committee to investigate violations of Human Rights in the territories occupied by Israel and to report thereon ;

6. *Requests* the Commission on Human Rights to keep the matter under constant review.”

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## CHAPTER XI

### Refugees, Fedayeens And Maltreatment Of Arabs Under Israel

Over 900,000 persons, according to U.N. records, had left their homes in Israel by May 14, 1948. The ensuing years saw more Arabs expelled, particularly from the Beersheba District into Jordan and the Sinai to swell their ranks to 1,317,749 on June 30, 1966. The 1967 Israeli aggression and occupation of Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula and parts of Jordan and Syria resulted in the displacement of another 350,000 to 400,000 people from their homes under Israeli occupation of which some 245,000 entered East Jordan and another 100,000 Syria, the latter being looked after by the Syrian Government with the assistance of UN, the FAO, UNICEF and other organizations. Some 60,000 to 70,000 were estimated to have left Gaza strip and entered the UAR. The UNRWA budget for the year 1968 was estimated at \$ 47.5 m. The representative of Syria stated in the Political Committee in December 1967 that the income derived from refugee properties in Israel was five times the UNRWA budget. Besides the UN, 14 voluntary agencies were working in the region. Of the total refugees before the 1967 Israeli Aggression there were 706,568 in camps in Jordan, some 307, 245, in Gaza, 63,904 in Lebanon, and 140,032 in Syria.

Besides there were 540,000 self-supporting Palestinians in Jordan (650,000), Lebanon (50,000), Iraq (10,000), UAR, Libya etc (20,000) and other countries of the world (15,000) bringing the total number of Palestinians affected by the creation of Israel to 1,858,000 and over 2,200,2000 including those displaced in 1967. The Arab Governments had contributed over \$ 7,603,700 in 1965-66 in direct assistance to the refugees, according to the Commissioner-General of UNRWA as against total absence of any material contributions by the Israelis to the UNRWA relief.



Resolution 194 (iii) of the General Assembly of December 11, 1948 guarantees the refugees' right to return or compensation and it has been a ritual with the Assembly to reiterate it in resolutions extending UNRWA projects each year. Israel, however, flatly refuses to implement the resolution. It has also resisted attempts at the appointment of a Custodian-General for the evacuee property. It wants them to be absorbed in the economies of Arab countries. The Arab countries, although willing to accept those who want to settle there, have no such obligation enjoined on them under any resolution of the UN. Dr. John H. Davis, as Commissioner-General of the UNRWA declared in Geneva on January 18, 1961, that "an overwhelming majority of refugees wished to return to their homes under Israeli occupation and the Arab peoples refused to accept Israel as a permanent component of the Middle East." An Arab is intensely attached to his native place and considers it a grave misfortune to be buried elsewhere. One can understand the intensity of Arab feeling and resentment when one realizes, as stated by Rabbi R. Benjamin, that most of Israelis live on land robbed from Arabs while the owners are homeless and miserable. Arnold Toynbee characterized the treatment of the Arabs by Jews in 1947 as morally indefensible as the slaughter of 6000,000 Jews by the Nazis.

In direct violation of the November 29, 1947 resolution of the UN partitioning Israel, and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Arabs under Israeli occupation are subjected to abject racial and religious discrimination. Under the 'Law of Return' of 1950 and the Nationality Law of 1952 a Jew is entitled to immigrate into and acquire Israeli nationality the moment he steps into Israel. Moslem and Christian Arabs, on the other hand, have to become naturalized and are officially designated as class B citizens. Birth in Israel, residence for three out of five years prior to the date of application, sufficient knowledge of Hebrew, title to permanent residence, settlement or intention to settle permanently in the country are the conditions precedent to becoming a naturalized citizen and even then the Minister of Interior is invested with discretion to allow or reject an application. The fact that automatic citizenship rights are granted to an Arab of Jewish faith illustrates the nature of discrimination on religious grounds. The Arabs, including Members of Parliament have

strongly protested against the law which has no parallel anywhere in the world. The Arabs are not permitted to have political parties of their own, and their share in the administrative services is virtually negligent.

Military zones were created by Israelis and notorious Defence Emergency Regulations of 1945 were employed against Arabs to segregate them and restrict their movements. The Northern, Central, and Negeb zones with 130,000, 35,000 and 14,000 Arabs respectively fell into these zones. Military authorities were given draconian powers to restrict movements, banish Arabs and confiscate their properties. The decisions of the Military Courts were final. Whole villages such as Ikret and Kafr Bir'im were destroyed. Long curfews were imposed and even cemeteries desecrated. The Kafr Qasem massacre of 51 men women and children in 1956 provided a shocking instance of Israeli brutality.

A Land Acquisition Law replaced on March 10, 1953, the various emergency regulations to legalize past seizures and to ensure future acquisitions which was described as 'robbery of land from people' by Dr Schereshevsky of I'hud Party. By 1957, 40,000 Acres of Arab land and orchards had been confiscated. No land belonging to a Jew was acquired. Custodian of Absentee Property was vested with powers to determine compensation, not a penny of which had been paid to an agriculturist. A Law of Limitation enacted in 1958 requiring landowners to prove continuous, undisputed possession for 15 years, as against 10 years under the Ottomans and the British, or forfeit their land made the bulk of remnant Arab lands forfeit to the State, since most of the sales were unregistered and expulsion and migration of Arabs made difficult the production of evidence in support. Jews, in cases where court ordered return of Arab lands, resorted to the practice of dynamiting their homes and uprooting their fields to frustrate the decision.

Moslem religious wakfs have been placed under the administration of an Israeli Jew under the Israeli Jewish Ministry of Religious Affairs. Revenue accruing from Wakf property intended for religious and charitable purposes is collected by Israeli authorities and channelled into Government revenue in gross violation of the endowments and injunctions of the resolutions of the U.N.

Repression of Arabs has become intensified since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Under the pretext of maintaining law and order Israeli military started blowing up the homes of suspected Arab patriots and extended the practice to Jerusalem on March 6, 1968 which was denounced by the Mayor, Teddy Kollek. The Arabs in Gaza were subjected to particular humiliations, curfews, searches, detentions and fines. Some 838 acres of Jordanian Sector of Jerusalem between Mount Scopus and the former Armistice line bordering the Sanhedrin sector of Israeli Jerusalem were illegally expropriated on January 11, 1968. Another 29 acres near the Wailing Wall and 190 in Neve Yaakov in Arab Jerusalem to the north near the Kalandia airport were expropriated on April 19. Gaza was sealed off to Arab traffic on May 28. The UAR in a note on May 18, 1968 alleged that 3,000 to 4,000 Arabs were made to leave Gaza each week. The New York Times reported on July 18, 1968 that Israel was planning to set up para-military settlements along Jordan valley on the West Bank which would displace 14,000 Arabs. The designation of enemy territories as 'military occupied territories' was an attempt by Israel at annexation of Arab territories.

Israelis since June 1967 have also been guilty of desecration of religious places. Jordan informed the Security Council on Feb 23, 1968 that demolition work in Muslim quarter of Jerusalem constituted an encroachment on Aqsa mosque. Russian Orthodox Metropolitan, Nikodin, in Moscow on March 13, 1968 charged Israel with robbing the Gornesky monas'tery in Eiu Karim and elsewhere. King Feisal in an address to Mecca pilgrims said that Israel was dishonouring Muslim shrines in East Jerusalem. A detailed charge against the desecration of religious places was made in a letter dated October 22, 1968 (S/ 8864) by the Kuwaiti Permanent Representative to the U. N., Ambassador Mr. Muhalhel Mohamed Al Mudhaf. The letter presented photographic evidence of desecration of holy places including the Aqsa mosque whose main gate was gunned down, mosque of Omer with Israelis with flag in hand inside the courtyard; bombed churches of Anne and Augustus Victoria Hospital and desecrated Christian cemeteries. The Saudi Arabian Ambassador Al Sowayel told the General Assembly on October 12, 1968 that Israel had turned religious places into bars, cabarets and dance halls.

A Joint Arab Military Command comprising eight Palestinian organizations was announced in Cairo on January 20, 1968 to bring about the liquidation of Zionist State. Palestine Liberation Organization formed in 1964 "to consolidate the Palestine entity and as a vanguard for the collective Arab struggle for the liberation of Palestine, however did not attend the Cairo convention. A unified command of four liberation organizations in Jordan was, however, announced on November 17, 1968. These were : National Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Al Fateh), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Arab Nationalists) Saika, connected with Syrian Baathist Party and the Palestine Liberation Organization headed by Ahmad el Shukairi. The organizations setting up a joint command earlier included Palestine Liberation Front, Palestinians Revolution, Palestinian Revolutionary Youth Movement, the Vanguard for Palestine Liberation, Palestine Revolutionary Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Vanguard of Peoples War of Liberation. They set up three corps : El Asifah (Storm), El Saiqa (lightning) and Khalid Ibn Walid, named after a famous Arab Commander of Middle Ages.

Resistance within Israel has been steadily on the increase since June 1967. Arab women of late have taken active part in demonstrations against Israeli occupation. On July 25, 1968 Palestine Popular Struggle Organization and Liberal Youth of Jerusalem distributed leaflets against collaboration with Israel. Eight Judges refused to serve, and 25 religious leaders, including notable public officials, in a meeting in Aqsa mosque challenged the Religious Affairs Ministry's right to deal with Muslim religious activities and declared that Arabs did not recognize the annexation of old city of Jerusalem. Israel retorted with mass arrests and banishment of four notables. Fortyfive minutes of rioting and looting by Jews of Arabs followed. Al Fateh activity in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv-targets of bomb attacks. But the Israeli repression has served only to enthuse new life and vigour into local resisters, and Fedayeens (partiotis prepared to sacrifice their lives) whose struggle appears to be entering a crucial stage at the moment.

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END

on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to in Section B, Paragraph, I, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated.

2. During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.

#### F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

### PART II. BOUNDARIES

#### A. *The Arab State*

The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. Thence it follows the western boundary line of the villages of 'Alma, Rihaniya, and Teitaba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to join the Acre-Safad sub-district boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of El Sammu'i village and joins it again at the northernmost point of Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafr I'nān village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre sub-district boundary line,

passing to the west of the Acre-Safad and Lubiya-Kafr I'nān roads. From the southwest corner of Kafr I'nān village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias sub-district to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.

The boundary rejoins the Tiberias sub-district boundary at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south east of the built up area of Tur'an, thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the north-west corner of these lands, whence it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west corner whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula Railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection.

The south-western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar 'ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of 'Ilut, thence westwards along the village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north-eastern corner of Waldheim, thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa 'Amar to the north-eastern corner of Ramat Yohanan. From here it runs due north-east to a point on the Shafa 'Amar-Haifa road, west of its junction with the road to I'Billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of I'Billin situated to the west of the I'Billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary of its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village